Volume 1, Number 3

August 1985

A publication for the members of SOR

NOTES FROM PETER GORDON

Hey, get those rhinos away from my Lear jet. Early this

spring, Thomas Jukes, Professor of Biophysics at UC Berkeley, and

indefatigable anti-creationist, wrote (in a letter to Kevin Wirth,

SOR Director of Research) that creationists who denied "the

overwhelming molecular evidence for evolution" lacked "scientific

credibility" and could be "compared to rhinoceroses wandering

through a jet-airplane factory."

Jukes wrote, further, of the "beauties

of modern discoveries in molecular evolution," a

sentiment he shares with many other evolutionists: it is widely

believed that the data found in theories of molecular evolution

provide exactly the sort of hard evidence the general theory of

evolution requires. Bernard Davis (Bacterial Physiology Unit,

Harvard Medical School) put the matter very plainly, when he wrote

recently:

In most of its development evolutionary biology has depended

on morphological homologies, both in the fossil record and

among living species; but this approach has not revealed the

continuum of transition forms between species that Darwin

predicted.

Moreover, while he expected further research in

paleontology to fill in the gaps, we no longer entertain that

hope. But now, at last, molecular genetics has provided a

direct, radically different kind of evidence for such

continuity...Not only does molecular genetics provide the

most convincing evidence for evolutionary continuity, but

this evidence should impress a public that is well aware of

the power of this science in other areas. ("Molecular

Genetics and the Foundations of Evolution", Perspectives in

Biology and Medicine, vol. 28: pp. 252-253, Winter 1985)

It is clear that Jukes and Davis, among many others, hope that

the molecular evidence will explain--and persuade--where other

evidence has failed. But several puzzles have emerged from the

study of molecular genetics, puzzles which ought to dampen the

enthusiastic claims made for the evidence.

A number of these puzzles are examined in a recent paper by

Paul Erbrich (Hochschule fur Philosophie, Munich), "On the

Probability of the Emergence of a Protein with a Particular

Function," Acta Biotheoretica, vol. 34: pp. 53-80, 1985. Erbrich

writes, in the abstract:

Proteins with nearly the same structure and function

(homologous proteins) are found in increasing numbers in

phylogenetically different, even very distant taxa

(e.g. hemoglobins in vertebrates, in some invertebrates, and

even in certain plants)...

The probability...of the convergent

evolution of two proteins with approximately the same

structure and function is too low to be plausible, even when

all possible circumstances are present which seem to heighten

the likelihood of such a convergence. If this is so, then

the plausibility of a random evolution of two or more

different but functionally related proteins seems hardly

greater. (p. 53)

The bulk of Erbrich's paper is devoted to a careful, critical

quantitative analysis of the likelihood of molecular evolution.

In his conclusions, however, he points out that some larger

issues are involved:

The probability for the de novo emergence of a particular

protein by chance alone is extremely small, even for a very

imperfect one...Why then does the scientific theory of

evolution hold on to the concept of chance to the degree it

does?

I suspect it is the fact that there is no alternative

whatsoever which could explain the fact of universal

evolution, at least in principle, and be formulated within

the framework of natural science. If no alternative should

be forthcoming, if chance remains overtaxed, then the

conclusion seems inevitable that evolution and therefore

living beings cannot be grasped by natural science to the

same extent as non-living things--not because organisms are

so complex, but because the explaining mechanism is

fundamentally inadequate. (pp. 77-78)

Recent Work from Australia. Question: will Michael Ruse

ever have a (semi) kind word to say about creationism, or the

work of creationists?

Answer: probably no time soon. But in a review published in

New Scientist, 13 June 1985, p. 33, he did see fit to call the

theory of creation a "paradigm," a nearly respectable term, quite

a distance from some of Ruse's earlier judgments (such as

"Scientific Creationism is not just wrong: it is ludicrously

implausible.

It is a grotesque parody of human thought, and a

downright misuse of human intelligence." Darwinism Defended,

p. 303) Ruse was reviewing Evolution: A Theory in Crisis, by

Michael Denton, an Australian molecular biologist (Burnett Books,

pp. 368). As far as I am aware, the book has not yet found an

American publisher; SOR will be attempting to obtain a copy for

review.

Denton's book sounds very interesting, although it "produces a

rather dreary sense of deja vu" in Ruse. According to Ruse,

Denton "gives us much critical writing about paths (of change),

which is then generalised, even to the fact of evolution." Ruse

denies that "questions about mechanism" cast any doubt "on the

fact of evolution."

I have to disagree. While once I might have

agreed, this answer (which aims at preserving the mysterious fact

of evolution) seems to me to be increasingly barren, a mere

dodge.

Evolution is, if anything, a theory of transformation,

and transformation requires a mechanism. The connection between

the postulated mechanisms of evolution, and its status as fact,

is critical, far more than many evolutionists care to admit.

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