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Question: 4 [<< | >>]
We have now to consider those things that are required for happiness:
and concerning this there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether delight is required for happiness?
(2) Which is of greater account in happiness, delight or vision?
(3) Whether comprehension is required?
(4) Whether rectitude of the will is required?
(5) Whether the body is necessary for man's happiness?
(6) Whether any perfection of the body is necessary?
(7) Whether any external goods are necessary?
(8) Whether the fellowship of friends is necessary?
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Objection 1: It would seem that delight is not required for happiness. For
Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that "vision is the entire reward of
faith." But the prize or reward of virtue is happiness, as the
Philosopher clearly states (Ethic. i, 9). Therefore nothing besides
vision is required for happiness.
Objection 2: Further, happiness is "the most self-sufficient of all goods," as
the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 7). But that which needs something
else is not self-sufficient. Since then the essence of happiness consists
in seeing God, as stated above (Question [3], Article [8]); it seems that delight is not
necessary for happiness.
Objection 3: Further, the "operation of bliss or happiness should be
unhindered" (Ethic. vii, 13). But delight hinders the operation of the
intellect: since it destroys the estimate of prudence (Ethic. vi, 5).
Therefore delight is not necessary for happiness.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is "joy
in truth."
I answer that, One thing may be necessary for another in four ways.
First, as a preamble and preparation to it: thus instruction is necessary
for science. Secondly, as perfecting it: thus the soul is necessary for
the life of the body. Thirdly, as helping it from without: thus friends
are necessary for some undertaking. Fourthly, as something attendant on
it: thus we might say that heat is necessary for fire. And in this way
delight is necessary for happiness. For it is caused by the appetite
being at rest in the good attained. Wherefore, since happiness is nothing
else but the attainment of the Sovereign Good, it cannot be without
concomitant delight.
Reply to Objection 1: From the very fact that a reward is given to anyone, the
will of him who deserves it is at rest, and in this consists delight.
Consequently, delight is included in the very notion of reward.
Reply to Objection 2: The very sight of God causes delight. Consequently, he who
sees God cannot need delight.
Reply to Objection 3: Delight that is attendant upon the operation of the intellect does not hinder it, rather does it perfect it, as stated in Ethic. x, 4: since what we do with delight, we do with greater care and perseverance. On the other hand, delight which is extraneous to the operation is a hindrance thereto: sometimes by distracting the attention because, as already observed, we are more attentive to those things that delight us; and when we are very attentive to one thing, we must needs be less attentive to another: sometimes on account of opposition; thus a sensual delight that is contrary to reason, hinders the estimate of prudence more than it hinders the estimate of the speculative intellect.
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Objection 1: It would seem that in happiness, delight ranks before vision. For
"delight is the perfection of operation" (Ethic. x, 4). But perfection
ranks before the thing perfected. Therefore delight ranks before the
operation of the intellect, i.e. vision.
Objection 2: Further, that by reason of which a thing is desirable, is yet
more desirable. But operations are desired on account of the delight they
afford: hence, too, nature has adjusted delight to those operations which
are necessary for the preservation of the individual and of the species,
lest animals should disregard such operations. Therefore, in happiness,
delight ranks before the operation of the intellect, which is vision.
Objection 3: Further, vision corresponds to faith; while delight or enjoyment
corresponds to charity. But charity ranks before faith, as the Apostle
says (@1 Cor. 13:13). Therefore delight or enjoyment ranks before vision.
On the contrary, The cause is greater than its effect. But vision is the
cause of delight. Therefore vision ranks before delight.
I answer that, The Philosopher discusses this question (Ethic. x, 4),
and leaves it unsolved. But if one consider the matter carefully, the
operation of the intellect which is vision, must needs rank before
delight. For delight consists in a certain repose of the will. Now that
the will finds rest in anything, can only be on account of the goodness
of that thing in which it reposes. If therefore the will reposes in an
operation, the will's repose is caused by the goodness of the operation.
Nor does the will seek good for the sake of repose; for thus the very act
of the will would be the end, which has been disproved above (Question [1], Article [1], ad 2; Question [3], Article [4]): but it seeks to be at rest in the operation, because
that operation is its good. Consequently it is evident that the operation
in which the will reposes ranks before the resting of the will therein.
Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) "delight perfects
operation as vigor perfects youth," because it is a result of youth.
Consequently delight is a perfection attendant upon vision; but not a
perfection whereby vision is made perfect in its own species.
Reply to Objection 2: The apprehension of the senses does not attain to the
universal good, but to some particular good which is delightful. And
consequently, according to the sensitive appetite which is in animals,
operations are sought for the sake of delight. But the intellect
apprehends the universal good, the attainment of which results in
delight: wherefore its purpose is directed to good rather than to
delight. Hence it is that the Divine intellect, which is the Author of
nature, adjusted delights to operations on account of the operations.
And we should form our estimate of things not simply according to the
order of the sensitive appetite, but rather according to the order of the
intellectual appetite.
Reply to Objection 3: Charity does not seem the beloved good for the sake of
delight: it is for charity a consequence that it delights in the good
gained which it loves. Thus delight does not answer to charity as its
end, but vision does, whereby the end is first made present to charity.
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Objection 1: It would seem that comprehension is not necessary for happiness.
For Augustine says (Ad Paulinam de Videndo Deum; [*Cf. Serm. xxxciii De
Verb. Dom.]): "To reach God with the mind is happiness, to comprehend Him
is impossible." Therefore happiness is without comprehension.
Objection 2: Further, happiness is the perfection of man as to his
intellective part, wherein there are no other powers than the intellect
and will, as stated in the FP, Questions [79] and following. But the intellect is
sufficiently perfected by seeing God, and the will by enjoying Him.
Therefore there is no need for comprehension as a third.
Objection 3: Further, happiness consists in an operation. But operations are
determined by their objects: and there are two universal objects, the
true and the good: of which the true corresponds to vision, and good to
delight. Therefore there is no need for comprehension as a third.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (@1 Cor. 9:24): "So run that you may
comprehend [Douay: 'obtain']." But happiness is the goal of the spiritual
race: hence he says (@2 Tim. 4:7,8): "I have fought a good fight, I have
finished my course, I have kept the faith; as to the rest there is laid
up for me a crown of justice." Therefore comprehension is necessary for
Happiness.
I answer that, Since Happiness consists in gaining the last end, those
things that are required for Happiness must be gathered from the way in
which man is ordered to an end. Now man is ordered to an intelligible end
partly through his intellect, and partly through his will: through his
intellect, in so far as a certain imperfect knowledge of the end
pre-exists in the intellect: through the will, first by love which is the
will's first movement towards anything; secondly, by a real relation of
the lover to the thing beloved, which relation may be threefold. For
sometimes the thing beloved is present to the lover: and then it is no
longer sought for. Sometimes it is not present, and it is impossible to
attain it: and then, too, it is not sought for. But sometimes it is
possible to attain it, yet it is raised above the capability of the
attainer, so that he cannot have it forthwith; and this is the relation
of one that hopes, to that which he hopes for, and this relation alone
causes a search for the end. To these three, there are a corresponding
three in Happiness itself. For perfect knowledge of the end corresponds
to imperfect knowledge; presence of the end corresponds to the relation
of hope; but delight in the end now present results from love, as already
stated (Article [2], ad 3). And therefore these three must concur with
Happiness; to wit, vision, which is perfect knowledge of the intelligible
end; comprehension, which implies presence of the end; and delight or
enjoyment, which implies repose of the lover in the object beloved.
Reply to Objection 1: Comprehension is twofold. First, inclusion of the
comprehended in the comprehensor; and thus whatever is comprehended by
the finite, is itself finite. Wherefore God cannot be thus comprehended
by a created intellect. Secondly, comprehension means nothing but the
holding of something already present and possessed: thus one who runs
after another is said to comprehend [*In English we should say 'catch.']
him when he lays hold on him. And in this sense comprehension is
necessary for Happiness.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as hope and love pertain to the will, because it is
the same one that loves a thing, and that tends towards it while not
possessed, so, too, comprehension and delight belong to the will, since
it is the same that possesses a thing and reposes therein.
Reply to Objection 3: Comprehension is not a distinct operation from vision; but
a certain relation to the end already gained. Wherefore even vision
itself, or the thing seen, inasmuch as it is present, is the object of
comprehension.
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Objection 1: It would seem that rectitude of the will is not necessary for
Happiness. For Happiness consists essentially in an operation of the
intellect, as stated above (Question [3], Article [4]). But rectitude of the will, by
reason of which men are said to be clean of heart, is not necessary for
the perfect operation of the intellect: for Augustine says (Retract. i,
4) "I do not approve of what I said in a prayer: O God, Who didst will
none but the clean of heart to know the truth. For it can be answered
that many who are not clean of heart, know many truths." Therefore
rectitude of the will is not necessary for Happiness.
Objection 2: Further, what precedes does not depend on what follows. But the
operation of the intellect precedes the operation of the will. Therefore
Happiness, which is the perfect operation of the intellect, does not
depend on rectitude of the will.
Objection 3: Further, that which is ordained to another as its end, is not
necessary, when the end is already gained; as a ship, for instance, after
arrival in port. But rectitude of will, which is by reason of virtue, is
ordained to Happiness as to its end. Therefore, Happiness once obtained,
rectitude of the will is no longer necessary.
On the contrary, It is written (@Mt. 5:8): "Blessed are the clean of
heart; for they shall see God": and (@Heb. 12:14): "Follow peace with all
men, and holiness; without which no man shall see God."
I answer that, Rectitude of will is necessary for Happiness both
antecedently and concomitantly. Antecedently, because rectitude of the
will consists in being duly ordered to the last end. Now the end in
comparison to what is ordained to the end is as form compared to matter.
Wherefore, just as matter cannot receive a form, unless it be duly
disposed thereto, so nothing gains an end, except it be duly ordained
thereto. And therefore none can obtain Happiness, without rectitude of
the will. Concomitantly, because as stated above (Question [3], Article [8]), final
Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, Which is the very
essence of goodness. So that the will of him who sees the Essence of God,
of necessity, loves, whatever he loves, in subordination to God; just as
the will of him who sees not God's Essence, of necessity, loves whatever
he loves, under the common notion of good which he knows. And this is
precisely what makes the will right. Wherefore it is evident that
Happiness cannot be without a right will.
Reply to Objection 2: Every act of the will is preceded by an act of the
intellect: but a certain act of the will precedes a certain act of the
intellect. For the will tends to the final act of the intellect which is
happiness. And consequently right inclination of the will is required
antecedently for happiness, just as the arrow must take a right course in
order to strike the target.
Reply to Objection 3: Not everything that is ordained to the end, ceases with the
getting of the end: but only that which involves imperfection, such as
movement. Hence the instruments of movement are no longer necessary when
the end has been gained: but the due order to the end is necessary.
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Objection 1: It would seem that the body is necessary for Happiness. For the
perfection of virtue and grace presupposes the perfection of nature. But
Happiness is the perfection of virtue and grace. Now the soul, without
the body, has not the perfection of nature; since it is naturally a part
of human nature, and every part is imperfect while separated from its
whole. Therefore the soul cannot be happy without the body.
Objection 2: Further, Happiness is a perfect operation, as stated above (Question [3], Articles [2],5). But perfect operation follows perfect being: since nothing
operates except in so far as it is an actual being. Since, therefore, the
soul has not perfect being, while it is separated from the body, just as
neither has a part, while separate from its whole; it seems that the soul
cannot be happy without the body.
Objection 3: Further, Happiness is the perfection of man. But the soul,
without the body, is not man. Therefore Happiness cannot be in the soul
separated from the body.
Objection 4: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 13) "the
operation of bliss," in which operation happiness consists, is "not
hindered." But the operation of the separate soul is hindered; because,
as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35), the soul "has a natural desire
to rule the body, the result of which is that it is held back, so to
speak, from tending with all its might to the heavenward journey," i.e.
to the vision of the Divine Essence. Therefore the soul cannot be happy
without the body.
Objection 5: Further, Happiness is the sufficient good and lulls desire. But
this cannot be said of the separated soul; for it yet desires to be
united to the body, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore
the soul is not happy while separated from the body.
Objection 6: Further, in Happiness man is equal to the angels. But the soul
without the body is not equal to the angels, as Augustine says (Gen. ad
lit. xii, 35). Therefore it is not happy.
On the contrary, It is written (@Apoc. 14:13): "Happy [Douay: 'blessed']
are the dead who die in the Lord."
I answer that, Happiness is twofold; the one is imperfect and is had in this life; the other is perfect, consisting in the vision of God. Now it is evident that the body is necessary for the happiness of this life. For the happiness of this life consists in an operation of the intellect, either speculative or practical. And the operation of the intellect in this life cannot be without a phantasm, which is only in a bodily organ, as was shown in the FP, Question [84], Articles [6],7. Consequently that happiness which can be had in this life, depends, in a way, on the body. But as to perfect Happiness, which consists in the vision of God, some have maintained that it is not possible to the soul separated from the body; and have said that the souls of saints, when separated from their bodies, do not attain to that Happiness until the Day of Judgment, when they will receive their bodies back again. And this is shown to be false, both by authority and by reason. By authority, since the Apostle says (@2 Cor. 5:6): "While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord"; and he points out the reason of this absence, saying: "For we walk by faith and not by sight." Now from this it is clear that so long as we walk by faith and not by sight, bereft of the vision of the Divine Essence, we are not present to the Lord. But the souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, are in God's presence; wherefore the text continues: "But we are confident and have a good will to be absent . . . from the body, and to be present with the Lord." Whence it is evident that the souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, "walk by sight," seeing the Essence of God, wherein is true Happiness.
Again this is made clear by reason. For the intellect needs not the
body, for its operation, save on account of the phantasms, wherein it
looks on the intelligible truth, as stated in the FP, Question [84], Article [7]. Now it
is evident that the Divine Essence cannot be seen by means of phantasms,
as stated in the FP, Question [12], Article [3]. Wherefore, since man's perfect
Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, it does not
depend on the body. Consequently, without the body the soul can be happy.
We must, however, notice that something may belong to a thing's
perfection in two ways. First, as constituting the essence thereof; thus
the soul is necessary for man's perfection. Secondly, as necessary for
its well-being: thus, beauty of body and keenness of perfection belong to
man's perfection. Wherefore though the body does not belong in the first
way to the perfection of human Happiness, yet it does in the second way.
For since operation depends on a thing's nature, the more perfect is the
soul in its nature, the more perfectly it has its proper operation,
wherein its happiness consists. Hence, Augustine, after inquiring (Gen.
ad lit. xii, 35) "whether that perfect Happiness can be ascribed to the
souls of the dead separated from their bodies," answers "that they cannot
see the Unchangeable Substance, as the blessed angels see It; either for
some other more hidden reason, or because they have a natural desire to
rule the body."
Reply to Objection 1: Happiness is the perfection of the soul on the part of the
intellect, in respect of which the soul transcends the organs of the
body; but not according as the soul is the natural form of the body.
Wherefore the soul retains that natural perfection in respect of which
happiness is due to it, though it does not retain that natural perfection
in respect of which it is the form of the body.
Reply to Objection 2: The relation of the soul to being is not the same as that
of other parts: for the being of the whole is not that of any individual
part: wherefore, either the part ceases altogether to be, when the whole
is destroyed, just as the parts of an animal, when the animal is
destroyed; or, if they remain, they have another actual being, just as a
part of a line has another being from that of the whole line. But the
human soul retains the being of the composite after the destruction of
the body: and this because the being of the form is the same as that of
its matter, and this is the being of the composite. Now the soul subsists
in its own being, as stated in the FP, Question [75], Article [2]. It follows,
therefore, that after being separated from the body it has perfect being
and that consequently it can have a perfect operation; although it has
not the perfect specific nature.
Reply to Objection 3: Happiness belongs to man in respect of his intellect: and, therefore, since the intellect remains, it can have Happiness. Thus the teeth of an Ethiopian, in respect of which he is said to be white, can retain their whiteness, even after extraction.
Reply to Objection 4: One thing is hindered by another in two ways. First, by way
of opposition; thus cold hinders the action of heat: and such a hindrance
to operation is repugnant to Happiness. Secondly, by way of some kind of
defect, because, to wit, that which is hindered has not all that is
necessary to make it perfect in every way: and such a hindrance to
operation is not incompatible with Happiness, but prevents it from being
perfect in every way. And thus it is that separation from the body is
said to hold the soul back from tending with all its might to the vision
of the Divine Essence. For the soul desires to enjoy God in such a way
that the enjoyment also may overflow into the body, as far as possible.
And therefore, as long as it enjoys God, without the fellowship of the
body, its appetite is at rest in that which it has, in such a way, that
it would still wish the body to attain to its share.
Reply to Objection 5: The desire of the separated soul is entirely at rest, as
regards the thing desired; since, to wit, it has that which suffices its
appetite. But it is not wholly at rest, as regards the desirer, since it
does not possess that good in every way that it would wish to possess it.
Consequently, after the body has been resumed, Happiness increases not in
intensity, but in extent.
Reply to Objection 6: The statement made (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) to the effect
that "the souls of the departed see not God as the angels do," is not to
be understood as referring to inequality of quantity; because even now
some souls of the Blessed are raised to the higher orders of the angels,
thus seeing God more clearly than the lower angels. But it refers to
inequality of proportion: because the angels, even the lowest, have every
perfection of Happiness that they ever will have, whereas the separated
souls of the saints have not.
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Objection 1: It would seem that perfection of the body is not necessary for
man's perfect Happiness. For perfection of the body is a bodily good. But
it has been shown above (Question [2]) that Happiness does not consist in bodily
goods. Therefore no perfect disposition of the body is necessary for
man's Happiness.
Objection 2: Further, man's Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine
Essence, as shown above (Question [3], Article [8]). But the body has not part in this
operation, as shown above (Article [5]). Therefore no disposition of the body is
necessary for Happiness.
Objection 3: Further, the more the intellect is abstracted from the body, the more perfectly it understands. But Happiness consists in the most perfect operation of the intellect. Therefore the soul should be abstracted from the body in every way. Therefore, in no way is a disposition of the body necessary for Happiness.
On the contrary, Happiness is the reward of virtue; wherefore it is
written (@Jn. 13:17): "You shall be blessed, if you do them." But the
reward promised to the saints is not only that they shall see and enjoy
God, but also that their bodies shall be well-disposed; for it is written
(@Is. 66:14): "You shall see and your heart shall rejoice, and your bones
shall flourish like a herb." Therefore good disposition of the body is
necessary for Happiness.
I answer that, If we speak of that happiness which man can acquire in
this life, it is evident that a well-disposed body is of necessity
required for it. For this happiness consists, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) in "an operation according to perfect virtue";
and it is clear that man can be hindered, by indisposition of the body,
from every operation of virtue.
But speaking of perfect Happiness, some have maintained that no
disposition of body is necessary for Happiness; indeed, that it is
necessary for the soul to be entirely separated from the body. Hence
Augustine (De Civ. Dei xxii, 26) quotes the words of Porphyry who said
that "for the soul to be happy, it must be severed from everything
corporeal." But this is unreasonable. For since it is natural to the soul
to be united to the body; it is not possible for the perfection of the
soul to exclude its natural perfection.
Consequently, we must say that perfect disposition of the body is
necessary, both antecedently and consequently, for that Happiness which
is in all ways perfect. Antecedently, because, as Augustine says (Gen. ad
lit. xii, 35), "if body be such, that the governance thereof is difficult
and burdensome, like unto flesh which is corruptible and weighs upon the
soul, the mind is turned away from that vision of the highest heaven."
Whence he concludes that, "when this body will no longer be 'natural,'
but 'spiritual,' then will it be equalled to the angels, and that will be
its glory, which erstwhile was its burden." Consequently, because from
the Happiness of the soul there will be an overflow on to the body, so
that this too will obtain its perfection. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad
Dioscor.) that "God gave the soul such a powerful nature that from its
exceeding fulness of happiness the vigor of incorruption overflows into
the lower nature."
Reply to Objection 1: Happiness does not consist in bodily good as its object:
but bodily good can add a certain charm and perfection to Happiness.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the body has not part in that operation of the
intellect whereby the Essence of God is seen, yet it might prove a
hindrance thereto. Consequently, perfection of the body is necessary,
lest it hinder the mind from being lifted up.
Reply to Objection 3: The perfect operation of the intellect requires indeed that
the intellect be abstracted from this corruptible body which weighs upon
the soul; but not from the spiritual body, which will be wholly subject
to the spirit. On this point we shall treat in the Third Part of this
work (SS, Question [82], seqq.).
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Article: 7 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that external goods also are necessary for
Happiness. For that which is promised the saints for reward, belongs to
Happiness. But external goods are promised the saints; for instance, food
and drink, wealth and a kingdom: for it is said (@Lk. 22:30): "That you
may eat and drink at My table in My kingdom": and (@Mt. 6:20): "Lay up to
yourselves treasures in heaven": and (@Mt. 25:34): "Come, ye blessed of My
Father, possess you the kingdom." Therefore external goods are necessary
for Happiness.
Objection 2: Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii): happiness is "a
state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." But some of
man's goods are external, although they be of least account, as Augustine
says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Therefore they too are necessary for
Happiness.
Objection 3: Further, Our Lord said (@Mt. 5:12): "Your reward is very great in
heaven." But to be in heaven implies being in a place. Therefore at least
external place is necessary for Happiness.
On the contrary, It is written (@Ps. 72:25): "For what have I in heaven?
and besides Thee what do I desire upon earth?" As though to say: "I
desire nothing but this,"---"It is good for me to adhere to my God."
Therefore nothing further external is necessary for Happiness.
I answer that, For imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life,
external goods are necessary, not as belonging to the essence of
happiness, but by serving as instruments to happiness, which consists in
an operation of virtue, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. For man needs in this
life, the necessaries of the body, both for the operation of
contemplative virtue, and for the operation of active virtue, for which
latter he needs also many other things by means of which to perform its
operations.
On the other hand, such goods as these are nowise necessary for perfect
Happiness, which consists in seeing God. The reason of this is that all
suchlike external goods are requisite either for the support of the
animal body; or for certain operations which belong to human life, which
we perform by means of the animal body: whereas that perfect Happiness
which consists in seeing God, will be either in the soul separated from
the body, or in the soul united to the body then no longer animal but
spiritual. Consequently these external goods are nowise necessary for
that Happiness, since they are ordained to the animal life. And since, in
this life, the felicity of contemplation, as being more Godlike,
approaches nearer than that of action to the likeness of that perfect
Happiness, therefore it stands in less need of these goods of the body
as stated in Ethic. x, 8.
Reply to Objection 1: All those material promises contained in Holy Scripture,
are to be understood metaphorically, inasmuch as Scripture is wont to
express spiritual things under the form of things corporeal, in order
"that from things we know, we may rise to the desire of things unknown,"
as Gregory says (Hom. xi in Evang.). Thus food and drink signify the
delight of Happiness; wealth, the sufficiency of God for man; the
kingdom, the lifting up of man to union of God.
Reply to Objection 2: These goods that serve for the animal life, are
incompatible with that spiritual life wherein perfect Happiness consists.
Nevertheless in that Happiness there will be the aggregate of all good
things, because whatever good there be in these things, we shall possess
it all in the Supreme Fount of goodness.
Reply to Objection 3: According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 5), it is
not material heaven that is described as the reward of the saints, but a
heaven raised on the height of spiritual goods. Nevertheless a bodily
place, viz. the empyrean heaven, will be appointed to the Blessed, not as
a need of Happiness, but by reason of a certain fitness and adornment.
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Objection 1: It would seem that friends are necessary for Happiness. For
future Happiness is frequently designated by Scripture under the name of
"glory." But glory consists in man's good being brought to the notice of
many. Therefore the fellowship of friends is necessary for Happiness.
Objection 2: Further, Boethius [*Seneca, Ep. 6] says that "there is no delight
in possessing any good whatever, without someone to share it with us."
But delight is necessary for Happiness. Therefore fellowship of friends
is also necessary.
Objection 3: Further, charity is perfected in Happiness. But charity includes
the love of God and of our neighbor. Therefore it seems that fellowship
of friends is necessary for Happiness.
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 7:11): "All good things came to me
together with her," i.e. with divine wisdom, which consists in
contemplating God. Consequently nothing else is necessary for Happiness.
I answer that, If we speak of the happiness of this life, the happy man
needs friends, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9), not, indeed, to
make use of them, since he suffices himself; nor to delight in them,
since he possesses perfect delight in the operation of virtue; but for
the purpose of a good operation, viz. that he may do good to them; that
he may delight in seeing them do good; and again that he may be helped
by them in his good work. For in order that man may do well, whether in
the works of the active life, or in those of the contemplative life, he
needs the fellowship of friends.
But if we speak of perfect Happiness which will be in our heavenly
Fatherland, the fellowship of friends is not essential to Happiness;
since man has the entire fulness of his perfection in God. But the
fellowship of friends conduces to the well-being of Happiness. Hence
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 25) that "the spiritual creatures
receive no other interior aid to happiness than the eternity, truth, and
charity of the Creator. But if they can be said to be helped from
without, perhaps it is only by this that they see one another and rejoice
in God, at their fellowship."
Reply to Objection 1: That glory which is essential to Happiness, is that which
man has, not with man but with God.
Reply to Objection 2: This saying is to be understood of the possession of good
that does not fully satisfy. This does not apply to the question under
consideration; because man possesses in God a sufficiency of every good.
Reply to Objection 3: Perfection of charity is essential to Happiness, as to the
love of God, but not as to the love of our neighbor. Wherefore if there
were but one soul enjoying God, it would be happy, though having no
neighbor to love. But supposing one neighbor to be there, love of him
results from perfect love of God. Consequently, friendship is, as it
were, concomitant with perfect Happiness.