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Question: 59 [<< | >>]
In the next place we must treat of things concerning the will of the
angels. In the first place we shall treat of the will itself; secondly,
of its movement, which is love. Under the first heading there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is will in the angels?
(2) Whether the will of the angel is his nature, or his intellect?
(3) Is there free-will in the angels?
(4) Is there an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in them?
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Question: 59 [<< | >>]
Article: 1 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no will in the angels. For as the
Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 42), "The will is in the reason."
But there is no reason in the angels, but something higher than reason.
Therefore there is no will in the angels, but something higher than the
will.
Objection 2: Further, the will is comprised under the appetite, as is evident
from the Philosopher (De Anima iii, text. 42). But the appetite argues
something imperfect; because it is a desire of something not as yet
possessed. Therefore, since there is no imperfection in the angels,
especially in the blessed ones, it seems that there is no will in them.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, text. 54) that the
will is a mover which is moved; for it is moved by the appetible object
understood. Now the angels are immovable, since they are incorporeal.
Therefore there is no will in the angels.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11,12) that the image of
the Trinity is found in the soul according to memory, understanding, and
will. But God's image is found not only in the soul of man, but also in
the angelic mind, since it also is capable of knowing God. Therefore
there is will in the angels.
I answer that, We must necessarily place a will in the angels. In
evidence thereof, it must be borne in mind that, since all things flow
from the Divine will, all things in their own way are inclined by
appetite towards good, but in different ways. Some are inclined to good
by their natural inclination, without knowledge, as plants and inanimate
bodies. Such inclination towards good is called "a natural appetite."
Others, again, are inclined towards good, but with some knowledge; not
that they know the aspect of goodness, but that they apprehend some
particular good; as in the sense, which knows the sweet, the white, and
so on. The inclination which follows this apprehension is called "a
sensitive appetite." Other things, again, have an inclination towards
good, but with a knowledge whereby they perceive the aspect of goodness;
this belongs to the intellect. This is most perfectly inclined towards
what is good; not, indeed, as if it were merely guided by another towards
some particular good only, like things devoid of knowledge, nor towards
some particular good only, as things which have only sensitive knowledge,
but as inclined towards good in general. Such inclination is termed
"will." Accordingly, since the angels by their intellect know the
universal aspect of goodness, it is manifest that there is a will in them.
Reply to Objection 1: Reason surpasses sense in a different way from that in which intellect surpasses reason. Reason surpasses sense according to the diversity of the objects known; for sense judges of particular objects, while reason judges of universals. Therefore there must be one appetite tending towards good in the abstract, which appetite belongs to reason; and another with a tendency towards particular good, which appetite belongs to sense. But intellect and reason differ as to their manner of knowing; because the intellect knows by simple intuition, while reason knows by a process of discursion from one thing to another. Nevertheless by such discursion reason comes to know what intellect learns without it, namely, the universal. Consequently the object presented to the appetitive faculty on the part of reason and on the part of intellect is the same. Therefore in the angels, who are purely intellectual, there is no appetite higher than the will.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the name of the appetitive part is derived from
seeking things not yet possessed, yet the appetitive part reaches out not
to these things only, but also to many other things; thus the name of a
stone [lapis] is derived from injuring the foot [laesione pedis], though
not this alone belongs to a stone. In the same way the irascible faculty
is so denominated from anger [ira]; though at the same time there are
several other passions in it, as hope, daring, and the rest.
Reply to Objection 3: The will is called a mover which is moved, according as to
will and to understand are termed movements of a kind; and there is
nothing to prevent movement of this kind from existing in the angels,
since such movement is the act of a perfect agent, as stated in De Anima
iii, text. 28.
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Question: 59 [<< | >>]
Article: 2 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that in the angel the will does not differ from the
intellect and from the nature. For an angel is more simple than a natural
body. But a natural body is inclined through its form towards its end,
which is its good. Therefore much more so is the angel. Now the angel's
form is either the nature in which he subsists, or else it is some
species within his intellect. Therefore the angel inclines towards the
good through his own nature, or through an intelligible species. But such
inclination towards the good belongs to the will. Therefore the will of
the angel does not differ from his nature or his intellect.
Objection 2: Further, the object of the intellect is the true, while the
object of the will is the good. Now the good and the true differ, not
really but only logically [*Cf. Question [16], Article [4]]. Therefore will and
intellect are not really different.
Objection 3: Further, the distinction of common and proper does not
differentiate the faculties; for the same power of sight perceives color
and whiteness. But the good and the true seem to be mutually related as
common to particular; for the true is a particular good, to wit, of the
intellect. Therefore the will, whose object is the good, does not differ
from the intellect, whose object is the true.
On the contrary, The will in the angels regards good things only, while
their intellect regards both good and bad things, for they know both.
Therefore the will of the angels is distinct from their intellect.
I answer that, In the angels the will is a special faculty or power,
which is neither their nature nor their intellect. That it is not their
nature is manifest from this, that the nature or essence of a thing is
completely comprised within it: whatever, then, extends to anything
beyond it, is not its essence. Hence we see in natural bodies that the
inclination to being does not come from anything superadded to the
essence, but from the matter which desires being before possessing it,
and from the form which keeps it in such being when once it exists. But
the inclination towards something extrinsic comes from something
superadded to the essence; as tendency to a place comes from gravity or
lightness, while the inclination to make something like itself comes from
the active qualities.
Now the will has a natural tendency towards good. Consequently there
alone are essence and will identified where all good is contained within
the essence of him who wills; that is to say, in God, Who wills nothing
beyond Himself except on account of His goodness. This cannot be said of
any creature, because infinite goodness is quite foreign to the nature of
any created thing. Accordingly, neither the will of the angel, nor that
of any creature, can be the same thing as its essence.
In like manner neither can the will be the same thing as the intellect
of angel or man. Because knowledge comes about in so far as the object
known is within the knower; consequently the intellect extends itself to
what is outside it, according as what, in its essence, is outside it is
disposed to be somehow within it. On the other hand, the will goes out to
what is beyond it, according as by a kind of inclination it tends, in a
manner, to what is outside it. Now it belongs to one faculty to have
within itself something which is outside it, and to another faculty to
tend to what is outside it. Consequently intellect and will must
necessarily be different powers in every creature. It is not so with God,
for He has within Himself universal being, and the universal good.
Therefore both intellect and will are His nature.
Reply to Objection 1: A natural body is moved to its own being by its substantial
form: while it is inclined to something outside by something additional,
as has been said.
Reply to Objection 2: Faculties are not differentiated by any material difference
of their objects, but according to their formal distinction, which is
taken from the nature of the object as such. Consequently the diversity
derived from the notion of good and true suffices for the difference of
intellect from will.
Reply to Objection 3: Because the good and the true are really convertible, it
follows that the good is apprehended by the intellect as something true;
while the true is desired by the will as something good. Nevertheless,
the diversity of their aspects is sufficient for diversifying the
faculties, as was said above (ad 2).
Index [<< | >>]
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Question: 59 [<< | >>]
Article: 3 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no free-will in the angels. For the
act of free-will is to choose. But there can be no choice with the
angels, because choice is "the desire of something after taking counsel,"
while counsel is "a kind of inquiry," as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. But
the angels' knowledge is not the result of inquiring, for this belongs to
the discursiveness of reason. Therefore it appears that there is no
free-will in the angels.
Objection 2: Further, free-will implies indifference to alternatives. But in
the angels on the part of their intellect there is no such indifference;
because, as was observed already (Question [58], Article [5]), their intellect is not
deceived as to things which are naturally intelligible to them. Therefore
neither on the part of their appetitive faculty can there be free-will.
Objection 3: Further, the natural endowments of the angels belong to them
according to degrees of more or less; because in the higher angels the
intellectual nature is more perfect than in the lower. But the free-will
does not admit of degrees. Therefore there is no free-will in them.
On the contrary, Free-will is part of man's dignity. But the angels'
dignity surpasses that of men. Therefore, since free-will is in men, with
much more reason is it in the angels.
I answer that, Some things there are which act, not from any previous
judgment, but, as it were, moved and made to act by others; just as the
arrow is directed to the target by the archer. Others act from some kind
of judgment; but not from free-will, such as irrational animals; for the
sheep flies from the wolf by a kind of judgment whereby it esteems it to
be hurtful to itself: such a judgment is not a free one, but implanted by
nature. Only an agent endowed with an intellect can act with a judgment
which is free, in so far as it apprehends the common note of goodness;
from which it can judge this or the other thing to be good. Consequently,
wherever there is intellect, there is free-will. It is therefore manifest
that just as there is intellect, so is there free-will in the angels, and
in a higher degree of perfection than in man.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of choice, as it is in man. As
a man's estimate in speculative matters differs from an angel's in this,
that the one needs not to inquire, while the other does so need; so is it
in practical matters. Hence there is choice in the angels, yet not with
the inquisitive deliberation of counsel, but by the sudden acceptance of
truth.
Reply to Objection 2: As was observed already (Article [2]), knowledge is effected by
the presence of the known within the knower. Now it is a mark of
imperfection in anything not to have within it what it should naturally
have. Consequently an angel would not be perfect in his nature, if his
intellect were not determined to every truth which he can know naturally.
But the act of the appetitive faculty comes of this, that the affection
is directed to something outside. Yet the perfection of a thing does not
come from everything to which it is inclined, but only from something
which is higher than it. Therefore it does not argue imperfection in an
angel if his will be not determined with regard to things beneath him;
but it would argue imperfection in him, with he to be indeterminate to
what is above him.
Reply to Objection 3: Free-will exists in a nobler manner in the higher angels
than it does in the lower, as also does the judgment of the intellect.
Yet it is true that liberty, in so far as the removal of compulsion is
considered, is not susceptible of greater and less degree; because
privations and negations are not lessened nor increased directly of
themselves; but only by their cause, or through the addition of some
qualification.
Index [<< | >>]
First Part [<< | >>]
Question: 59 [<< | >>]
Article: 4 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that there is an irascible and a concupiscible
appetite in the angels. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that in the
demons there is "unreasonable fury and wild concupiscence." But demons
are of the same nature as angels; for sin has not altered their nature.
Therefore there is an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in the
angels.
Objection 2: Further, love and joy are in the concupiscible; while anger,
hope, and fear are in the irascible appetite. But in the Sacred
Scriptures these things are attributed both to the good and to the wicked
angels. Therefore there is an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in
the angels.
Objection 3: Further, some virtues are said to reside in the irascible
appetite and some in the concupiscible: thus charity and temperance
appear to be in the concupiscible, while hope and fortitude are in the
irascible. But these virtues are in the angels. Therefore there is both a
concupiscible and an irascible appetite in the angels.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 42) that the
irascible and concupiscible are in the sensitive part, which does not
exist in angels. Consequently there is no irascible or concupiscible
appetite in the angels.
I answer that, The intellective appetite is not divided into irascible
and concupiscible; only the sensitive appetite is so divided. The reason
of this is because, since the faculties are distinguished from one
another not according to the material but only by the formal distinction
of objects, if to any faculty there respond an object according to some
common idea, there will be no distinction of faculties according to the
diversity of the particular things contained under that common idea. Just
as if the proper object of the power of sight be color as such, then
there are not several powers of sight distinguished according to the
difference of black and white: whereas if the proper object of any
faculty were white, as white, then the faculty of seeing white would be
distinguished from the faculty of seeing black.
Now it is quite evident from what has been said (Article [1]; Question [16], Article [1]),
that the object of the intellective appetite, otherwise known as the
will, is good according to the common aspect of goodness; nor can there
be any appetite except of what is good. Hence, in the intellective part,
the appetite is not divided according to the distinction of some
particular good things, as the sensitive appetite is divided, which does
not crave for what is good according to its common aspect, but for some
particular good object. Accordingly, since there exists in the angels
only an intellective appetite, their appetite is not distinguished into
irascible and concupiscible, but remains undivided; and it is called the
will.
Reply to Objection 1: Fury and concupiscence are metaphorically said to be in the
demons, as anger is sometimes attributed to God;---on account of the
resemblance in the effect.
Reply to Objection 2: Love and joy, in so far as they are passions, are in the
concupiscible appetite, but in so far as they express a simple act of the
will, they are in the intellective part: in this sense to love is to wish
well to anyone; and to be glad is for the will to repose in some good
possessed. Universally speaking, none of these things is said of the
angels, as by way of passions; as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix).
Reply to Objection 3: Charity, as a virtue, is not in the concupiscible appetite,
but in the will; because the object of the concupiscible appetite is the
good as delectable to the senses. But the Divine goodness, which is the
object of charity, is not of any such kind. For the same reason it must
be said that hope does not exist in the irascible appetite; because the
object of the irascible appetite is something arduous belonging to the
sensible order, which the virtue of hope does not regard; since the
object of hope is arduous and divine. Temperance, however, considered as
a human virtue, deals with the desires of sensible pleasures, which
belong to the concupiscible faculty. Similarly, fortitude regulates
daring and fear, which reside in the irascible part. Consequently
temperance, in so far as it is a human virtue, resides in the
concupiscible part, and fortitude in the irascible. But they do not exist
in the angels in this manner. For in them there are no passions of
concupiscence, nor of fear and daring, to be regulated by temperance and
fortitude. But temperance is predicated of them according as in
moderation they display their will in conformity with the Divine will.
Fortitude is likewise attributed to them, in so far as they firmly carry
out the Divine will. All of this is done by their will, and not by the
irascible or concupiscible appetite.