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We consider next the subject of habits: and under this head there are
six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is a habit in the body?
(2) Whether the soul is a subject of habit, in respect of its essence or
in respect of its power?
(3) Whether in the powers of the sensitive part there can be a habit?
(4) Whether there is a habit in the intellect?
(5) Whether there is a habit in the will?
(6) Whether there is a habit in separate substances?
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Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a habit in the body. For, as the
Commentator says (De Anima iii), "a habit is that whereby we act when we
will." But bodily actions are not subject to the will, since they are
natural. Therefore there can be no habit in the body.
Objection 2: Further, all bodily dispositions are easy to change. But habit is
a quality, difficult to change. Therefore no bodily disposition can be a
habit.
Objection 3: Further, all bodily dispositions are subject to change. But
change can only be in the third species of quality, which is divided
against habit. Therefore there is no habit in the body.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says in the Book of Predicaments (De
Categor. vi) that health of the body and incurable disease are called
habits.
I answer that, As we have said above (Question [49], Articles [2] seqq.), habit is a
disposition of a subject which is in a state of potentiality either to
form or to operation. Therefore in so far as habit implies disposition to
operation, no habit is principally in the body as its subject. For every
operation of the body proceeds either from a natural quality of the body
or from the soul moving the body. Consequently, as to those operations
which proceed from its nature, the body is not disposed by a habit:
because the natural forces are determined to one mode of operation; and
we have already said (Question [49], Article [4]) that it is when the subject is in
potentiality to many things that a habitual disposition is required. As
to the operations which proceed from the soul through the body, they
belong principally to the soul, and secondarily to the body. Now habits
are in proportion to their operations: whence "by like acts like habits
are formed" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). And therefore the dispositions to such
operations are principally in the soul. But they can be secondarily in
the body: to wit, in so far as the body is disposed and enabled with
promptitude to help in the operations of the soul.
If, however, we speak of the disposition of the subject to form, thus a
habitual disposition can be in the body, which is related to the soul as
a subject is to its form. And in this way health and beauty and such like
are called habitual dispositions. Yet they have not the nature of habit
perfectly: because their causes, of their very nature, are easily
changeable.
On the other hand, as Simplicius reports in his Commentary on the
Predicaments, Alexander denied absolutely that habits or dispositions of
the first species are in the body: and held that the first species of
quality belonged to the soul alone. And he held that Aristotle mentions
health and sickness in the Book on the Predicaments not as though they
belonged to the first species of quality, but by way of example: so that
he would mean that just as health and sickness may be easy or difficult
to change, so also are all the qualities of the first species, which are
called habits and dispositions. But this is clearly contrary to the
intention of Aristotle: both because he speaks in the same way of health
and sickness as examples, as of virtue and science; and because in Phys.
vii, text. 17, he expressly mentions beauty and health among habits.
Reply to Objection 1: This objection runs in the sense of habit as a disposition
to operation, and of those actions of the body which are from nature: but
not in the sense of those actions which proceed from the soul, and the
principle of which is the will.
Reply to Objection 2: Bodily dispositions are not simply difficult to change on
account of the changeableness of their bodily causes. But they may be
difficult to change by comparison to such a subject, because, to wit, as
long as such a subject endures, they cannot be removed; or because they
are difficult to change, by comparison to other dispositions. But
qualities of the soul are simply difficult to change, on account of the
unchangeableness of the subject. And therefore he does not say that
health which is difficult to change is a habit simply: but that it is "as
a habit," as we read in the Greek [*{isos hexin} (Categor. viii)]. On the
other hand, the qualities of the soul are called habits simply.
Reply to Objection 3: Bodily dispositions which are in the first species of
quality, as some maintained, differ from qualities of the third species,
in this, that the qualities of the third species consist in some
"becoming" and movement, as it were, wherefore they are called passions
or passible qualities. But when they have attained to perfection
(specific perfection, so to speak), they have then passed into the first
species of quality. But Simplicius in his Commentary disapproves of this;
for in this way heating would be in the third species, and heat in the
first species of quality; whereas Aristotle puts heat in the third.
Wherefore Porphyrius, as Simplicius reports (Commentary), says that
passion or passion-like quality, disposition and habit, differ in bodies
by way of intensity and remissness. For when a thing receives heat in
this only that it is being heated, and not so as to be able to give heat,
then we have passion, if it is transitory; or passion-like quality if it
is permanent. But when it has been brought to the point that it is able
to heat something else, then it is a disposition; and if it goes so far
as to be firmly fixed and to become difficult to change, then it will be
a habit: so that disposition would be a certain intensity of passion or
passion-like quality, and habit an intensity or disposition. But
Simplicius disapproves of this, for such intensity and remissness do not
imply diversity on the part of the form itself, but on the part of the
diverse participation thereof by the subject; so that there would be no
diversity among the species of quality. And therefore we must say
otherwise that, as was explained above (Question [49], Article [2], ad 1), the
adjustment of the passion-like qualities themselves, according to their
suitability to nature, implies the notion of disposition: and so, when a
change takes place in these same passion-like qualities, which are heat
and cold, moisture and dryness, there results a change as to sickness and
health. But change does not occur in regard to like habits and
dispositions, primarily and of themselves.
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Objection 1: It would seem that habit is in the soul in respect of its essence
rather than in respect of its powers. For we speak of dispositions and
habits in relation to nature, as stated above (Question [49], Article [2]). But nature
regards the essence of the soul rather than the powers; because it is in
respect of its essence that the soul is the nature of such a body and the
form thereof. Therefore habits are in the soul in respect of its essence
and not in respect of its powers.
Objection 2: Further, accident is not the subject of accident. Now habit is an
accident. But the powers of the soul are in the genus of accident, as we
have said in the FP, Question [77], Article [1], ad 5. Therefore habit is not in the
soul in respect of its powers.
Objection 3: Further, the subject is prior to that which is in the subject.
But since habit belongs to the first species of quality, it is prior to
power, which belongs to the second species. Therefore habit is not in a
power of the soul as its subject.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) puts various habits in
the various powers of the soul.
I answer that, As we have said above (Question [49], Articles [2],3), habit implies a
certain disposition in relation to nature or to operation. If therefore
we take habit as having a relation to nature, it cannot be in the
soul---that is, if we speak of human nature: for the soul itself is the
form completing the human nature; so that, regarded in this way, habit or
disposition is rather to be found in the body by reason of its relation
to the soul, than in the soul by reason of its relation to the body. But
if we speak of a higher nature, of which man may become a partaker,
according to 2 Pt. 1, "that we may be partakers of the Divine Nature":
thus nothing hinders some habit, namely, grace, from being in the soul in
respect of its essence, as we shall state later on (Question [110], Article [4]).
On the other hand, if we take habit in its relation to operation, it is
chiefly thus that habits are found in the soul: in so far as the soul is
not determined to one operation, but is indifferent to many, which is a
condition for a habit, as we have said above (Question [49], Article [4]). And since the
soul is the principle of operation through its powers, therefore,
regarded in this sense, habits are in the soul in respect of its powers.
Reply to Objection 1: The essence of the soul belongs to human nature, not as a
subject requiring to be disposed to something further, but as a form and
nature to which someone is disposed.
Reply to Objection 2: Accident is not of itself the subject of accident. But
since among accidents themselves there is a certain order, the subject,
according as it is under one accident, is conceived as the subject of a
further accident. In this way we say that one accident is the subject of
another; as superficies is the subject of color, in which sense power is
the subject of habit.
Reply to Objection 3: Habit takes precedence of power, according as it implies a
disposition to nature: whereas power always implies a relation to
operation, which is posterior, since nature is the principle of
operation. But the habit whose subject is a power, does not imply
relation to nature, but to operation. Wherefore it is posterior to power.
Or, we may say that habit takes precedence of power, as the complete
takes precedence of the incomplete, and as act takes precedence of
potentiality. For act is naturally prior to potentiality, though
potentiality is prior in order of generation and time, as stated in
Metaph. vii, text. 17; ix, text. 13.
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Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be any habits in the powers of
the sensitive part. For as the nutritive power is an irrational part, so
is the sensitive power. But there can be no habits in the powers of the
nutritive part. Therefore we ought not to put any habit in the powers of
the sensitive part.
Objection 2: Further, the sensitive parts are common to us and the brutes. But
there are not any habits in brutes: for in them there is no will, which
is put in the definition of habit, as we have said above (Question [49], Article [3]).
Therefore there are no habits in the sensitive powers.
Objection 3: Further, the habits of the soul are sciences and virtues: and
just as science is related to the apprehensive power, so it virtue
related to the appetitive power. But in the sensitive powers there are no
sciences: since science is of universals, which the sensitive powers
cannot apprehend. Therefore, neither can there be habits of virtue in the
sensitive part.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "some
virtues," namely, temperance and fortitude, "belong to the irrational
part."
I answer that, The sensitive powers can be considered in two ways: first, according as they act from natural instinct: secondly, according as they act at the command of reason. According as they act from natural instinct, they are ordained to one thing, even as nature is; but according as they act at the command of reason, they can be ordained to various things. And thus there can be habits in them, by which they are well or ill disposed in regard to something.
Reply to Objection 1: The powers of the nutritive part have not an inborn
aptitude to obey the command of reason, and therefore there are no habits
in them. But the sensitive powers have an inborn aptitude to obey the
command of reason; and therefore habits can be in them: for in so far as
they obey reason, in a certain sense they are said to be rational, as
stated in Ethic. i, 13.
Reply to Objection 2: The sensitive powers of dumb animals do not act at the
command of reason; but if they are left to themselves, such animals act
from natural instinct: and so in them there are no habits ordained to
operations. There are in them, however, certain dispositions in relation
to nature, as health and beauty. But whereas by man's reason brutes are
disposed by a sort of custom to do things in this or that way, so in this
sense, to a certain extent, we can admit the existence of habits in dumb
animals: wherefore Augustine says (Questions. lxxxiii, qu. 36): "We find the
most untamed beasts, deterred by fear of pain, from that wherein they
took the keenest pleasure; and when this has become a custom in them, we
say that they are tame and gentle." But the habit is incomplete, as to
the use of the will, for they have not that power of using or of
refraining, which seems to belong to the notion of habit: and therefore,
properly speaking, there can be no habits in them.
Reply to Objection 3: The sensitive appetite has an inborn aptitude to be moved
by the rational appetite, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 57: but the
rational powers of apprehension have an inborn aptitude to receive from
the sensitive powers. And therefore it is more suitable that habits
should be in the powers of sensitive appetite than in the powers of
sensitive apprehension, since in the powers of sensitive appetite habits
do not exist except according as they act at the command of the reason.
And yet even in the interior powers of sensitive apprehension, we may
admit of certain habits whereby man has a facility of memory, thought or
imagination: wherefore also the Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. ii)
that "custom conduces much to a good memory": the reason of which is that
these powers also are moved to act at the command of the reason.
On the other hand the exterior apprehensive powers, as sight, hearing
and the like, are not susceptible of habits, but are ordained to their
fixed acts, according to the disposition of their nature, just as the
members of the body, for there are no habits in them, but rather in the
powers which command their movements.
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Objection 1: It would seem that there are no habits in the intellect. For
habits are in conformity with operations, as stated above (Article [1]). But the
operations of man are common to soul and body, as stated in De Anima i,
text. 64. Therefore also are habits. But the intellect is not an act of
the body (De Anima iii, text. 6). Therefore the intellect is not the
subject of a habit.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is in a thing, is there according to the mode
of that in which it is. But that which is form without matter, is act
only: whereas what is composed of form and matter, has potentiality and
act at the same time. Therefore nothing at the same time potential and
actual can be in that which is form only, but only in that which is
composed of matter and form. Now the intellect is form without matter.
Therefore habit, which has potentiality at the same time as act, being a
sort of medium between the two, cannot be in the intellect; but only in
the "conjunction," which is composed of soul and body.
Objection 3: Further, habit is a disposition whereby we are well or ill
disposed in regard to something, as is said (Metaph. v, text. 25). But
that anyone should be well or ill disposed to an act of the intellect is
due to some disposition of the body: wherefore also it is stated (De
Anima ii, text. 94) that "we observe men with soft flesh to be quick
witted." Therefore the habits of knowledge are not in the intellect,
which is separate, but in some power which is the act of some part of the
body.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2,3,10) puts science,
wisdom and understanding, which is the habit of first principles, in the
intellective part of the soul.
I answer that, concerning intellective habits there have been various
opinions. Some, supposing that there was only one "possible" [*FP, Question [79],
Article [2], ad 2] intellect for all men, were bound to hold that habits of
knowledge are not in the intellect itself, but in the interior sensitive
powers. For it is manifest that men differ in habits; and so it was
impossible to put the habits of knowledge directly in that, which, being
only one, would be common to all men. Wherefore if there were but one
single "possible" intellect of all men, the habits of science, in which
men differ from one another, could not be in the "possible" intellect as
their subject, but would be in the interior sensitive powers, which
differ in various men.
Now, in the first place, this supposition is contrary to the mind of
Aristotle. For it is manifest that the sensitive powers are rational, not
by their essence, but only by participation (Ethic. i, 13). Now the
Philosopher puts the intellectual virtues, which are wisdom, science and
understanding, in that which is rational by its essence. Wherefore they
are not in the sensitive powers, but in the intellect itself. Moreover he
says expressly (De Anima iii, text. 8,18) that when the "possible"
intellect "is thus identified with each thing," that is, when it is
reduced to act in respect of singulars by the intelligible species, "then
it is said to be in act, as the knower is said to be in act; and this
happens when the intellect can act of itself," i.e. by considering: "and
even then it is in potentiality in a sense; but not in the same way as
before learning and discovering." Therefore the "possible" intellect
itself is the subject of the habit of science, by which the intellect,
even though it be not actually considering, is able to consider. In the
second place, this supposition is contrary to the truth. For as to whom
belongs the operation, belongs also the power to operate, belongs also
the habit. But to understand and to consider is the proper act of the
intellect. Therefore also the habit whereby one considers is properly in
the intellect itself.
Reply to Objection 1: Some said, as Simplicius reports in his Commentary on the
Predicaments, that, since every operation of man is to a certain extent
an operation of the "conjunctum," as the Philosopher says (De Anima i,
text. 64); therefore no habit is in the soul only, but in the
"conjunctum." And from this it follows that no habit is in the intellect,
for the intellect is separate, as ran the argument, given above. But the
argument is no cogent. For habit is not a disposition of the object to
the power, but rather a disposition of the power to the object: wherefore
the habit needs to be in that power which is principle of the act, and
not in that which is compared to the power as its object.
Now the act of understanding is not said to be common to soul and body,
except in respect of the phantasm, as is stated in De Anima, text. 66.
But it is clear that the phantasm is compared as object to the passive
intellect (De Anima iii, text. 3,39). Whence it follows that the
intellective habit is chiefly on the part of the intellect itself; and
not on the part of the phantasm, which is common to soul and body. And
therefore we must say that the "possible" intellect is the subject of
habit, which is in potentiality to many: and this belongs, above all, to
the "possible" intellect. Wherefore the "possible" intellect is the
subject of intellectual habits.
Reply to Objection 2: As potentiality to sensible being belongs to corporeal
matter, so potentiality to intellectual being belongs to the "possible"
intellect. Wherefore nothing forbids habit to be in the "possible"
intellect, for it is midway between pure potentiality and perfect act.
Reply to Objection 3: Because the apprehensive powers inwardly prepare their
proper objects for the "possible intellect," therefore it is by the good
disposition of these powers, to which the good disposition of the body
cooperates, that man is rendered apt to understand. And so in a secondary
way the intellective habit can be in these powers. But principally it is
in the "possible" intellect.
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Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a habit in the will. For the
habit which is in the intellect is the intelligible species, by means of
which the intellect actually understands. But the will does not act by
means of species. Therefore the will is not the subject of habit.
Objection 2: Further, no habit is allotted to the active intellect, as there
is to the "possible" intellect, because the former is an active power.
But the will is above all an active power, because it moves all the
powers to their acts, as stated above (Question [9], Article [1]). Therefore there is no
habit in the will.
Objection 3: Further, in the natural powers there is no habit, because, by
reason of their nature, they are determinate to one thing. But the will,
by reason of its nature, is ordained to tend to the good which reason
directs. Therefore there is no habit in the will.
On the contrary, Justice is a habit. But justice is in the will; for it
is "a habit whereby men will and do that which is just" (Ethic. v, 1).
Therefore the will is the subject of a habit.
I answer that, Every power which may be variously directed to act, needs
a habit whereby it is well disposed to its act. Now since the will is a
rational power, it may be variously directed to act. And therefore in the
will we must admit the presence of a habit whereby it is well disposed to
its act. Moreover, from the very nature of habit, it is clear that it is
principally related to the will; inasmuch as habit "is that which one
uses when one wills," as stated above (Article [1]).
Reply to Objection 1: Even as in the intellect there is a species which is the
likeness of the object; so in the will, and in every appetitive power
there must be something by which the power is inclined to its object; for
the act of the appetitive power is nothing but a certain inclination, as
we have said above (Question [6], Article [4]; Question [22], Article [2]). And therefore in respect of
those things to which it is inclined sufficiently by the nature of the
power itself, the power needs no quality to incline it. But since it is
necessary, for the end of human life, that the appetitive power be
inclined to something fixed, to which it is not inclined by the nature of
the power, which has a relation to many and various things, therefore it
is necessary that, in the will and in the other appetitive powers, there
be certain qualities to incline them, and these are called habits.
Reply to Objection 2: The active intellect is active only, and in no way passive.
But the will, and every appetitive power, is both mover and moved (De
Anima iii, text. 54). And therefore the comparison between them does not
hold; for to be susceptible of habit belongs to that which is somehow in
potentiality.
Reply to Objection 3: The will from the very nature of the power inclined to the
good of the reason. But because this good is varied in many ways, the
will needs to be inclined, by means of a habit, to some fixed good of the
reason, in order that action may follow more promptly.
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Objection 1: It would seem that there are no habits in the angels. For
Maximus, commentator of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), says: "It is not
proper to suppose that there are intellectual (i.e. spiritual) powers in
the divine intelligences (i.e. in the angels) after the manner of
accidents, as in us: as though one were in the other as in a subject: for
accident of any kind is foreign to them." But every habit is an accident.
Therefore there are no habits in the angels.
Objection 2: Further, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "The holy
dispositions of the heavenly essences participate, above all other
things, in God's goodness." But that which is of itself [per se] is prior
to and more power than that which is by another [per aliud]. Therefore
the angelic essences are perfected of themselves unto conformity with
God, and therefore not by means of habits. And this seems to have been
the reasoning of Maximus, who in the same passage adds: "For if this were
the case, surely their essence would not remain in itself, nor could it
have been as far as possible deified of itself."
Objection 3: Further, habit is a disposition (Metaph. v, text. 25). But
disposition, as is said in the same book, is "the order of that which has
parts." Since, therefore, angels are simple substances, it seems that
there are no dispositions and habits in them.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that the angels are of
the first hierarchy are called: "Fire-bearers and Thrones and Outpouring
of Wisdom, by which is indicated the godlike nature of their habits."
I answer that, Some have thought that there are no habits in the angels,
and that whatever is said of them, is said essentially. Whence Maximus,
after the words which we have quoted, says: "Their dispositions, and the
powers which are in them, are essential, through the absence of matter in
them." And Simplicius says the same in his Commentary on the
Predicaments: "Wisdom which is in the soul is its habit: but that which
is in the intellect, is its substance. For everything divine is
sufficient of itself, and exists in itself."
Now this opinion contains some truth, and some error. For it is manifest
from what we have said (Question [49], Article [4]) that only a being in potentiality is
the subject of habit. So the above-mentioned commentators considered that
angels are immaterial substances, and that there is no material
potentiality in them, and on that account, excluded from them habit and
any kind of accident. Yet since though there is no material potentiality
in angels, there is still some potentiality in them (for to be pure act
belongs to God alone), therefore, as far as potentiality is found to be
in them, so far may habits be found in them. But because the potentiality
of matter and the potentiality of intellectual substance are not of the
same kind. Whence, Simplicius says in his Commentary on the Predicaments
that: "The habits of the intellectual substance are not like the habits
here below, but rather are they like simple and immaterial images which
it contains in itself."
However, the angelic intellect and the human intellect differ with
regard to this habit. For the human intellect, being the lowest in the
intellectual order, is in potentiality as regards all intelligible
things, just as primal matter is in respect of all sensible forms; and
therefore for the understanding of all things, it needs some habit. But
the angelic intellect is not as a pure potentiality in the order of
intelligible things, but as an act; not indeed as pure act (for this
belongs to God alone), but with an admixture of some potentiality: and
the higher it is, the less potentiality it has. And therefore, as we said
in the FP, Question [55], Article [1], so far as it is in potentiality, so far is it in
need of habitual perfection by means of intelligible species in regard to
its proper operation: but so far as it is in act, through its own essence
it can understand some things, at least itself, and other things
according to the mode of its substance, as stated in De Causis: and the
more perfect it is, the more perfectly will it understand.
But since no angel attains to the perfection of God, but all are
infinitely distant therefrom; for this reason, in order to attain to God
Himself, through intellect and will, the angels need some habits, being
as it were in potentiality in regard to that Pure Act. Wherefore
Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that their habits are "godlike," that is
to say, that by them they are made like to God.
But those habits that are dispositions to the natural being are not in
angels, since they are immaterial.
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of Maximus must be understood of material
habits and accidents.
Reply to Objection 2: As to that which belongs to angels by their essence, they
do not need a habit. But as they are not so far beings of themselves, as
not to partake of Divine wisdom and goodness, therefore, so far as they
need to partake of something from without, so far do they need to have
habits.
Reply to Objection 3: In angels there are no essential parts: but there are
potential parts, in so far as their intellect is perfected by several
species, and in so far as their will has a relation to several things.