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Question: 35 [<< | >>]
We have now to consider pain and sorrow: concerning which we must
consider: (1) Sorrow or pain in itself; (2) Its cause; (3) Its effects;
(4) Its remedies; (5) Its goodness or malice.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether pain is a passion of the soul?
(2) Whether sorrow is the same as pain?
(3) Whether sorrow or pain is contrary in pleasure?
(4) Whether all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure?
(5) Whether there is a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation?
(6) Whether sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought?
(7) Whether exterior pain is greater than interior?
(8) Of the species of sorrow.
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Question: 35 [<< | >>]
Article: 1 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that pain is not a passion of the soul. Because no
passion of the soul is in the body. But pain can be in the body, since
Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xii), that "bodily pain is a sudden
corruption of the well-being of that thing which the soul, by making evil
use of it, made subject to corruption." Therefore pain is not a passion
of the soul.
Objection 2: Further, every passion of the soul belongs to the appetitive
faculty. But pain does not belong to the appetitive, but rather to the
apprehensive part: for Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx) that "bodily pain
is caused by the sense resisting a more powerful body." Therefore pain is
not a passion of the soul.
Objection 3: Further, every passion of the soul belongs to the animal
appetite. But pain does not belong to the animal appetite, but rather to
the natural appetite; for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 14): "Had
not some good remained in nature, we should feel no pain in being
punished by the loss of good." Therefore pain is not a passion of the
soul.
On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8) reckons pain among the
passions of the soul; quoting Virgil (Aeneid, vi, 733): "hence wild
desires and grovelling fears/And human laughter, human tears."
[Translation: Conington.]
I answer that, Just as two things are requisite for pleasure; namely,
conjunction with good and perception of this conjunction; so also two
things are requisite for pain: namely, conjunction with some evil (which
is in so far evil as it deprives one of some good), and perception of
this conjunction. Now whatever is conjoined, if it have not the aspect
of good or evil in regard to the being to which it is conjoined, cannot
cause pleasure or pain. Whence it is evident that something under the
aspect of good or evil is the object of the pleasure or pain. But good
and evil, as such, are objects of the appetite. Consequently it is clear
that pleasure and pain belong to the appetite.
Now every appetitive movement or inclination consequent to apprehension,
belongs to the intellective or sensitive appetite: since the inclination
of the natural appetite is not consequent to an apprehension of the
subject of that appetite, but to the apprehension of another, as stated
in the FP, Question [103], Articles [1],3. Since then pleasure and pain presuppose some
sense or apprehension in the same subject, it is evident that pain, like
pleasure, is in the intellective or sensitive appetite.
Again every movement of the sensitive appetite is called a passion, as
stated above (Question [22], Articles [1],3): and especially those which tend to some
defect. Consequently pain, according as it is in the sensitive appetite,
is most properly called a passion of the soul: just as bodily ailments
are properly called passions of the body. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei
xiv, 7,[8] [*Quoting Cicero]) reckons pain especially as being a kind of
ailment.
Reply to Objection 1: We speak of the body, because the cause of pain is in the
body: as when we suffer something hurtful to the body. But the movement
of pain is always in the soul; since "the body cannot feel pain unless
the soul feel it," as Augustine says (Super Psalm 87:4).
Reply to Objection 2: We speak of pain of the senses, not as though it were an
act of the sensitive power; but because the senses are required for
bodily pain, in the same way as for bodily pleasure.
Reply to Objection 3: Pain at the loss of good proves the goodness of the nature,
not because pain is an act of the natural appetite, but because nature
desires something as good, the removal of which being perceived, there
results the passion of pain in the sensitive appetite.
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Question: 35 [<< | >>]
Article: 2 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is not pain. For Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xiv, 7) that "pain is used to express bodily suffering." But
sorrow is used more in reference to the soul. Therefore sorrow is not
pain.
Objection 2: Further, pain is only in respect of present evil. But sorrow can
refer to both past and future evil: thus repentance is sorrow for the
past, and anxiety for the future. Therefore sorrow is quite different
from pain.
Objection 3: Further, pain seems not to follow save from the sense of touch.
But sorrow can arise from all the senses. Therefore sorrow is not pain,
and extends to more objects.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (@Rm. 9:2): "I have great sorrow
[Douay: 'sadness'] and continual pain [Douay: 'sorrow'] in my heart,"
thus denoting the same thing by sorrow and pain.
I answer that, Pleasure and pain can arise from a twofold apprehension,
namely, from the apprehension of an exterior sense; and from the interior
apprehension of the intellect or of the imagination. Now the interior
apprehension extends to more objects than the exterior apprehension:
because whatever things come under the exterior apprehension, come under
the interior, but not conversely. Consequently that pleasure alone which
is caused by an interior apprehension is called joy, as stated above
(Question [31], Article [3]): and in like manner that pain alone which is caused by an
interior apprehension, is called sorrow. And just as that pleasure which
is caused by an exterior apprehension, is called pleasure but not joy; so
too that pain which is caused by an exterior apprehension, is called pain
indeed but not sorrow. Accordingly sorrow is a species of pain, as joy is
a species of pleasure.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking there of the use of the word: because
"pain" is more generally used in reference to bodily pains, which are
better known, than in reference to spiritual pains.
Reply to Objection 2: External sense perceives only what is present; but the
interior cognitive power can perceive the present, past and future.
Consequently sorrow can regard present, past and future: whereas bodily
pain, which follows apprehension of the external sense, can only regard
something present.
Reply to Objection 3: The sensibles of touch are painful, not only in so far as
they are disproportionate to the apprehensive power, but also in so far
as they are contrary to nature: whereas the objects of the other senses
can indeed be disproportionate to the apprehensive power, but they are
not contrary to nature, save as they are subordinate to the sensibles of
touch. Consequently man alone, who is a perfectly cognizant animal, takes
pleasure in the objects of the other senses for their own sake; whereas
other animals take no pleasure in them save as referable to the sensibles
of touch, as stated in Ethic. iii, 10. Accordingly, in referring to the
objects of the other senses, we do not speak of pain in so far as it is
contrary to natural pleasure: but rather of sorrow, which is contrary to
joy. So then if pain be taken as denoting bodily pain, which is its more
usual meaning, then it is contrasted with sorrow, according to the
distinction of interior and exterior apprehension; although, on the part
of the objects, pleasure extends further than does bodily pain. But if
pain be taken in a wide sense, then it is the genus of sorrow, as stated
above.
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Question: 35 [<< | >>]
Article: 3 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is not contrary to pleasure. For one of
two contraries is not the cause of the other. But sorrow can be the cause
of pleasure; for it is written (@Mt. 5:5): "Blessed are they that mourn,
for they shall be comforted." Therefore they are not contrary to one
another.
Objection 2: Further, one contrary does not denominate the other. But to some,
pain or sorrow gives pleasure: thus Augustine says (Confess. iii, 2) that
in stage-plays sorrow itself gives pleasure: and (Confess. iv, 5) that
"weeping is a bitter thing, and yet it sometimes pleases us." Therefore
pain is not contrary to pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, one contrary is not the matter of the other; because
contraries cannot co-exist together. But sorrow can be the matter of
pleasure; for Augustine says (De Poenit. xiii): "The penitent should ever
sorrow, and rejoice in his sorrow." The Philosopher too says (Ethic. ix,
4) that, on the other hand, "the evil man feels pain at having been
pleased." Therefore pleasure and pain are not contrary to one another.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6) that "joy is the
volition of consent to the things we wish: and that sorrow is the
volition of dissent from the things we do not wish." But consent and
dissent are contraries. Therefore pleasure and sorrow are contrary to one
another.
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Metaph. x, 4), contrariety is a
difference in respect of a form. Now the form or species of a passion or
movement is taken from the object or term. Consequently, since the
objects of pleasure and sorrow or pain, viz. present good and present
evil, are contrary to one another, it follows that pain and pleasure are
contrary to one another.
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing hinders one contrary causing the other
accidentally: and thus sorrow can be the cause of pleasure. In one way,
in so far as from sorrow at the absence of something, or at the presence
of its contrary, one seeks the more eagerly for something pleasant: thus
a thirsty man seeks more eagerly the pleasure of a drink, as a remedy for
the pain he suffers. In another way, in so far as, from a strong desire
for a certain pleasure, one does not shrink from undergoing pain, so as
to obtain that pleasure. In each of these ways, the sorrows of the
present life lead us to the comfort of the future life. Because by the
mere fact that man mourns for his sins, or for the delay of glory, he
merits the consolation of eternity. In like manner a man merits it when
he shrinks not from hardships and straits in order to obtain it.
Reply to Objection 2: Pain itself can be pleasurable accidentally in so far as it
is accompanied by wonder, as in stage-plays; or in so far as it recalls a
beloved object to one's memory, and makes one feel one's love for the
thing, whose absence gives us pain. Consequently, since love is pleasant,
both pain and whatever else results from love, forasmuch as they remind
us of our love, are pleasant. And, for this reason, we derive pleasure
even from pains depicted on the stage: in so far as, in witnessing them,
we perceive ourselves to conceive a certain love for those who are there
represented.
Reply to Objection 3: The will and the reason reflect on their own acts, inasmuch
as the acts themselves of the will and reason are considered under the
aspect of good or evil. In this way sorrow can be the matter of pleasure,
or vice versa, not essentially but accidentally: that is, in so far as
either of them is considered under the aspect of good or evil.
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Question: 35 [<< | >>]
Article: 4 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure.
Because, just as whiteness and blackness are contrary species of color,
so pleasure and sorrow are contrary species of the soul's passions. But
whiteness and blackness are universally contrary to one another.
Therefore pleasure and sorrow are so too.
Objection 2: Further, remedies are made of things contrary (to the evil). But
every pleasure is a remedy for all manner of sorrow, as the Philosopher
declares (Ethic. vii, 14). Therefore every pleasure is contrary to every
sorrow.
Objection 3: Further, contraries are hindrances to one another. But every
sorrow hinders any kind of pleasure: as is evident from Ethic. x, 5.
Therefore every sorrow is contrary to every pleasure.
On the contrary, The same thing is not the cause of contraries. But joy
for one thing, and sorrow for the opposite thing, proceed from the same
habit: thus from charity it happens that we "rejoice with them that
rejoice," and "weep with them that weep" (@Rm. 12:15). Therefore not every
sorrow is contrary to every pleasure.
I answer that, As stated in Metaph. x, 4 contrariety is a difference in
respect of a form. Now a form may be generic or specific. Consequently
things may be contraries in respect of a generic form, as virtue and
vice; or in respect of a specific form, as justice and injustice.
Now we must observe that some things are specified by absolute forms,
e.g. substances and qualities; whereas other things are specified in
relation to something extrinsic, e.g. passions and movements, which
derive their species from their terms or objects. Accordingly in those
things that are specified by absolute forms, it happens that species
contained under contrary genera are not contrary as to their specific
nature: but it does not happen for them to have any affinity or
fittingness to one another. For intemperance and justice, which are in
the contrary genera of virtue and vice, are not contrary to one another
in respect of their specific nature; and yet they have no affinity or
fittingness to one another. On the other hand, in those things that are
specified in relation to something extrinsic, it happens that species
belonging to contrary genera, are not only not contrary to one another,
but also that they have a certain mutual affinity or fittingness. The
reason of this is that where there is one same relation to two
contraries, there is contrariety; e.g. to approach to a white thing, and
to approach to a black thing, are contraries; whereas contrary relations
to contrary things, implies a certain likeness, e.g. to recede from
something white, and to approach to something black. This is most evident
in the case of contradiction, which is the principle of opposition:
because opposition consists in affirming and denying the same thing, e.g.
"white" and "non-white"; while there is fittingness and likeness in the
affirmation of one contrary and the denial of the other, as, if I were to
say "black" and "not white."
Now sorrow and pleasure, being passions, are specified by their objects.
According to their respective genera, they are contrary to one another:
since one is a kind of "pursuit," the other a kind of "avoidance," which
"are to the appetite, what affirmation and denial are to the intellect"
(Ethic. vi, 2). Consequently sorrow and pleasure in respect of the same
object, are specifically contrary to one another: whereas sorrow and
pleasure in respect of objects that are not contrary but disparate, are
not specifically contrary to one another, but are also disparate; for
instance, sorrow at the death of a friend, and pleasure in contemplation.
If, however, those diverse objects be contrary to one another, then
pleasure and sorrow are not only specifically contrary, but they also
have a certain mutual fittingness and affinity: for instance to rejoice
in good and to sorrow for evil.
Reply to Objection 1: Whiteness and blackness do not take their species from
their relationship to something extrinsic, as pleasure and sorrow do:
wherefore the comparison does not hold.
Reply to Objection 2: Genus is taken from matter, as is stated in Metaph. viii,
2; and in accidents the subject takes the place of matter. Now it has
been said above that pleasure and sorrow are generically contrary to one
another. Consequently in every sorrow the subject has a disposition
contrary to the disposition of the subject of pleasure: because in every
pleasure the appetite is viewed as accepting what it possesses, and in
every sorrow, as avoiding it. And therefore on the part of the subject
every pleasure is a remedy for any kind of sorrow, and every sorrow is a
hindrance of all manner of pleasure: but chiefly when pleasure is opposed
to sorrow specifically.
Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is evident. Or we may say
that, although not every sorrow is specifically contrary to every
pleasure, yet they are contrary to one another in regard to their
effects: since one has the effect of strengthening the animal nature,
while the other results in a kind of discomfort.
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Question: 35 [<< | >>]
Article: 5 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that there is a sorrow that is contrary to the
pleasure of contemplation. For the Apostle says (@2 Cor. 7:10): "The
sorrow that is according to God, worketh penance steadfast unto
salvation." Now to look at God belongs to the higher reason, whose act is
to give itself to contemplation, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii,
3,4). Therefore there is a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of
contemplation.
Objection 2: Further, contrary things have contrary effects. If therefore the
contemplation of one contrary gives pleasure, the other contrary will
give sorrow: and so there will be a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of
contemplation.
Objection 3: Further, as the object of pleasure is good, so the object of
sorrow is evil. But contemplation can be an evil: since the Philosopher
says (Metaph. xii, 9) that "it is unfitting to think of certain things."
Therefore sorrow can be contrary to the pleasure of contemplation.
Objection 4: Further, any work, so far as it is unhindered, can be a cause of
pleasure, as stated in Ethic. vii, 12,13; x, 4. But the work of
contemplation can be hindered in many ways, either so as to destroy it
altogether, or as to make it difficult. Therefore in contemplation there
can be a sorrow contrary to the pleasure.
Objection 5: Further, affliction of the flesh is a cause of sorrow. But, as it
is written (@Eccles. 12:12) "much study is an affliction of the flesh."
Therefore contemplation admits of sorrow contrary to its pleasure.
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 8:16): "Her," i.e. wisdom's,
"conversation hath no bitterness nor her company any tediousness; but joy
and gladness." Now the conversation and company of wisdom are found in
contemplation. Therefore there is no sorrow contrary to the pleasure of
contemplation.
I answer that, The pleasure of contemplation can be understood in two
ways. In one way, so that contemplation is the cause, but not the object
of pleasure: and then pleasure is taken not in contemplating but in the
thing contemplated. Now it is possible to contemplate something harmful
and sorrowful, just as to contemplate something suitable and pleasant.
Consequently if the pleasure of contemplation be taken in this way,
nothing hinders some sorrow being contrary to the pleasure of
contemplation.
In another way, the pleasure of contemplation is understood, so that
contemplation is its object and cause; as when one takes pleasure in the
very act of contemplating. And thus, according to Gregory of Nyssa
[*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii.], "no sorrow is contrary to that pleasure
which is about contemplation": and the Philosopher says the same (Topic.
i, 13; Ethic. x, 3). This, however, is to be understood as being the case
properly speaking. The reason is because sorrow is of itself contrary to
pleasure in a contrary object: thus pleasure in heat is contrary to
sorrow caused by cold. But there is no contrary to the object of
contemplation: because contraries, as apprehended by the mind, are not
contrary, but one is the means of knowing the other. Wherefore, properly
speaking, there cannot be a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of
contemplation. Nor has it any sorrow annexed to it, as bodily pleasures
have, which are like remedies against certain annoyances; thus a man
takes pleasure in drinking through being troubled with thirst, but when
the thirst is quite driven out, the pleasure of drinking ceases also.
Because the pleasure of contemplation is not caused by one's being quit
of an annoyance, but by the fact that contemplation is pleasant in
itself: for pleasure is not a "becoming" but a perfect operation, as
stated above (Question [31], Article [1]).
Accidentally, however, sorrow is mingled with the pleasure of
contemplation; and this in two ways: first, on the part of an organ,
secondly, through some impediment in the apprehension. On the part of an
organ, sorrow or pain is mingled with apprehension, directly, as regards
the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part, which have a bodily organ;
either from the sensible object disagreeing with the normal condition of
the organ, as the taste of something bitter, and the smell of something
foul; or from the sensible object, though agreeable, being so continuous
in its action on the sense, that it exceeds the normal condition of the
organ, as stated above (Question [33], Article [2]), the result being that an
apprehension which at first was pleasant becomes tedious. But these two
things cannot occur directly in the contemplation of the mind; because
the mind has no corporeal organ: wherefore it was said in the authority
quoted above that intellectual contemplation has neither "bitterness,"
nor "tediousness." Since, however, the human mind, in contemplation,
makes use of the sensitive powers of apprehension, to whose acts
weariness is incidental; therefore some affliction or pain is indirectly
mingled with contemplation.
Nevertheless, in neither of these ways, is the pain thus accidentally
mingled with contemplation, contrary to the pleasure thereof. Because
pain caused by a hindrance to contemplation, is not contrary to the
pleasure of contemplation, but rather is in affinity and in harmony with
it, as is evident from what has been said above (Article [4]): while pain or
sorrow caused by bodily weariness, does not belong to the same genus,
wherefore it is altogether disparate. Accordingly it is evident that no
sorrow is contrary to pleasure taken in the very act of contemplation;
nor is any sorrow connected with it save accidentally.
Reply to Objection 1: The "sorrow which is according to God," is not caused by
the very act of intellectual contemplation, but by something which the
mind contemplates: viz. by sin, which the mind considers as contrary to
the love of God.
Reply to Objection 2: Things which are contrary according to nature are not
contrary according as they exist in the mind: for things that are
contrary in reality are not contrary in the order of thought; indeed
rather is one contrary the reason for knowing the other. Hence one and
the same science considers contraries.
Reply to Objection 3: Contemplation, in itself, is never evil, since it is
nothing else than the consideration of truth, which is the good of the
intellect: it can, however, be evil accidentally, i.e. in so far as the
contemplation of a less noble object hinders the contemplation of a more
noble object; or on the part of the object contemplated, to which the
appetite is inordinately attached.
Reply to Objection 4: Sorrow caused by a hindrance to contemplation, is not
contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, but is in harmony with it, as
stated above.
Reply to Objection 5: Affliction of the flesh affects contemplation accidentally
and indirectly, as stated above.
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Question: 35 [<< | >>]
Article: 6 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is
to be sought. For Augustine says (Questions. 83, qu. 63): "There is nobody that
does not shun sorrow more than he seeks pleasure." Now that which all
agree in doing, seems to be natural. Therefore it is natural and right
for sorrow to be shunned more than pleasure is sought.
Objection 2: Further, the action of a contrary conduces to rapidity and
intensity of movement: for "hot water freezes quicker and harder," as the
Philosopher says (Meteor. i, 12). But the shunning of sorrow is due to
the contrariety of the cause of sorrow; whereas the desire for pleasure
does not arise from any contrariety, but rather from the suitableness of
the pleasant object. Therefore sorrow is shunned more eagerly than
pleasure is sought.
Objection 3: Further, the stronger the passion which a man resists according
to reason, the more worthy is he of praise, and the more virtuous: since
"virtue is concerned with the difficult and the good" (Ethic. ii, 3). But
the brave man who resists the movement of shunning sorrow, is more
virtuous than the temperate man, who resists the movement of desire for
pleasure: since the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "the brave and
the just are chiefly praised." Therefore the movement of shunning sorrow
is more eager than the movement of seeking pleasure.
On the contrary, Good is stronger than evil, as Dionysius declares (Div.
Nom. iv). But pleasure is desirable for the sake of the good which is its
object; whereas the shunning of sorrow is on account of evil. Therefore
the desire for pleasure is more eager than the shunning of sorrow.
I answer that, The desire for pleasure is of itself more eager than the
shunning of sorrow. The reason of this is that the cause of pleasure is a
suitable good; while the cause of pain or sorrow is an unsuitable evil.
Now it happens that a certain good is suitable without any repugnance at
all: but it is not possible for any evil to be so unsuitable as not to be
suitable in some way. Wherefore pleasure can be entire and perfect:
whereas sorrow is always partial. Therefore desire for pleasure is
naturally greater than the shunning of sorrow. Another reason is because
the good, which is the object of pleasure, is sought for its own sake:
whereas the evil, which is the object of sorrow, is to be shunned as
being a privation of good: and that which is by reason of itself is
stronger than that which is by reason of something else. Moreover we find
a confirmation of this in natural movements. For every natural movement
is more intense in the end, when a thing approaches the term that is
suitable to its nature, than at the beginning, when it leaves the term
that is unsuitable to its nature: as though nature were more eager in
tending to what is suitable to it, than in shunning what is unsuitable.
Therefore the inclination of the appetitive power is, of itself, more
eager in tending to pleasure than in shunning sorrow.
But it happens accidentally that a man shuns sorrow more eagerly than he
seeks pleasure: and this for three reasons. First, on the part of the
apprehension. Because, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12), "love is felt
more keenly, when we lack that which we love." Now from the lack of what
we love, sorrow results, which is caused either by the loss of some loved
good, or by the presence of some contrary evil. But pleasure suffers no
lack of the good loved, for it rests in possession of it. Since then love
is the cause of pleasure and sorrow, the latter is more the shunned,
according as love is the more keenly felt on account of that which is
contrary to it. Secondly, on the part of the cause of sorrow or pain,
which cause is repugnant to a good that is more loved than the good in
which we take pleasure. For we love the natural well-being of the body
more than the pleasure of eating: and consequently we would leave the
pleasure of eating and the like, from fear of the pain occasioned by
blows or other such causes, which are contrary to the well-being of the
body. Thirdly, on the part of the effect: namely, in so far as sorrow
hinders not only one pleasure, but all.
Reply to Objection 1: The saying of Augustine that "sorrow is shunned more than
pleasure is sought" is true accidentally but not simply. And this is
clear from what he says after: "Since we see that the most savage animals
are deterred from the greatest pleasures by fear of pain," which pain is
contrary to life which is loved above all.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not the same with movement from within and movement
from without. For movement from within tends to what is suitable more
than it recedes from that which is unsuitable; as we remarked above in
regard to natural movement. But movement from without is intensified by
the very opposition: because each thing strives in its own way to resist
anything contrary to it, as aiming at its own preservation. Hence
violent movement is intense at first, and slackens towards the end. Now
the movement of the appetitive faculty is from within: since it tends
from the soul to the object. Consequently pleasure is, of itself, more to
be sought than sorrow is to be shunned. But the movement of the sensitive
faculty is from without, as it were from the object of the soul.
Consequently the more contrary a thing is the more it is felt. And then
too, accidentally, in so far as the senses are requisite for pleasure and
pain, pain is shunned more than pleasure is sought.
Reply to Objection 3: A brave man is not praised because, in accordance with
reason, he is not overcome by any kind of sorrow or pain whatever, but
because he is not overcome by that which is concerned with the dangers of
death. And this kind of sorrow is more shunned, than pleasures of the
table or of sexual intercourse are sought, which latter pleasures are the
object of temperance: thus life is loved more than food and sexual
pleasure. But the temperate man is praised for refraining from pleasures
of touch, more than for not shunning the pains which are contrary to
them, as is stated in Ethic. iii, 11.
Index [<< | >>]
First Part of the Second Part [<< | >>]
Question: 35 [<< | >>]
Article: 7 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that outward pain is greater than interior sorrow
of the heart. Because outward pain arises from a cause repugnant to the
well-being of the body in which is life: whereas interior sorrow is
caused by some evil in the imagination. Since, therefore, life is loved
more than an imagined good, it seems that, according to what has been
said above (Article [6]), outward pain is greater than interior sorrow.
Objection 2: Further, the reality moves more than its likeness does. But
outward pain arises from the real conjunction of some contrary; whereas
inward sorrow arises from the apprehended likeness of a contrary.
Therefore outward pain is greater than inward sorrow.
Objection 3: Further, a cause is known by its effect. But outward pain has
more striking effects: since man dies sooner of outward pain than of
interior sorrow. Therefore outward pain is greater and is shunned more
than interior sorrow.
On the contrary, it is written (Ecclus. 25:17): "The sadness of the
heart is every wound [Douay: 'plague'], and the wickedness of a woman is
all evil." Therefore, just as the wickedness of a woman surpasses all
other wickedness, as the text implies; so sadness of the heart surpasses
every outward wound.
I answer that, Interior and exterior pain agree in one point and differ
in two. They agree in this, that each is a movement of the appetitive
power, as stated above (Article [1]). But they differ in respect of those two
things which are requisite for pain and pleasure; namely, in respect of
the cause, which is a conjoined good or evil; and in respect of the
apprehension. For the cause of outward pain is a conjoined evil
repugnant to the body; while the cause of inward pain is a conjoined evil
repugnant to the appetite. Again, outward pain arises from an
apprehension of sense, chiefly of touch; while inward pain arises from an
interior apprehension, of the imagination or of the reason.
If then we compare the cause of inward pain to the cause of outward
pain, the former belongs, of itself, to the appetite to which both these
pains belong: while the latter belongs to the appetite directly. Because
inward pain arises from something being repugnant to the appetite itself,
while outward pain arises from something being repugnant to the appetite,
through being repugnant to the body. Now, that which is of itself is
always prior to that which is by reason of another. Wherefore, from this
point of view, inward pain surpasses outward pain. In like manner also on
the part of apprehension: because the apprehension of reason and
imagination is of a higher order than the apprehension of the sense of
touch. Consequently inward pain is, simply and of itself, more keen than
outward pain: a sign whereof is that one willingly undergoes outward pain
in order to avoid inward pain: and in so far as outward pain is not
repugnant to the interior appetite, it becomes in a manner pleasant and
agreeable by way of inward joy. Sometimes, however, outward pain is
accompanied by inward pain, and then the pain is increased. Because
inward pain is not only greater than outward pain, it is also more
universal: since whatever is repugnant to the body, can be repugnant to
the interior appetite; and whatever is apprehended by sense may be
apprehended by imagination and reason, but not conversely. Hence in the
passage quoted above it is said expressively: "Sadness of the heart is
every wound," because even the pains of outward wounds are comprised in
the interior sorrows of the heart.
Reply to Objection 1: Inward pain can also arise from things that are destructive
of life. And then the comparison of inward to outward pain must not be
taken in reference to the various evils that cause pain; but in regard to
the various ways in which this cause of pain is compared to the appetite.
Reply to Objection 2: Inward pain is not caused by the apprehended likeness of a
thing: for a man is not inwardly pained by the apprehended likeness
itself, but by the thing which the likeness represents. And this thing is
all the more perfectly apprehended by means of its likeness, as this
likeness is more immaterial and abstract. Consequently inward pain is, of
itself, greater, as being caused by a greater evil, forasmuch as evil is
better known by an inward apprehension.
Reply to Objection 3: Bodily changes are more liable to be caused by outward
pain, both from the fact that outward pain is caused by a corruptive
conjoined corporally, which is a necessary condition of the sense of
touch; and from the fact that the outward sense is more material than the
inward sense, just as the sensitive appetite is more material than the
intellective. For this reason, as stated above (Question [22], Article [3]; Question [31], Article [5]), the body undergoes a greater change from the movement of the
sensitive appetite: and, in like manner, from outward than from inward
pain.
Index [<< | >>]
First Part of the Second Part [<< | >>]
Question: 35 [<< | >>]
Article: 8 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that Damascene's (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) division of
sorrow into four species is incorrect; viz. into "torpor, distress,"
which Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.] calls
"anxiety,"---"pity," and "envy." For sorrow is contrary to pleasure. But
there are not several species of pleasure. Therefore it is incorrect to
assign different species of sorrow.
Objection 2: Further, "Repentance" is a species of sorrow; and so are
"indignation" and "jealousy," as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 9,11).
But these are not included in the above species. Therefore this division
is insufficient.
Objection 3: Further, the members of a division should be things that are
opposed to one another. But these species are not opposed to one another.
For according to Gregory [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.] "torpor is sorrow
depriving of speech; anxiety is the sorrow that weighs down; envy is
sorrow for another's good; pity is sorrow for another's wrongs." But it
is possible for one to sorrow for another's wrongs, and for another's
good, and at the same time to be weighed down inwardly, and outwardly to
be speechless. Therefore this division is correct.
On the contrary, stands the twofold authority of Gregory of Nyssa
[*Nemesius] and of Damascene.
I answer that, It belongs to the notion of a species that it is
something added to the genus. But a thing can be added to a genus in two
ways. First, as something belonging of itself to the genus, and virtually
contained therein: thus "rational" is added to "animal." Such an addition
makes true species of a genus: as the Philosopher says (Metaph. vii, 12;
viii, 2,3). But, secondly, a thing may be added to a genus, that is, as
it were, foreign to the notion conveyed by that genus: thus "white" or
something of the kind may be added to "animal." Such an addition does not
make true species of the genus, according to the usual sense in which we
speak of genera and species. But sometimes a thing is said to be a
species of a certain genus, through having something foreign to that
genus indeed, but to which the notion of that genus is applicable: thus a
live coal or a flame is said to be a species of fire, because in each of
them the nature of fire is applied to a foreign matter. In like manner we
speak of astronomy and perspective as being species of mathematics,
inasmuch as the principles of mathematics are applied to natural matter.
In accordance with this manner of speaking, the species of sorrow are
reckoned by an application of the notion of sorrow to something foreign
to it. This foreign matter may be taken on the part of the cause or the
object, or of the effect. For the proper object of sorrow is "one's own
evil." Hence sorrow may be concerned for an object foreign to it either
through one's being sorry for an evil that is not one's own; and thus we
have "pity" which is sorrow for another's evil, considered, however, as
one's own: or through one's being sorry for something that is neither
evil nor one's own, but another's good, considered, however, as one's own
evil: and thus we have "envy." The proper effect of sorrow consists in a
certain "flight of the appetite." Wherefore the foreign element in the
effect of sorrow, may be taken so as to affect the first part only, by
excluding flight: and thus we have "anxiety" which weighs on the mind, so
as to make escape seem impossible: hence it is also called "perplexity."
If, however, the mind be weighed down so much, that even the limbs become
motionless, which belongs to "torpor," then we have the foreign element
affecting both, since there is neither flight, nor is the effect in the
appetite. And the reason why torpor especially is said to deprive one of
speech is because of all the external movements the voice is the best
expression of the inward thought and desire, not only in men, but also in
other animals, as is stated in Polit. i, 1.
Reply to Objection 1: Pleasure is caused by good, which has only one meaning: and
so pleasure is not divided into several species as sorrow is; for the
latter is caused by evil, which "happens in many ways," as Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. iv).
Reply to Objection 2: Repentance is for one's own evil, which is the proper
object of sorrow: wherefore it does not belong to these species. Jealousy
and indignation are included in envy, as we shall explain later (SS,
Question [36], Article [2]).
Reply to Objection 3: This division is not according to opposite species; but
according to the diversity of foreign matter to which the notion of
sorrow is applied, as stated above.