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First Part of the Second Part [<< | >>]
Question: 22 [<< | >>]
We must now consider the passions of the soul: first, in general;
secondly, in particular. Taking them in general, there are four things to
be considered: (1) Their subject: (2) The difference between them: (3)
Their mutual relationship: (4) Their malice and goodness.
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is any passion in the soul?
(2) Whether passion is in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive
part?
(3) Whether passion is in the sensitive appetite rather than in the
intellectual appetite, which is called the will?
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Question: 22 [<< | >>]
Article: 1 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no passion in the soul. Because
passivity belongs to matter. But the soul is not composed of matter and
form, as stated in the FP, Question [75], Article [5]. Therefore there is no passion in
the soul.
Objection 2: Further, passion is movement, as is stated in Phys. iii, 3. But
the soul is not moved, as is proved in De Anima i, 3. Therefore passion
is not in the soul.
Objection 3: Further, passion is the road to corruption; since "every passion,
when increased, alters the substance," as is stated in Topic. vi, 6. But
the soul is incorruptible. Therefore no passion is in the soul.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (@Rm. 7:5): "When we were in the flesh,
the passions of sins which were by the law, did the work in our members."
Now sins are, properly speaking, in the soul. Therefore passions also,
which are described as being "of sins," are in the soul.
I answer that, The word "passive" is used in three ways. First, in a
general way, according as whatever receives something is passive,
although nothing is taken from it: thus we may say that the air is
passive when it is lit up. But this is to be perfected rather than to be
passive. Secondly, the word "passive" is employed in its proper sense,
when something is received, while something else is taken away: and this
happens in two ways. For sometimes that which is lost is unsuitable to
the thing: thus when an animal's body is healed, and loses sickness. At
other times the contrary occurs: thus to ail is to be passive; because
the ailment is received and health is lost. And here we have passion in
its most proper acceptation. For a thing is said to be passive from its
being drawn to the agent: and when a thing recedes from what is suitable
to it, then especially does it appear to be drawn to something else.
Moreover in De Generat. i, 3 it is stated that when a more excellent
thing is generated from a less excellent, we have generation simply, and
corruption in a particular respect: whereas the reverse is the case, when
from a more excellent thing, a less excellent is generated. In these
three ways it happens that passions are in the soul. For in the sense of
mere reception, we speak of "feeling and understanding as being a kind of
passion" (De Anima i, 5). But passion, accompanied by the loss of
something, is only in respect of a bodily transmutation; wherefore
passion properly so called cannot be in the soul, save accidentally, in
so far, to wit, as the "composite" is passive. But here again we find a
difference; because when this transmutation is for the worse, it has more
of the nature of a passion, than when it is for the better: hence sorrow
is more properly a passion than joy.
Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to matter to be passive in such a way as to lose
something and to be transmuted: hence this happens only in those things
that are composed of matter and form. But passivity, as implying mere
reception, need not be in matter, but can be in anything that is in
potentiality. Now, though the soul is not composed of matter and form,
yet it has something of potentiality, in respect of which it is competent
to receive or to be passive, according as the act of understanding is a
kind of passion, as stated in De Anima iii, 4.
Reply to Objection 2: Although it does not belong to the soul in itself to be
passive and to be moved, yet it belongs accidentally as stated in De
Anima i, 3.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument is true of passion accompanied by
transmutation to something worse. And passion, in this sense, is not
found in the soul, except accidentally: but the composite, which is
corruptible, admits of it by reason of its own nature.
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Question: 22 [<< | >>]
Article: 2 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that passion is in the apprehensive part of the
soul rather than in the appetitive. Because that which is first in any
genus, seems to rank first among all things that are in that genus, and
to be their cause, as is stated in Metaph. ii, 1. Now passion is found to
be in the apprehensive, before being in the appetitive part: for the
appetitive part is not affected unless there be a previous passion in the
apprehensive part. Therefore passion is in the apprehensive part more
than in the appetitive.
Objection 2: Further, what is more active is less passive; for action is
contrary to passion. Now the appetitive part is more active than the
apprehensive part. Therefore it seems that passion is more in the
apprehensive part.
Objection 3: Further, just as the sensitive appetite is the power of a
corporeal organ, so is the power of sensitive apprehension. But passion
in the soul occurs, properly speaking, in respect of a bodily
transmutation. Therefore passion is not more in the sensitive appetitive
than in the sensitive apprehensive part.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4) that "the movement
of the soul, which the Greeks called {pathe}, are styled by some of our
writers, Cicero [*Those things which the Greeks call {pathe}, we prefer
to call disturbances rather than diseases (Tusc. iv. 5)] for instance,
disturbances; by some, affections or emotions; while others rendering the
Greek more accurately, call them passions." From this it is evident that
the passions of the soul are the same as affections. But affections
manifestly belong to the appetitive, and not to the apprehensive part.
Therefore the passions are in the appetitive rather than in the
apprehensive part.
I answer that, As we have already stated (Article [1]) the word "passion" implies that the patient is drawn to that which belongs to the agent. Now the soul is drawn to a thing by the appetitive power rather than by the apprehensive power: because the soul has, through its appetitive power, an order to things as they are in themselves: hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, 4) that "good and evil," i.e. the objects of the appetitive power, "are in things themselves." On the other hand the apprehensive power is not drawn to a thing, as it is in itself; but knows it by reason of an "intention" of the thing, which "intention" it has in itself, or receives in its own way. Hence we find it stated (Metaph. vi, 4) that "the true and the false," which pertain to knowledge, "are not in things, but in the mind." Consequently it is evident that the nature of passion is consistent with the appetitive, rather than with the apprehensive part.
Reply to Objection 1: In things relating to perfection the case is the opposite,
in comparison to things that pertain to defect. Because in things
relating to perfection, intensity is in proportion to the approach to one
first principle; to which the nearer a thing approaches, the more intense
it is. Thus the intensity of a thing possessed of light depends on its
approach to something endowed with light in a supreme degree, to which
the nearer a thing approaches the more light it possesses. But in things
that relate to defect, intensity depends, not on approach to something
supreme, but in receding from that which is perfect; because therein
consists the very notion of privation and defect. Wherefore the less a
thing recedes from that which stands first, the less intense it is: and
the result is that at first we always find some small defect, which
afterwards increases as it goes on. Now passion pertains to defect,
because it belongs to a thing according as it is in potentiality.
Wherefore in those things that approach to the Supreme Perfection, i.e.
to God, there is but little potentiality and passion: while in other
things, consequently, there is more. Hence also, in the supreme, i.e. the
apprehensive, power of the soul, passion is found less than in the other
powers.
Reply to Objection 2: The appetitive power is said to be more active, because it
is, more than the apprehensive power, the principle of the exterior
action: and this for the same reason that it is more passive, namely, its
being related to things as existing in themselves: since it is through
the external action that we come into contact with things.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated in the FP, Question [78], Article [3] the organs of the soul can
be changed in two ways. First, by a spiritual change, in respect of which
the organ receives an "intention" of the object. And this is essential to
the act of the sensitive apprehension: thus is the eye changed by the
object visible, not by being colored, but by receiving an intention of
color. But the organs are receptive of another and natural change, which
affects their natural disposition; for instance, when they become hot or
cold, or undergo some similar change. And whereas this kind of change is
accidental to the act of the sensitive apprehension; for instance, if the
eye be wearied through gazing intently at something or be overcome by the
intensity of the object: on the other hand, it is essential to the act of
the sensitive appetite; wherefore the material element in the definitions
of the movements of the appetitive part, is the natural change of the
organ; for instance, "anger is" said to be "a kindling of the blood about
the heart." Hence it is evident that the notion of passion is more
consistent with the act of the sensitive appetite, than with that of the
sensitive apprehension, although both are actions of a corporeal organ.
Index [<< | >>]
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Question: 22 [<< | >>]
Article: 3 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that passion is not more in the sensitive than in
the intellectual appetite. For Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. ii)
Hierotheus "to be taught by a kind of yet more Godlike instruction; not
only by learning Divine things, but also by suffering [patiens] them."
But the sensitive appetite cannot "suffer" Divine things, since its
object is the sensible good. Therefore passion is in the intellectual
appetite, just as it is also in the sensitive appetite.
Objection 2: Further, the more powerful the active force, the more intense the
passion. But the object of the intellectual appetite, which is the
universal good, is a more powerful active force than the object of the
sensitive appetite, which is a particular good. Therefore passion is more
consistent with the intellectual than with the sensitive appetite.
Objection 3: Further, joy and love are said to be passions. But these are to
be found in the intellectual and not only in the sensitive appetite: else
they would not be ascribed by the Scriptures to God and the angels.
Therefore the passions are not more in the sensitive than in the
intellectual appetite.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22), while describing
the animal passions: "Passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite
when we imagine good or evil: in other words, passion is a movement of
the irrational soul, when we think of good or evil."
I answer that, As stated above (Article [1]) passion is properly to be found
where there is corporeal transmutation. This corporeal transmutation is
found in the act of the sensitive appetite, and is not only spiritual, as
in the sensitive apprehension, but also natural. Now there is no need for
corporeal transmutation in the act of the intellectual appetite: because
this appetite is not exercised by means of a corporeal organ. It is
therefore evident that passion is more properly in the act of the
sensitive appetite, than in that of the intellectual appetite; and this
is again evident from the definitions of Damascene quoted above.
Reply to Objection 1: By "suffering" Divine things is meant being well affected
towards them, and united to them by love: and this takes place without
any alteration in the body.
Reply to Objection 2: Intensity of passion depends not only on the power of the
agent, but also on the passibility of the patient: because things that
are disposed to passion, suffer much even from petty agents. Therefore
although the object of the intellectual appetite has greater activity
than the object of the sensitive appetite, yet the sensitive appetite is
more passive.
Reply to Objection 3: When love and joy and the like are ascribed to God or the
angels, or to man in respect of his intellectual appetite, they signify
simple acts of the will having like effects, but without passion. Hence
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5): "The holy angels feel no anger while
they punish . . . no fellow-feeling with misery while they relieve the
unhappy: and yet ordinary human speech is wont to ascribe to them also
these passions by name, because, although they have none of our weakness,
their acts bear a certain resemblance to ours."