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Question: 16 [<< | >>]
Since knowledge is of things that are true, after the consideration of
the knowledge of God, we must inquire concerning truth. About this there
are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether truth resides in the thing, or only in the intellect?
(2) Whether it resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?
(3) On the comparison of the true to being.
(4) On the comparison of the true to the good.
(5) Whether God is truth?
(6) Whether all things are true by one truth, or by many?
(7) On the eternity of truth.
(8) On the unchangeableness of truth.
Index [<< | >>]
First Part [<< | >>]
Question: 16 [<< | >>]
Article: 1 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect, but
rather in things. For Augustine (Soliloq. ii, 5) condemns this definition
of truth, "That is true which is seen"; since it would follow that stones
hidden in the bosom of the earth would not be true stones, as they are
not seen. He also condemns the following, "That is true which is as it
appears to the knower, who is willing and able to know," for hence it
would follow that nothing would be true, unless someone could know it.
Therefore he defines truth thus: "That is true which is." It seems, then,
that truth resides in things, and not in the intellect.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is true, is true by reason of truth. If, then,
truth is only in the intellect, nothing will be true except in so far as
it is understood. But this is the error of the ancient philosophers, who
said that whatever seems to be true is so. Consequently mutual
contradictories seem to be true as seen by different persons at the same
time.
Objection 3: Further, "that, on account of which a thing is so, is itself more
so," as is evident from the Philosopher (Poster. i). But it is from the
fact that a thing is or is not, that our thought or word is true or
false, as the Philosopher teaches (Praedicam. iii). Therefore truth
resides rather in things than in the intellect.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Metaph. vi), " The true and the false reside not in things, but in the intellect."
I answer that, As the good denotes that towards which the appetite
tends, so the true denotes that towards which the intellect tends. Now
there is this difference between the appetite and the intellect, or any
knowledge whatsoever, that knowledge is according as the thing known is
in the knower, whilst appetite is according as the desirer tends towards
the thing desired. Thus the term of the appetite, namely good, is in the
object desirable, and the term of the intellect, namely true, is in the
intellect itself. Now as good exists in a thing so far as that thing is
related to the appetite---and hence the aspect of goodness passes on from
the desirable thing to the appetite, in so far as the appetite is called
good if its object is good; so, since the true is in the intellect in so
far as it is conformed to the object understood, the aspect of the true
must needs pass from the intellect to the object understood, so that also
the thing understood is said to be true in so far as it has some relation
to the intellect. Now a thing understood may be in relation to an
intellect either essentially or accidentally. It is related essentially
to an intellect on which it depends as regards its essence; but
accidentally to an intellect by which it is knowable; even as we may say
that a house is related essentially to the intellect of the architect,
but accidentally to the intellect upon which it does not depend.
Now we do not judge of a thing by what is in it accidentally, but by
what is in it essentially. Hence, everything is said to be true
absolutely, in so far as it is related to the intellect from which it
depends; and thus it is that artificial things are said to be true a
being related to our intellect. For a house is said to be true that
expresses the likeness of the form in the architect's mind; and words are
said to be true so far as they are the signs of truth in the intellect.
In the same way natural things are said to be true in so far as they
express the likeness of the species that are in the divine mind. For a
stone is called true, which possesses the nature proper to a stone,
according to the preconception in the divine intellect. Thus, then, truth
resides primarily in the intellect, and secondarily in things according
as they are related to the intellect as their principle. Consequently
there are various definitions of truth. Augustine says (De Vera Relig.
xxxvi), "Truth is that whereby is made manifest that which is;" and
Hilary says (De Trin. v) that "Truth makes being clear and evident" and
this pertains to truth according as it is in the intellect. As to the
truth of things in so far as they are related to the intellect, we have
Augustine's definition (De Vera Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is a supreme
likeness without any unlikeness to a principle": also Anselm's definition
(De Verit. xii), "Truth is rightness, perceptible by the mind alone"; for
that is right which is in accordance with the principle; also Avicenna's
definition (Metaph. viii, 6), "The truth of each thing is a property of
the essence which is immutably attached to it." The definition that
"Truth is the equation of thought and thing" is applicable to it under
either aspect.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking about the truth of things, and
excludes from the notion of this truth, relation to our intellect; for
what is accidental is excluded from every definition.
Reply to Objection 2: The ancient philosophers held that the species of natural
things did not proceed from any intellect, but were produced by chance.
But as they saw that truth implies relation to intellect, they were
compelled to base the truth of things on their relation to our intellect.
From this, conclusions result that are inadmissible, and which the
Philosopher refutes (Metaph. iv). Such, however, do not follow, if we say
that the truth of things consists in their relation to the divine
intellect.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the truth of our intellect is caused by the thing,
yet it is not necessary that truth should be there primarily, any more
than that health should be primarily in medicine, rather than in the
animal: for the virtue of medicine, and not its health, is the cause of
health, for here the agent is not univocal. In the same way, the being of
the thing, not its truth, is the cause of truth in the intellect. Hence
the Philosopher says that a thought or a word is true "from the fact that
a thing is, not because a thing is true."
Index [<< | >>]
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Question: 16 [<< | >>]
Article: 2 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect
composing and dividing. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that as
the senses are always true as regards their proper sensible objects, so
is the intellect as regards "what a thing is." Now composition and
division are neither in the senses nor in the intellect knowing "what a
thing is." Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect
composing and dividing.
Objection 2: Further, Isaac says in his book On Definitions that truth is the
equation of thought and thing. Now just as the intellect with regard to
complex things can be equated to things, so also with regard to simple
things; and this is true also of sense apprehending a thing as it is.
Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and
dividing.
On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi) that with regard to
simple things and "what a thing is," truth is "found neither in the
intellect nor in things."
I answer that, As stated before, truth resides, in its primary aspect,
in the intellect. Now since everything is true according as it has the
form proper to its nature, the intellect, in so far as it is knowing,
must be true, so far as it has the likeness of the thing known, this
being its form, as knowing. For this reason truth is defined by the
conformity of intellect and thing; and hence to know this conformity is
to know truth. But in no way can sense know this. For although sight has
the likeness of a visible thing, yet it does not know the comparison
which exists between the thing seen and that which itself apprehends
concerning it. But the intellect can know its own conformity with the
intelligible thing; yet it does not apprehend it by knowing of a thing
"what a thing is." When, however, it judges that a thing corresponds to
the form which it apprehends about that thing, then first it knows and
expresses truth. This it does by composing and dividing: for in every
proposition it either applies to, or removes from the thing signified by
the subject, some form signified by the predicate: and this clearly shows
that the sense is true of any thing, as is also the intellect, when it
knows "what a thing is"; but it does not thereby know or affirm truth.
This is in like manner the case with complex or non-complex words. Truth
therefore may be in the senses, or in the intellect knowing "what a thing
is," as in anything that is true; yet not as the thing known in the
knower, which is implied by the word "truth"; for the perfection of the
intellect is truth as known. Therefore, properly speaking, truth resides
in the intellect composing and dividing; and not in the senses; nor in
the intellect knowing "what a thing is."
And thus the Objections given are solved.
Index [<< | >>]
First Part [<< | >>]
Question: 16 [<< | >>]
Article: 3 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It seems that the true and being are not convertible terms. For
the true resides properly in the intellect, as stated (Article [1]); but being
is properly in things. Therefore they are not convertible.
Objection 2: Further, that which extends to being and not-being is not
convertible with being. But the true extends to being and not-being; for
it is true that what is, is; and that what is not, is not. Therefore the
true and being are not convertible.
Objection 3: Further, things which stand to each other in order of priority
and posteriority seem not to be convertible. But the true appears to be
prior to being; for being is not understood except under the aspect of
the true. Therefore it seems they are not convertible.
On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that there is the
same disposition of things in being and in truth.
I answer that, As good has the nature of what is desirable, so truth is
related to knowledge. Now everything, in as far as it has being, so far
is it knowable. Wherefore it is said in De Anima iii that "the soul is in
some manner all things," through the senses and the intellect. And
therefore, as good is convertible with being, so is the true. But as good
adds to being the notion of desirable, so the true adds relation to the
intellect.
Reply to Objection 1: The true resides in things and in the intellect, as said
before (Article [1]). But the true that is in things is convertible with being
as to substance; while the true that is in the intellect is convertible
with being, as the manifestation with the manifested; for this belongs to
the nature of truth, as has been said already (Article [1]). It may, however, be
said that being also is in the things and in the intellect, as is the
true; although truth is primarily in things; and this is so because truth
and being differ in idea.
Reply to Objection 2: Not-being has nothing in itself whereby it can be known;
yet it is known in so far as the intellect renders it knowable. Hence the
true is based on being, inasmuch as not-being is a kind of logical being,
apprehended, that is, by reason.
Reply to Objection 3: When it is said that being cannot be apprehended except
under the notion of the true, this can be understood in two ways. In the
one way so as to mean that being is not apprehended, unless the idea of
the true follows apprehension of being; and this is true. In the other
way, so as to mean that being cannot be apprehended unless the idea of
the true be apprehended also; and this is false. But the true cannot be
apprehended unless the idea of being be apprehended also; since being is
included in the idea of the true. The case is the same if we compare the
intelligible object with being. For being cannot be understood, unless
being is intelligible. Yet being can be understood while its
intelligibility is not understood. Similarly, being when understood is
true, yet the true is not understood by understanding being.
Index [<< | >>]
First Part [<< | >>]
Question: 16 [<< | >>]
Article: 4 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It seems that good is logically prior to the true. For what is
more universal is logically prior, as is evident from Phys. i. But the
good is more universal than the true, since the true is a kind of good,
namely, of the intellect. Therefore the good is logically prior to the
true.
Objection 2: Further, good is in things, but the true in the intellect
composing and dividing as said above (Article [2]). But that which is in things
is prior to that which is in the intellect. Therefore good is logically
prior to the true.
Objection 3: Further, truth is a species of virtue, as is clear from Ethic.
iv. But virtue is included under good; since, as Augustine says (De Lib.
Arbit. ii, 19), it is a good quality of the mind. Therefore the good is
prior to the true.
On the contrary, What is in more things is prior logically. But the true
is in some things wherein good is not, as, for instance, in mathematics.
Therefore the true is prior to good.
I answer that, Although the good and the true are convertible with
being, as to suppositum, yet they differ logically. And in this manner
the true, speaking absolutely, is prior to good, as appears from two
reasons. First, because the true is more closely related to being than
is good. For the true regards being itself simply and immediately; while
the nature of good follows being in so far as being is in some way
perfect; for thus it is desirable. Secondly, it is evident from the fact
that knowledge naturally precedes appetite. Hence, since the true regards
knowledge, but the good regards the appetite, the true must be prior in
idea to the good.
Reply to Objection 1: The will and the intellect mutually include one another:
for the intellect understands the will, and the will wills the intellect
to understand. So then, among things directed to the object of the will,
are comprised also those that belong to the intellect; and conversely.
Whence in the order of things desirable, good stands as the universal,
and the true as the particular; whereas in the order of intelligible
things the converse of the case. From the fact, then, that the true is a
kind of good, it follows that the good is prior in the order of things
desirable; but not that it is prior absolutely.
Reply to Objection 2: A thing is prior logically in so far as it is prior to the
intellect. Now the intellect apprehends primarily being itself; secondly,
it apprehends that it understands being; and thirdly, it apprehends that
it desires being. Hence the idea of being is first, that of truth second,
and the idea of good third, though good is in things.
Reply to Objection 3: The virtue which is called "truth" is not truth in general,
but a certain kind of truth according to which man shows himself in deed
and word as he really is. But truth as applied to "life" is used in a
particular sense, inasmuch as a man fulfills in his life that to which he
is ordained by the divine intellect, as it has been said that truth
exists in other things (Article [1]). Whereas the truth of "justice" is found in
man as he fulfills his duty to his neighbor, as ordained by law. Hence we
cannot argue from these particular truths to truth in general.
Index [<< | >>]
First Part [<< | >>]
Question: 16 [<< | >>]
Article: 5 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It seems that God is not truth. For truth consists in the
intellect composing and dividing. But in God there is not composition and
division. Therefore in Him there is not truth.
Objection 2: Further, truth, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xxxvi) is
a "likeness to the principle." But in God there is no likeness to a
principle. Therefore in God there is not truth.
Objection 3: Further, whatever is said of God, is said of Him as of the first
cause of all things; thus the being of God is the cause of all being; and
His goodness the cause of all good. If therefore there is truth in God,
all truth will be from Him. But it is true that someone sins. Therefore
this will be from God; which is evidently false.
On the contrary, Our Lord says, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life"
(@Jn. 14:6).
I answer that, As said above (Article [1]), truth is found in the intellect
according as it apprehends a thing as it is; and in things according as
they have being conformable to an intellect. This is to the greatest
degree found in God. For His being is not only conformed to His
intellect, but it is the very act of His intellect; and His act of
understanding is the measure and cause of every other being and of every
other intellect, and He Himself is His own existence and act of
understanding. Whence it follows not only that truth is in Him, but that
He is truth itself, and the sovereign and first truth.
Reply to Objection 1: Although in the divine intellect there is neither
composition nor division, yet in His simple act of intelligence He judges
of all things and knows all things complex; and thus there is truth in
His intellect.
Reply to Objection 2: The truth of our intellect is according to its conformity
with its principle, that is to say, to the things from which it receives
knowledge. The truth also of things is according to their conformity with
their principle, namely, the divine intellect. Now this cannot be said,
properly speaking, of divine truth; unless perhaps in so far as truth is
appropriated to the Son, Who has a principle. But if we speak of divine
truth in its essence, we cannot understand this unless the affirmative
must be resolved into the negative, as when one says: "the Father is of
Himself, because He is not from another." Similarly, the divine truth can
be called a "likeness to the principle," inasmuch as His existence is not
dissimilar to His intellect.
Reply to Objection 3: Not-being and privation have no truth of themselves, but
only in the apprehension of the intellect. Now all apprehension of the
intellect is from God. Hence all the truth that exists in the
statement---"that a person commits fornication is true"---is entirely
from God. But to argue, "Therefore that this person fornicates is from
God", is a fallacy of Accident.
Index [<< | >>]
First Part [<< | >>]
Question: 16 [<< | >>]
Article: 6 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It seems that there is only one truth, according to which all
things are true. For according to Augustine (De Trin. xv, 1), "nothing is
greater than the mind of man, except God." Now truth is greater than the
mind of man; otherwise the mind would be the judge of truth: whereas in
fact it judges all things according to truth, and not according to its
own measure. Therefore God alone is truth. Therefore there is no other
truth but God.
Objection 2: Further, Anselm says (De Verit. xiv), that, "as is the relation
of time to temporal things, so is that of truth to true things." But
there is only one time for all temporal things. Therefore there is only
one truth, by which all things are true.
On the contrary, it is written (@Ps. 11:2), "Truths are decayed from
among the children of men."
I answer that, In one sense truth, whereby all things are true, is one,
and in another sense it is not. In proof of which we must consider that
when anything is predicated of many things univocally, it is found in
each of them according to its proper nature; as animal is found in each
species of animal. But when anything is predicated of many things
analogically, it is found in only one of them according to its proper
nature, and from this one the rest are denominated. So healthiness is
predicated of animal, of urine, and of medicine, not that health is only
in the animal; but from the health of the animal, medicine is called
healthy, in so far as it is the cause of health, and urine is called
healthy, in so far as it indicates health. And although health is neither
in medicine nor in urine, yet in either there is something whereby the
one causes, and the other indicates health. Now we have said (Article [1]) that
truth resides primarily in the intellect; and secondarily in things,
according as they are related to the divine intellect. If therefore we
speak of truth, as it exists in the intellect, according to its proper
nature, then are there many truths in many created intellects; and even
in one and the same intellect, according to the number of things known.
Whence a gloss on Ps. 11:2, "Truths are decayed from among the children
of men," says: "As from one man's face many likenesses are reflected in a
mirror, so many truths are reflected from the one divine truth." But if
we speak of truth as it is in things, then all things are true by one
primary truth; to which each one is assimilated according to its own
entity. And thus, although the essences or forms of things are many, yet
the truth of the divine intellect is one, in conformity to which all
things are said to be true.
Reply to Objection 1: The soul does not judge of things according to any kind of
truth, but according to the primary truth, inasmuch as it is reflected in
the soul, as in a mirror, by reason of the first principles of the
understanding. It follows, therefore, that the primary truth is greater
than the soul. And yet, even created truth, which resides in our
intellect, is greater than the soul, not simply, but in a certain degree,
in so far as it is its perfection; even as science may be said to be
greater than the soul. Yet it is true that nothing subsisting is greater
than the rational soul, except God.
Reply to Objection 2: The saying of Anselm is correct in so far as things are
said to be true by their relation to the divine intellect.
Index [<< | >>]
First Part [<< | >>]
Question: 16 [<< | >>]
Article: 7 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It seems that created truth is eternal. For Augustine says (De
Lib. Arbit. ii, 8) "Nothing is more eternal than the nature of a circle,
and that two added to three make five." But the truth of these is a
created truth. Therefore created truth is eternal.
Objection 2: Further, that which is always, is eternal. But universals are
always and everywhere; therefore they are eternal. So therefore is truth,
which is the most universal.
Objection 3: Further, it was always true that what is true in the present was
to be in the future. But as the truth of a proposition regarding the
present is a created truth, so is that of a proposition regarding the
future. Therefore some created truth is eternal.
Objection 4: Further, all that is without beginning and end is eternal. But
the truth of enunciables is without beginning and end; for if their truth
had a beginning, since it was not before, it was true that truth was not,
and true, of course, by reason of truth; so that truth was before it
began to be. Similarly, if it be asserted that truth has an end, it
follows that it is after it has ceased to be, for it will still be true
that truth is not. Therefore truth is eternal.
On the contrary, God alone is eternal, as laid down before (Question [10], Article [3]).
I answer that, The truth of enunciations is no other than the truth of
the intellect. For an enunciation resides in the intellect, and in
speech. Now according as it is in the intellect it has truth of itself:
but according as it is in speech, it is called enunciable truth,
according as it signifies some truth of the intellect, not on account of
any truth residing in the enunciation, as though in a subject. Thus urine
is called healthy, not from any health within it but from the health of
an animal which it indicates. In like manner it has been already said
that things are called true from the truth of the intellect. Hence, if no
intellect were eternal, no truth would be eternal. Now because only the
divine intellect is eternal, in it alone truth has eternity. Nor does it
follow from this that anything else but God is eternal; since the truth
of the divine intellect is God Himself, as shown already (Article [5]).
Reply to Objection 1: The nature of a circle, and the fact that two and three
make five, have eternity in the mind of God.
Reply to Objection 2: That something is always and everywhere, can be understood
in two ways. In one way, as having in itself the power of extension to
all time and to all places, as it belongs to God to be everywhere and
always. In the other way as not having in itself determination to any
place or time, as primary matter is said to be one, not because it has
one form, but by the absence of all distinguishing form. In this manner
all universals are said to be everywhere and always, in so far as
universals are independent of place and time. It does not, however,
follow from this that they are eternal, except in an intellect, if one
exists that is eternal.
Reply to Objection 3: That which now is, was future, before it (actually) was;
because it was in its cause that it would be. Hence, if the cause were
removed, that thing's coming to be was not future. But the first cause is
alone eternal. Hence it does not follow that it was always true that what
now is would be, except in so far as its future being was in the
sempiternal cause; and God alone is such a cause.
Reply to Objection 4: Because our intellect is not eternal, neither is the truth
of enunciable propositions which are formed by us, eternal, but it had a
beginning in time. Now before such truth existed, it was not true to say
that such a truth did exist, except by reason of the divine intellect,
wherein alone truth is eternal. But it is true now to say that that truth
did not then exist: and this is true only by reason of the truth that is
now in our intellect; and not by reason of any truth in the things. For
this is truth concerning not-being; and not-being has not truth of
itself, but only so far as our intellect apprehends it. Hence it is true
to say that truth did not exist, in so far as we apprehend its not-being
as preceding its being.
Index [<< | >>]
First Part [<< | >>]
Question: 16 [<< | >>]
Article: 8 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It seems that truth is immutable. For Augustine says (De Lib.
Arbit. ii, 12), that "Truth and mind do not rank as equals, otherwise
truth would be mutable, as the mind is."
Objection 2: Further, what remains after every change is immutable; as primary
matter is unbegotten and incorruptible, since it remains after all
generation and corruption. But truth remains after all change; for after
every change it is true to say that a thing is, or is not. Therefore
truth is immutable.
Objection 3: Further, if the truth of an enunciation changes, it changes
mostly with the changing of the thing. But it does not thus change. For
truth, according to Anselm (De Verit. viii), "is a certain rightness" in
so far as a thing answers to that which is in the divine mind concerning
it. But this proposition that "Socrates sits", receives from the divine
mind the signification that Socrates does sit; and it has the same
signification even though he does not sit. Therefore the truth of the
proposition in no way changes.
Objection 4: Further, where there is the same cause, there is the same effect.
But the same thing is the cause of the truth of the three propositions,
"Socrates sits, will sit, sat." Therefore the truth of each is the same.
But one or other of these must be the true one. Therefore the truth of
these propositions remains immutable; and for the same reason that of any
other.
On the contrary, It is written (@Ps. 11:2),"Truths are decayed from
among the children of men."
I answer that, Truth, properly speaking, resides only in the intellect,
as said before (Article [1]); but things are called true in virtue of the truth
residing in an intellect. Hence the mutability of truth must be regarded
from the point of view of the intellect, the truth of which consists in
its conformity to the thing understood. Now this conformity may vary in
two ways, even as any other likeness, through change in one of the two
extremes. Hence in one way truth varies on the part of the intellect,
from the fact that a change of opinion occurs about a thing which in
itself has not changed, and in another way, when the thing is changed,
but not the opinion; and in either way there can be a change from true to
false. If, then, there is an intellect wherein there can be no
alternation of opinions, and the knowledge of which nothing can escape,
in this is immutable truth. Now such is the divine intellect, as is clear
from what has been said before (Question [14], Article [15]). Hence the truth of the
divine intellect is immutable. But the truth of our intellect is mutable;
not because it is itself the subject of change, but in so far as our
intellect changes from truth to falsity, for thus forms may be called
mutable. Whereas the truth of the divine intellect is that according to
which natural things are said to be true, and this is altogether
immutable.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of divine truth.
Reply to Objection 2: The true and being are convertible terms. Hence just as
being is not generated nor corrupted of itself, but accidentally, in so
far as this being or that is corrupted or generated, as is said in Phys.
i, so does truth change, not so as that no truth remains, but because
that truth does not remain which was before.
Reply to Objection 3: A proposition not only has truth, as other things are said
to have it, in so far, that is, as they correspond to that which is the
design of the divine intellect concerning them; but it said to have truth
in a special way, in so far as it indicates the truth of the intellect,
which consists in the conformity of the intellect with a thing. When this
disappears, the truth of an opinion changes, and consequently the truth
of the proposition. So therefore this proposition, "Socrates sits," is
true, as long as he is sitting, both with the truth of the thing, in so
far as the expression is significative, and with the truth of
signification, in so far as it signifies a true opinion. When Socrates
rises, the first truth remains, but the second is changed.
Reply to Objection 4: The sitting of Socrates, which is the cause of the truth of
the proposition, "Socrates sits," has not the same meaning when Socrates
sits, after he sits, and before he sits. Hence the truth which results,
varies, and is variously signified by these propositions concerning
present, past, or future. Thus it does not follow, though one of the
three propositions is true, that the same truth remains invariable.