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Index [<< | >>]
First Part [<< | >>]
Question: 5 [<< | >>]
We next consider goodness: First, goodness in general. Secondly, the
goodness of God.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether goodness and being are the same really?
(2) Granted that they differ only in idea, which is prior in thought?
(3) Granted that being is prior, whether every being is good?
(4) To what cause should goodness be reduced?
(5) Whether goodness consists in mode, species, and order?
(6) Whether goodness is divided into the virtuous, the useful, and the
pleasant?
Index [<< | >>]
First Part [<< | >>]
Question: 5 [<< | >>]
Article: 1 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It seems that goodness differs really from being. For Boethius
says (De Hebdom.): "I perceive that in nature the fact that things are
good is one thing: that they are is another." Therefore goodness and
being really differ.
Objection 2: Further, nothing can be its own form. "But that is called good which has the form of being", according to the commentary on De Causis. Therefore goodness differs really from being.
Objection 3: Further, goodness can be more or less. But being cannot be more
or less. Therefore goodness differs really from being.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 42) that,
"inasmuch as we exist we are good."
I answer that, Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only
in idea; which is clear from the following argument. The essence of
goodness consists in this, that it is in some way desirable. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. i): "Goodness is what all desire." Now it is
clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect; for all
desire their own perfection. But everything is perfect so far as it is
actual. Therefore it is clear that a thing is perfect so far as it
exists; for it is existence that makes all things actual, as is clear
from the foregoing (Question [3], Article [4]; Question [4], Article [1]). Hence it is clear that
goodness and being are the same really. But goodness presents the aspect
of desirableness, which being does not present.
Reply to Objection 1: Although goodness and being are the same really,
nevertheless since they differ in thought, they are not predicated of a
thing absolutely in the same way. Since being properly signifies that
something actually is, and actuality properly correlates to potentiality;
a thing is, in consequence, said simply to have being, accordingly as it
is primarily distinguished from that which is only in potentiality; and
this is precisely each thing's substantial being. Hence by its
substantial being, everything is said to have being simply; but by any
further actuality it is said to have being relatively. Thus to be white
implies relative being, for to be white does not take a thing out of
simply potential being; because only a thing that actually has being can
receive this mode of being. But goodness signifies perfection which is
desirable; and consequently of ultimate perfection. Hence that which has
ultimate perfection is said to be simply good; but that which has not the
ultimate perfection it ought to have (although, in so far as it is at all
actual, it has some perfection), is not said to be perfect simply nor
good simply, but only relatively. In this way, therefore, viewed in its
primal (i.e. substantial) being a thing is said to be simply, and to be
good relatively (i.e. in so far as it has being) but viewed in its
complete actuality, a thing is said to be relatively, and to be good
simply. Hence the saying of Boethius (De Hebrom.), "I perceive that in
nature the fact that things are good is one thing; that they are is
another," is to be referred to a thing's goodness simply, and having
being simply. Because, regarded in its primal actuality, a thing simply
exists; and regarded in its complete actuality, it is good simply---in
such sort that even in its primal actuality, it is in some sort good, and
even in its complete actuality, it in some sort has being.
Reply to Objection 2: Goodness is a form so far as absolute goodness signifies
complete actuality.
Reply to Objection 3: Again, goodness is spoken of as more or less according to a
thing's superadded actuality, for example, as to knowledge or virtue.
Index [<< | >>]
First Part [<< | >>]
Question: 5 [<< | >>]
Article: 2 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It seems that goodness is prior in idea to being. For names are
arranged according to the arrangement of the things signified by the
names. But Dionysius (Div. Nom. iii) assigned the first place, amongst
the other names of God, to His goodness rather than to His being.
Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being.
Objection 2: Further, that which is the more extensive is prior in idea. But
goodness is more extensive than being, because, as Dionysius notes (Div.
Nom. v), "goodness extends to things both existing and non-existing;
whereas existence extends to existing things alone." Therefore goodness
is in idea prior to being.
Objection 3: Further, what is the more universal is prior in idea. But
goodness seems to be more universal than being, since goodness has the
aspect of desirable; whereas to some non-existence is desirable; for it
is said of Judas: "It were better for him, if that man had not been born"
(@Mt. 26:24). Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being.
Objection 4: Further, not only is existence desirable, but life, knowledge,
and many other things besides. Thus it seems that existence is a
particular appetible, and goodness a universal appetible. Therefore,
absolutely, goodness is prior in idea to being.
On the contrary, It is said by Aristotle (De Causis) that "the first of
created things is being."
I answer that, In idea being is prior to goodness. For the meaning
signified by the name of a thing is that which the mind conceives of the
thing and intends by the word that stands for it. Therefore, that is
prior in idea, which is first conceived by the intellect. Now the first
thing conceived by the intellect is being; because everything is knowable
only inasmuch as it is in actuality. Hence, being is the proper object of
the intellect, and is primarily intelligible; as sound is that which is
primarily audible. Therefore in idea being is prior to goodness.
Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius discusses the Divine Names (Div. Nom. i, iii) as
implying some causal relation in God; for we name God, as he says, from
creatures, as a cause from its effects. But goodness, since it has the
aspect of desirable, implies the idea of a final cause, the causality of
which is first among causes, since an agent does not act except for some
end; and by an agent matter is moved to its form. Hence the end is called
the cause of causes. Thus goodness, as a cause, is prior to being, as is
the end to the form. Therefore among the names signifying the divine
causality, goodness precedes being. Again, according to the Platonists,
who, through not distinguishing primary matter from privation, said that
matter was non-being, goodness is more extensively participated than
being; for primary matter participates in goodness as tending to it, for
all seek their like; but it does not participate in being, since it is
presumed to be non-being. Therefore Dionysius says that "goodness extends
to non-existence" (Div. Nom. v).
Reply to Objection 2: The same solution is applied to this objection. Or it may
be said that goodness extends to existing and non-existing things, not so
far as it can be predicated of them, but so far as it can cause
them---if, indeed, by non-existence we understand not simply those things
which do not exist, but those which are potential, and not actual. For
goodness has the aspect of the end, in which not only actual things find
their completion, but also towards which tend even those things which are
not actual, but merely potential. Now being implies the habitude of a
formal cause only, either inherent or exemplar; and its causality does
not extend save to those things which are actual.
Reply to Objection 3: Non-being is desirable, not of itself, but only
relatively---i.e. inasmuch as the removal of an evil, which can only be
removed by non-being, is desirable. Now the removal of an evil cannot be
desirable, except so far as this evil deprives a thing of some being.
Therefore being is desirable of itself; and non-being only relatively,
inasmuch as one seeks some mode of being of which one cannot bear to be
deprived; thus even non-being can be spoken of as relatively good.
Reply to Objection 4: Life, wisdom, and the like, are desirable only so far as
they are actual. Hence, in each one of them some sort of being is
desired. And thus nothing can be desired except being; and consequently
nothing is good except being.
Index [<< | >>]
First Part [<< | >>]
Question: 5 [<< | >>]
Article: 3 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It seems that not every being is good. For goodness is something
superadded to being, as is clear from Article [1]. But whatever is added to
being limits it; as substance, quantity, quality, etc. Therefore goodness
limits being. Therefore not every being is good.
Objection 2: Further, no evil is good: "Woe to you that call evil good and
good evil" (@Is. 5:20). But some things are called evil. Therefore not
every being is good.
Objection 3: Further, goodness implies desirability. Now primary matter does
not imply desirability, but rather that which desires. Therefore primary
matter does not contain the formality of goodness. Therefore not every
being is good.
Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher notes (Metaph. iii) that "in mathematics
goodness does not exist." But mathematics are entities; otherwise there
would be no science of mathematics. Therefore not every being is good.
On the contrary, Every being that is not God is God's creature. Now
every creature of God is good (@1 Tim. 4:4): and God is the greatest good.
Therefore every being is good.
I answer that, Every being, as being, is good. For all being, as being,
has actuality and is in some way perfect; since every act implies some
sort of perfection; and perfection implies desirability and goodness, as
is clear from Article [1]. Hence it follows that every being as such is good.
Reply to Objection 1: Substance, quantity, quality, and everything included in
them, limit being by applying it to some essence or nature. Now in this
sense, goodness does not add anything to being beyond the aspect of
desirability and perfection, which is also proper to being, whatever kind
of nature it may be. Hence goodness does not limit being.
Reply to Objection 2: No being can be spoken of as evil, formally as being, but
only so far as it lacks being. Thus a man is said to be evil, because he
lacks some virtue; and an eye is said to be evil, because it lacks the
power to see well.
Reply to Objection 3: As primary matter has only potential being, so it is only
potentially good. Although, according to the Platonists, primary matter
may be said to be a non-being on account of the privation attaching to
it, nevertheless, it does participate to a certain extent in goodness,
viz. by its relation to, or aptitude for, goodness. Consequently, to be
desirable is not its property, but to desire.
Reply to Objection 4: Mathematical entities do not subsist as realities; because
they would be in some sort good if they subsisted; but they have only
logical existence, inasmuch as they are abstracted from motion and
matter; thus they cannot have the aspect of an end, which itself has the
aspect of moving another. Nor is it repugnant that there should be in
some logical entity neither goodness nor form of goodness; since the idea
of being is prior to the idea of goodness, as was said in the preceding
article.
Index [<< | >>]
First Part [<< | >>]
Question: 5 [<< | >>]
Article: 4 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It seems that goodness has not the aspect of a final cause, but
rather of the other causes. For, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv),
"Goodness is praised as beauty." But beauty has the aspect of a formal
cause. Therefore goodness has the aspect of a formal cause.
Objection 2: Further, goodness is self-diffusive; for Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. iv) that goodness is that whereby all things subsist, and are. But
to be self-giving implies the aspect of an efficient cause. Therefore
goodness has the aspect of an efficient cause.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 31) that "we exist
because God is good." But we owe our existence to God as the efficient
cause. Therefore goodness implies the aspect of an efficient cause.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. ii) that "that is to be
considered as the end and the good of other things, for the sake of which
something is." Therefore goodness has the aspect of a final cause.
I answer that, Since goodness is that which all things desire, and since
this has the aspect of an end, it is clear that goodness implies the
aspect of an end. Nevertheless, the idea of goodness presupposes the idea
of an efficient cause, and also of a formal cause. For we see that what
is first in causing, is last in the thing caused. Fire, e.g. heats first
of all before it reproduces the form of fire; though the heat in the fire
follows from its substantial form. Now in causing, goodness and the end
come first, both of which move the agent to act; secondly, the action of
the agent moving to the form; thirdly, comes the form. Hence in that
which is caused the converse ought to take place, so that there should be
first, the form whereby it is a being; secondly, we consider in it its
effective power, whereby it is perfect in being, for a thing is perfect
when it can reproduce its like, as the Philosopher says (Meteor. iv);
thirdly, there follows the formality of goodness which is the basic
principle of its perfection.
Reply to Objection 1: Beauty and goodness in a thing are identical fundamentally;
for they are based upon the same thing, namely, the form; and
consequently goodness is praised as beauty. But they differ logically,
for goodness properly relates to the appetite (goodness being what all
things desire); and therefore it has the aspect of an end (the appetite
being a kind of movement towards a thing). On the other hand, beauty
relates to the cognitive faculty; for beautiful things are those which
please when seen. Hence beauty consists in due proportion; for the senses
delight in things duly proportioned, as in what is after their own
kind---because even sense is a sort of reason, just as is every cognitive
faculty. Now since knowledge is by assimilation, and similarity relates
to form, beauty properly belongs to the nature of a formal cause.
Reply to Objection 2: Goodness is described as self-diffusive in the sense that
an end is said to move.
Reply to Objection 3: He who has a will is said to be good, so far as he has a
good will; because it is by our will that we employ whatever powers we
may have. Hence a man is said to be good, not by his good understanding;
but by his good will. Now the will relates to the end as to its proper
object. Thus the saying, "we exist because God is good" has reference to
the final cause.
Index [<< | >>]
First Part [<< | >>]
Question: 5 [<< | >>]
Article: 5 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It seems that the essence of goodness does not consist in mode,
species and order. For goodness and being differ logically. But mode,
species and order seem to belong to the nature of being, for it is
written: "Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and
weight" (Wis. 11:21). And to these three can be reduced species, mode and
order, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3): "Measure fixes the mode of
everything, number gives it its species, and weight gives it rest and
stability." Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode,
species and order.
Objection 2: Further, mode, species and order are themselves good. Therefore
if the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order, then
every mode must have its own mode, species and order. The same would be
the case with species and order in endless succession.
Objection 3: Further, evil is the privation of mode, species and order. But
evil is not the total absence of goodness. Therefore the essence of
goodness does not consist in mode, species and order.
Objection 4: Further, that wherein consists the essence of goodness cannot be
spoken of as evil. Yet we can speak of an evil mode, species and order.
Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and
order.
Objection 5: Further, mode, species and order are caused by weight, number and
measure, as appears from the quotation from Augustine. But not every good
thing has weight, number and measure; for Ambrose says (Hexam. i, 9): "It
is of the nature of light not to have been created in number, weight and
measure." Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode,
species and order.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. iii): "These
three---mode, species and order---as common good things, are in
everything God has made; thus, where these three abound the things are
very good; where they are less, the things are less good; where they do
not exist at all, there can be nothing good." But this would not be
unless the essence of goodness consisted in them. Therefore the essence
of goodness consists in mode, species and order.
I answer that, Everything is said to be good so far as it is perfect;
for in that way only is it desirable (as shown above Articles [1],3). Now a
thing is said to be perfect if it lacks nothing according to the mode of
its perfection. But since everything is what it is by its form (and since
the form presupposes certain things, and from the form certain things
necessarily follow), in order for a thing to be perfect and good it must
have a form, together with all that precedes and follows upon that form.
Now the form presupposes determination or commensuration of its
principles, whether material or efficient, and this is signified by the
mode: hence it is said that the measure marks the mode. But the form
itself is signified by the species; for everything is placed in its
species by its form. Hence the number is said to give the species, for
definitions signifying species are like numbers, according to the
Philosopher (Metaph. x); for as a unit added to, or taken from a number,
changes its species, so a difference added to, or taken from a
definition, changes its species. Further, upon the form follows an
inclination to the end, or to an action, or something of the sort; for
everything, in so far as it is in act, acts and tends towards that which
is in accordance with its form; and this belongs to weight and order.
Hence the essence of goodness, so far as it consists in perfection,
consists also in mode, species and order.
Reply to Objection 1: These three only follow upon being, so far as it is
perfect, and according to this perfection is it good.
Reply to Objection 2: Mode, species and order are said to be good, and to be
beings, not as though they themselves were subsistences, but because it
is through them that other things are both beings and good. Hence they
have no need of other things whereby they are good: for they are spoken
of as good, not as though formally constituted so by something else, but
as formally constituting others good: thus whiteness is not said to be a
being as though it were by anything else; but because, by it, something
else has accidental being, as an object that is white.
Reply to Objection 3: Every being is due to some form. Hence, according to every
being of a thing is its mode, species, order. Thus, a man has a mode,
species and order as he is white, virtuous, learned and so on; according
to everything predicated of him. But evil deprives a thing of some sort
of being, as blindness deprives us of that being which is sight; yet it
does not destroy every mode, species and order, but only such as follow
upon the being of sight.
Reply to Objection 4: Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. xxiii), "Every mode, as mode,
is good" (and the same can be said of species and order). "But an evil
mode, species and order are so called as being less than they ought to
be, or as not belonging to that which they ought to belong. Therefore
they are called evil, because they are out of place and incongruous."
Reply to Objection 5: The nature of light is spoken of as being without number,
weight and measure, not absolutely, but in comparison with corporeal
things, because the power of light extends to all corporeal things;
inasmuch as it is an active quality of the first body that causes change,
i.e. the heavens.
Index [<< | >>]
First Part [<< | >>]
Question: 5 [<< | >>]
Article: 6 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It seems that goodness is not rightly divided into the virtuous,
the useful and the pleasant. For goodness is divided by the ten
predicaments, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i). But the virtuous, the
useful and the pleasant can be found under one predicament. Therefore
goodness is not rightly divided by them.
Objection 2: Further, every division is made by opposites. But these three do
not seem to be opposites; for the virtuous is pleasing, and no wickedness
is useful; whereas this ought to be the case if the division were made by
opposites, for then the virtuous and the useful would be opposed; and
Tully speaks of this (De Offic. ii). Therefore this division is incorrect.
Objection 3: Further, where one thing is on account of another, there is only
one thing. But the useful is not goodness, except so far as it is
pleasing and virtuous. Therefore the useful ought not to divided against
the pleasant and the virtuous.
On the contrary, Ambrose makes use of this division of goodness (De
Offic. i, 9)
I answer that, This division properly concerns human goodness. But if we
consider the nature of goodness from a higher and more universal point of
view, we shall find that this division properly concerns goodness as
such. For everything is good so far as it is desirable, and is a term of
the movement of the appetite; the term of whose movement can be seen from
a consideration of the movement of a natural body. Now the movement of a
natural body is terminated by the end absolutely; and relatively by the
means through which it comes to the end, where the movement ceases; so a
thing is called a term of movement, so far as it terminates any part of
that movement. Now the ultimate term of movement can be taken in two
ways, either as the thing itself towards which it tends, e.g. a place or
form; or a state of rest in that thing. Thus, in the movement of the
appetite, the thing desired that terminates the movement of the appetite
relatively, as a means by which something tends towards another, is
called the useful; but that sought after as the last thing absolutely
terminating the movement of the appetite, as a thing towards which for
its own sake the appetite tends, is called the virtuous; for the virtuous
is that which is desired for its own sake; but that which terminates the
movement of the appetite in the form of rest in the thing desired, is
called the pleasant.
Reply to Objection 1: Goodness, so far as it is identical with being, is divided
by the ten predicaments. But this division belongs to it according to its
proper formality.
Reply to Objection 2: This division is not by opposite things; but by opposite aspects. Now those things are called pleasing which have no other formality under which they are desirable except the pleasant, being sometimes hurtful and contrary to virtue. Whereas the useful applies to such as have nothing desirable in themselves, but are desired only as helpful to something further, as the taking of bitter medicine; while the virtuous is predicated of such as are desirable in themselves.
Reply to Objection 3: Goodness is not divided into these three as something
univocal to be predicated equally of them all; but as something
analogical to be predicated of them according to priority and
posteriority. Hence it is predicated chiefly of the virtuous; then of the
pleasant; and lastly of the useful.