Sister Projects: Wikichristian | WikiMD
BelieversCafe is a large collection of christian articles with over 40,000 pages
Our sponsors:
Index [<< | >>]
First Part of the Second Part [<< | >>]
Question: 1 [<< | >>]
In this matter we shall consider first the last end of human life; and
secondly, those things by means of which man may advance towards this
end, or stray from the path: for the end is the rule of whatever is
ordained to the end. And since the last end of human life is stated to be
happiness, we must consider (1) the last end in general; (2) happiness.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it belongs to man to act for an end?
(2) Whether this is proper to the rational nature?
(3) Whether a man's actions are specified by their end?
(4) Whether there is any last end of human life?
(5) Whether one man can have several last ends?
(6) Whether man ordains all to the last end?
(7) Whether all men have the same last end?
(8) Whether all other creatures concur with man in that last end?
Index [<< | >>]
First Part of the Second Part [<< | >>]
Question: 1 [<< | >>]
Article: 1 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to man to act for an end.
For a cause is naturally first. But an end, in its very name, implies
something that is last. Therefore an end is not a cause. But that for
which a man acts, is the cause of his action; since this preposition
"for" indicates a relation of causality. Therefore it does not belong to
man to act for an end.
Objection 2: Further, that which is itself the last end is not for an end. But
in some cases the last end is an action, as the Philosopher states
(Ethic. i, 1). Therefore man does not do everything for an end.
Objection 3: Further, then does a man seem to act for an end, when he acts
deliberately. But man does many things without deliberation, sometimes
not even thinking of what he is doing; for instance when one moves one's
foot or hand, or scratches one's beard, while intent on something else.
Therefore man does not do everything for an end.
On the contrary, All things contained in a genus are derived from the
principle of that genus. Now the end is the principle in human
operations, as the Philosopher states (Phys. ii, 9). Therefore it belongs
to man to do everything for an end.
I answer that, Of actions done by man those alone are properly called
"human," which are proper to man as man. Now man differs from irrational
animals in this, that he is master of his actions. Wherefore those
actions alone are properly called human, of which man is master. Now man
is master of his actions through his reason and will; whence, too, the
free-will is defined as "the faculty and will of reason." Therefore those
actions are properly called human which proceed from a deliberate will.
And if any other actions are found in man, they can be called actions "of
a man," but not properly "human" actions, since they are not proper to
man as man. Now it is clear that whatever actions proceed from a power,
are caused by that power in accordance with the nature of its object. But
the object of the will is the end and the good. Therefore all human
actions must be for an end.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the end be last in the order of execution, yet it
is first in the order of the agent's intention. And it is this way that
it is a cause.
Reply to Objection 2: If any human action be the last end, it must be voluntary,
else it would not be human, as stated above. Now an action is voluntary
in one of two ways: first, because it is commanded by the will, e.g. to
walk, or to speak; secondly, because it is elicited by the will, for
instance the very act of willing. Now it is impossible for the very act
elicited by the will to be the last end. For the object of the will is
the end, just as the object of sight is color: wherefore just as the
first visible cannot be the act of seeing, because every act of seeing is
directed to a visible object; so the first appetible, i.e. the end,
cannot be the very act of willing. Consequently it follows that if a
human action be the last end, it must be an action commanded by the will:
so that there, some action of man, at least the act of willing, is for
the end. Therefore whatever a man does, it is true to say that man acts
for an end, even when he does that action in which the last end consists.
Reply to Objection 3: Such like actions are not properly human actions; since
they do not proceed from deliberation of the reason, which is the proper
principle of human actions. Therefore they have indeed an imaginary end,
but not one that is fixed by reason.
Index [<< | >>]
First Part of the Second Part [<< | >>]
Question: 1 [<< | >>]
Article: 2 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that it is proper to the rational nature to act for
an end. For man, to whom it belongs to act for an end, never acts for an
unknown end. On the other hand, there are many things that have no
knowledge of an end; either because they are altogether without
knowledge, as insensible creatures: or because they do not apprehend the
idea of an end as such, as irrational animals. Therefore it seems proper
to the rational nature to act for an end.
Objection 2: Further, to act for an end is to order one's action to an end.
But this is the work of reason. Therefore it does not belong to things
that lack reason.
Objection 3: Further, the good and the end is the object of the will. But "the
will is in the reason" (De Anima iii, 9). Therefore to act for an end
belongs to none but a rational nature.
On the contrary, The Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 5) that "not only
mind but also nature acts for an end."
I answer that, Every agent, of necessity, acts for an end. For if, in a
number of causes ordained to one another, the first be removed, the
others must, of necessity, be removed also. Now the first of all causes
is the final cause. The reason of which is that matter does not receive
form, save in so far as it is moved by an agent; for nothing reduces
itself from potentiality to act. But an agent does not move except out of
intention for an end. For if the agent were not determinate to some
particular effect, it would not do one thing rather than another:
consequently in order that it produce a determinate effect, it must, of
necessity, be determined to some certain one, which has the nature of an
end. And just as this determination is effected, in the rational nature,
by the "rational appetite," which is called the will; so, in other
things, it is caused by their natural inclination, which is called the
"natural appetite."
Nevertheless it must be observed that a thing tends to an end, by its action or movement, in two ways: first, as a thing, moving itself to the end, as man; secondly, as a thing moved by another to the end, as an arrow tends to a determinate end through being moved by the archer who directs his action to the end. Therefore those things that are possessed of reason, move themselves to an end; because they have dominion over their actions through their free-will, which is the "faculty of will and reason." But those things that lack reason tend to an end, by natural inclination, as being moved by another and not by themselves; since they do not know the nature of an end as such, and consequently cannot ordain anything to an end, but can be ordained to an end only by another. For the entire irrational nature is in comparison to God as an instrument to the principal agent, as stated above (FP, Question [22], Article [2], ad 4; FP, Question [103], Article [1], ad 3). Consequently it is proper to the rational nature to tend to an end, as directing [agens] and leading itself to the end: whereas it is proper to the irrational nature to tend to an end, as directed or led by another, whether it apprehend the end, as do irrational animals, or do not apprehend it, as is the case of those things which are altogether void of knowledge.
Reply to Objection 1: When a man of himself acts for an end, he knows the end:
but when he is directed or led by another, for instance, when he acts at
another's command, or when he is moved under another's compulsion, it is
not necessary that he should know the end. And it is thus with irrational
creatures.
Reply to Objection 2: To ordain towards an end belongs to that which directs
itself to an end: whereas to be ordained to an end belongs to that which
is directed by another to an end. And this can belong to an irrational
nature, but owing to some one possessed of reason.
Reply to Objection 3: The object of the will is the end and the good in
universal. Consequently there can be no will in those things that lack
reason and intellect, since they cannot apprehend the universal; but they
have a natural appetite or a sensitive appetite, determinate to some
particular good. Now it is clear that particular causes are moved by a
universal cause: thus the governor of a city, who intends the common
good, moves, by his command, all the particular departments of the city.
Consequently all things that lack reason are, of necessity, moved to
their particular ends by some rational will which extends to the
universal good, namely by the Divine will.
Index [<< | >>]
First Part of the Second Part [<< | >>]
Question: 1 [<< | >>]
Article: 3 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that human acts are not specified by their end. For
the end is an extrinsic cause. But everything is specified by an
intrinsic principle. Therefore human acts are not specified by their end.
Objection 2: Further, that which gives a thing its species should exist before
it. But the end comes into existence afterwards. Therefore a human act
does not derive its species from the end.
Objection 3: Further, one thing cannot be in more than one species. But one
and the same act may happen to be ordained to various ends. Therefore the
end does not give the species to human acts.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Mor. Eccl. et Manich. ii, 13):
"According as their end is worthy of blame or praise so are our deeds
worthy of blame or praise."
I answer that Each thing receives its species in respect of an act and
not in respect of potentiality; wherefore things composed of matter and
form are established in their respective species by their own forms. And
this is also to be observed in proper movements. For since movements are,
in a way, divided into action and passion, each of these receives its
species from an act; action indeed from the act which is the principle of
acting, and passion from the act which is the terminus of the movement.
Wherefore heating, as an action, is nothing else than a certain movement
proceeding from heat, while heating as a passion is nothing else than a
movement towards heat: and it is the definition that shows the specific
nature. And either way, human acts, whether they be considered as
actions, or as passions, receive their species from the end. For human
acts can be considered in both ways, since man moves himself, and is
moved by himself. Now it has been stated above (Article [1]) that acts are
called human, inasmuch as they proceed from a deliberate will. Now the
object of the will is the good and the end. And hence it is clear that
the principle of human acts, in so far as they are human, is the end. In
like manner it is their terminus: for the human act terminates at that
which the will intends as the end; thus in natural agents the form of the
thing generated is conformed to the form of the generator. And since, as
Ambrose says (Prolog. super Luc.) "morality is said properly of man,"
moral acts properly speaking receive their species from the end, for
moral acts are the same as human acts.
Reply to Objection 1: The end is not altogether extrinsic to the act, because it
is related to the act as principle or terminus; and thus it just this
that is essential to an act, viz. to proceed from something, considered
as action, and to proceed towards something, considered as passion.
Reply to Objection 2: The end, in so far as it pre-exists in the intention,
pertains to the will, as stated above (Article [1], ad 1). And it is thus that
it gives the species to the human or moral act.
Reply to Objection 3: One and the same act, in so far as it proceeds once from
the agent, is ordained to but one proximate end, from which it has its
species: but it can be ordained to several remote ends, of which one is
the end of the other. It is possible, however, that an act which is one
in respect of its natural species, be ordained to several ends of the
will: thus this act "to kill a man," which is but one act in respect of
its natural species, can be ordained, as to an end, to the safeguarding
of justice, and to the satisfying of anger: the result being that there
would be several acts in different species of morality: since in one way
there will be an act of virtue, in another, an act of vice. For a
movement does not receive its species from that which is its terminus
accidentally, but only from that which is its "per se" terminus. Now
moral ends are accidental to a natural thing, and conversely the relation
to a natural end is accidental to morality. Consequently there is no
reason why acts which are the same considered in their natural species,
should not be diverse, considered in their moral species, and conversely.
Index [<< | >>]
First Part of the Second Part [<< | >>]
Question: 1 [<< | >>]
Article: 4 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no last end of human life, but that
we proceed to infinity. For good is essentially diffusive, as Dionysius
states (Div. Nom. iv). Consequently if that which proceeds from good is
itself good, the latter must needs diffuse some other good: so that the
diffusion of good goes on indefinitely. But good has the nature of an
end. Therefore there is an indefinite series of ends.
Objection 2: Further, things pertaining to the reason can be multiplied to
infinity: thus mathematical quantities have no limit. For the same reason
the species of numbers are infinite, since, given any number, the reason
can think of one yet greater. But desire of the end is consequent on the
apprehension of the reason. Therefore it seems that there is also an
infinite series of ends.
Objection 3: Further, the good and the end is the object of the will. But the
will can react on itself an infinite number of times: for I can will
something, and will to will it, and so on indefinitely. Therefore there
is an infinite series of ends of the human will, and there is no last end
of the human will.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, 2) that "to suppose a
thing to be indefinite is to deny that it is good." But the good is that
which has the nature of an end. Therefore it is contrary to the nature of
an end to proceed indefinitely. Therefore it is necessary to fix one last
end.
I answer that, Absolutely speaking, it is not possible to proceed
indefinitely in the matter of ends, from any point of view. For in
whatsoever things there is an essential order of one to another, if the
first be removed, those that are ordained to the first, must of necessity
be removed also. Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 5) that we
cannot proceed to infinitude in causes of movement, because then there
would be no first mover, without which neither can the others move, since
they move only through being moved by the first mover. Now there is to be
observed a twofold order in ends---the order of intention and the order
of execution: and in either of these orders there must be something
first. For that which is first in the order of intention, is the
principle, as it were, moving the appetite; consequently, if you remove
this principle, there will be nothing to move the appetite. On the other
hand, the principle in execution is that wherein operation has its
beginning; and if this principle be taken away, no one will begin to
work. Now the principle in the intention is the last end; while the
principle in execution is the first of the things which are ordained to
the end. Consequently, on neither side is it possible to go to infinity
since if there were no last end, nothing would be desired, nor would any
action have its term, nor would the intention of the agent be at rest;
while if there is no first thing among those that are ordained to the
end, none would begin to work at anything, and counsel would have no
term, but would continue indefinitely.
On the other hand, nothing hinders infinity from being in things that
are ordained to one another not essentially but accidentally; for
accidental causes are indeterminate. And in this way it happens that
there is an accidental infinity of ends, and of things ordained to the
end.
Reply to Objection 1: The very nature of good is that something flows from it,
but not that it flows from something else. Since, therefore, good has the
nature of end, and the first good is the last end, this argument does not
prove that there is no last end; but that from the end, already supposed,
we may proceed downwards indefinitely towards those things that are
ordained to the end. And this would be true if we considered but the
power of the First Good, which is infinite. But, since the First Good
diffuses itself according to the intellect, to which it is proper to flow
forth into its effects according to a certain fixed form; it follows that
there is a certain measure to the flow of good things from the First Good
from Which all other goods share the power of diffusion. Consequently the
diffusion of goods does not proceed indefinitely but, as it is written
(Wis. 11:21), God disposes all things "in number, weight and measure."
Reply to Objection 2: In things which are of themselves, reason begins from
principles that are known naturally, and advances to some term. Wherefore
the Philosopher proves (Poster. i, 3) that there is no infinite process
in demonstrations, because there we find a process of things having an
essential, not an accidental, connection with one another. But in those
things which are accidentally connected, nothing hinders the reason from
proceeding indefinitely. Now it is accidental to a stated quantity or
number, as such, that quantity or unity be added to it. Wherefore in such
like things nothing hinders the reason from an indefinite process.
Reply to Objection 3: This multiplication of acts of the will reacting on itself,
is accidental to the order of ends. This is clear from the fact that in
regard to one and the same end, the will reacts on itself indifferently
once or several times.
Index [<< | >>]
First Part of the Second Part [<< | >>]
Question: 1 [<< | >>]
Article: 5 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem possible for one man's will to be directed at the
same time to several things, as last ends. For Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei xix, 1) that some held man's last end to consist in four things, viz.
"in pleasure, repose, the gifts of nature, and virtue." But these are
clearly more than one thing. Therefore one man can place the last end of
his will in many things.
Objection 2: Further, things not in opposition to one another do not exclude
one another. Now there are many things which are not in opposition to one
another. Therefore the supposition that one thing is the last end of the
will does not exclude others.
Objection 3: Further, by the fact that it places its last end in one thing, the will does not lose its freedom. But before it placed its last end in that thing, e.g. pleasure, it could place it in something else, e.g. riches. Therefore even after having placed his last end in pleasure, a man can at the same time place his last end in riches. Therefore it is possible for one man's will to be directed at the same time to several things, as last ends.
On the contrary, That in which a man rests as in his last end, is master
of his affections, since he takes therefrom his entire rule of life.
Hence of gluttons it is written (@Phil. 3:19): "Whose god is their belly":
viz. because they place their last end in the pleasures of the belly. Now
according to Mt. 6:24, "No man can serve two masters," such, namely, as
are not ordained to one another. Therefore it is impossible for one man
to have several last ends not ordained to one another.
I answer that, It is impossible for one man's will to be directed at the
same time to diverse things, as last ends. Three reasons may be assigned
for this. First, because, since everything desires its own perfection, a
man desires for his ultimate end, that which he desires as his perfect
and crowning good. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 1): "In speaking of
the end of good we mean now, not that it passes away so as to be no more,
but that it is perfected so as to be complete." It is therefore necessary
for the last end so to fill man's appetite, that nothing is left besides
it for man to desire. Which is not possible, if something else be
required for his perfection. Consequently it is not possible for the
appetite so to tend to two things, as though each were its perfect good.
The second reason is because, just as in the process of reasoning, the
principle is that which is naturally known, so in the process of the
rational appetite, i.e. the will, the principle needs to be that which is
naturally desired. Now this must needs be one: since nature tends to one
thing only. But the principle in the process of the rational appetite is
the last end. Therefore that to which the will tends, as to its last end,
is one.
The third reason is because, since voluntary actions receive their
species from the end, as stated above (Article [3]), they must needs receive
their genus from the last end, which is common to them all: just as
natural things are placed in a genus according to a common form. Since,
then, all things that can be desired by the will, belong, as such, to one
genus, the last end must needs be one. And all the more because in every
genus there is one first principle; and the last end has the nature of a
first principle, as stated above. Now as the last end of man, simply as
man, is to the whole human race, so is the last end of any individual man
to that individual. Therefore, just as of all men there is naturally one
last end, so the will of an individual man must be fixed on one last end.
Reply to Objection 1: All these several objects were considered as one perfect
good resulting therefrom, by those who placed in them the last end.
Reply to Objection 2: Although it is possible to find several things which are not in opposition to one another, yet it is contrary to a thing's perfect good, that anything besides be required for that thing's perfection.
Reply to Objection 3: The power of the will does not extend to making opposites
exist at the same time. Which would be the case were it to tend to
several diverse objects as last ends, as has been shown above (ad 2).
Index [<< | >>]
First Part of the Second Part [<< | >>]
Question: 1 [<< | >>]
Article: 6 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that man does not will all, whatsoever he wills,
for the last end. For things ordained to the last end are said to be
serious matter, as being useful. But jests are foreign to serious matter.
Therefore what man does in jest, he ordains not to the last end.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says at the beginning of his Metaphysics
1,[2] that speculative science is sought for its own sake. Now it cannot
be said that each speculative science is the last end. Therefore man does
not desire all, whatsoever he desires, for the last end.
Objection 3: Further, whosoever ordains something to an end, thinks of that
end. But man does not always think of the last end in all that he desires
or does. Therefore man neither desires nor does all for the last end.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 1): "That is the end
of our good, for the sake of which we love other things, whereas we love
it for its own sake."
I answer that, Man must, of necessity, desire all, whatsoever he
desires, for the last end. This is evident for two reasons. First,
because whatever man desires, he desires it under the aspect of good. And
if he desire it, not as his perfect good, which is the last end, he must,
of necessity, desire it as tending to the perfect good, because the
beginning of anything is always ordained to its completion; as is clearly
the case in effects both of nature and of art. Wherefore every beginning
of perfection is ordained to complete perfection which is achieved
through the last end. Secondly, because the last end stands in the same
relation in moving the appetite, as the first mover in other movements.
Now it is clear that secondary moving causes do not move save inasmuch as
they are moved by the first mover. Therefore secondary objects of the
appetite do not move the appetite, except as ordained to the first object
of the appetite, which is the last end.
Reply to Objection 1: Actions done jestingly are not directed to any external
end; but merely to the good of the jester, in so far as they afford him
pleasure or relaxation. But man's consummate good is his last end.
Reply to Objection 2: The same applies to speculative science; which is desired as the scientist's good, included in complete and perfect good, which is the ultimate end.
Reply to Objection 3: One need not always be thinking of the last end, whenever
one desires or does something: but the virtue of the first intention,
which was in respect of the last end, remains in every desire directed to
any object whatever, even though one's thoughts be not actually directed
to the last end. Thus while walking along the road one needs not to be
thinking of the end at every step.
Index [<< | >>]
First Part of the Second Part [<< | >>]
Question: 1 [<< | >>]
Article: 7 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that all men have not the same last end. For before
all else the unchangeable good seems to be the last end of man. But some
turn away from the unchangeable good, by sinning. Therefore all men have
not the same last end.
Objection 2: Further, man's entire life is ruled according to his last end.
If, therefore, all men had the same last end, they would not have various
pursuits in life. Which is evidently false.
Objection 3: Further, the end is the term of action. But actions are of
individuals. Now although men agree in their specific nature, yet they
differ in things pertaining to individuals. Therefore all men have not
the same last end.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3) that all men agree in
desiring the last end, which is happiness.
I answer that, We can speak of the last end in two ways: first,
considering only the aspect of last end; secondly, considering the thing
in which the aspect of last end is realized. So, then, as to the aspect
of last end, all agree in desiring the last end: since all desire the
fulfilment of their perfection, and it is precisely this fulfilment in
which the last end consists, as stated above (Article [5]). But as to the thing
in which this aspect is realized, all men are not agreed as to their last
end: since some desire riches as their consummate good; some, pleasure;
others, something else. Thus to every taste the sweet is pleasant but to
some, the sweetness of wine is most pleasant, to others, the sweetness of
honey, or of something similar. Yet that sweet is absolutely the best of
all pleasant things, in which he who has the best taste takes most
pleasure. In like manner that good is most complete which the man with
well disposed affections desires for his last end.
Reply to Objection 1: Those who sin turn from that in which their last end really
consists: but they do not turn away from the intention of the last end,
which intention they mistakenly seek in other things.
Reply to Objection 2: Various pursuits in life are found among men by reason of
the various things in which men seek to find their last end.
Reply to Objection 3: Although actions are of individuals, yet their first
principle of action is nature, which tends to one thing, as stated above
(Article [5]).
Index [<< | >>]
First Part of the Second Part [<< | >>]
Question: 1 [<< | >>]
Article: 8 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that all other creatures concur in man's last end.
For the end corresponds to the beginning. But man's beginning---i.e.
God---is also the beginning of all else. Therefore all other things
concur in man's last end.
Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "God turns all things
to Himself as to their last end." But He is also man's last end; because
He alone is to be enjoyed by man, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i,
5,22). Therefore other things, too, concur in man's last end.
Objection 3: Further, man's last end is the object of the will. But the object
of the will is the universal good, which is the end of all. Therefore
other things, too, concur in man's last end.
On the contrary, man's last end is happiness; which all men desire, as
Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3,4). But "happiness is not possible for
animals bereft of reason," as Augustine says (Questions. 83, qu. 5). Therefore
other things do not concur in man's last end.
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2), the end is
twofold---the end "for which" and the end "by which"; viz. the thing
itself in which is found the aspect of good, and the use or acquisition
of that thing. Thus we say that the end of the movement of a weighty body
is either a lower place as "thing," or to be in a lower place, as "use";
and the end of the miser is money as "thing," or possession of money as
"use."
If, therefore, we speak of man's last end as of the thing which is the
end, thus all other things concur in man's last end, since God is the
last end of man and of all other things. If, however, we speak of man's
last end, as of the acquisition of the end, then irrational creatures do
not concur with man in this end. For man and other rational creatures
attain to their last end by knowing and loving God: this is not possible
to other creatures, which acquire their last end, in so far as they share
in the Divine likeness, inasmuch as they are, or live, or even know.
Hence it is evident how the objections are solved: since happiness means
the acquisition of the last end.