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Question: 94 [<< | >>]
We must next consider the relations of the saints towards the damned.
Under this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the saints see the sufferings of the damned?
(2) Whether they pity them?
(3) Whether they rejoice in their sufferings?
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Question: 94 [<< | >>]
Article: 1 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that the blessed in heaven will not see the
sufferings of the damned. For the damned are more cut off from the
blessed than wayfarers. But the blessed do not see the deeds of
wayfarers: wherefore a gloss on Is. 63:16, "Abraham hath not known us,"
says: "The dead, even the saints, know not what the living, even their
own children, are doing" [*St. Augustine, De cura pro mortuis xiii, xv].
Much less therefore do they see the sufferings of the damned.
Objection 2: Further, perfection of vision depends on the perfection of the visible object: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "the most perfect operation of the sense of sight is when the sense is most disposed with reference to the most beautiful of the objects which fall under the sight." Therefore, on the other hand, any deformity in the visible object redounds to the imperfection of the sight. But there will be no imperfection in the blessed. Therefore they will not see the sufferings of the damned wherein there is extreme deformity.
On the contrary, It is written (@Is. 66:24): "They shall go out and see
the carcasses of the men that have transgressed against Me"; and a gloss
says: "The elect will go out by understanding or seeing manifestly, so
that they may be urged the more to praise God."
I answer that, Nothing should be denied the blessed that belongs to the
perfection of their beatitude. Now everything is known the more for being
compared with its contrary, because when contraries are placed beside one
another they become more conspicuous. Wherefore in order that the
happiness of the saints may be more delightful to them and that they may
render more copious thanks to God for it, they are allowed to see
perfectly the sufferings of the damned.
Reply to Objection 1: This gloss speaks of what the departed saints are able to
do by nature: for it is not necessary that they should know by natural
knowledge all that happens to the living. But the saints in heaven know
distinctly all that happens both to wayfarers and to the damned. Hence
Gregory says (Moral. xii) that Job's words (14:21), "'Whether his
children come to honour or dishonour, he shall not understand,' do not
apply to the souls of the saints, because since they possess the glory of
God within them, we cannot believe that external things are unknown to
them." [*Concerning this Reply, Cf. FP, Question [89], Article [8]].
Reply to Objection 2: Although the beauty of the thing seen conduces to the
perfection of vision, there may be deformity of the thing seen without
imperfection of vision: because the images of things whereby the soul
knows contraries are not themselves contrary. Wherefore also God Who has
most perfect knowledge sees all things, beautiful and deformed.
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Question: 94 [<< | >>]
Article: 2 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that the blessed pity the unhappiness of the
damned. For pity proceeds from charity [*Cf. SS, Question [30]]; and charity will
be most perfect in the blessed. Therefore they will most especially pity
the sufferings of the damned.
Objection 2: Further, the blessed will never be so far from taking pity as God
is. Yet in a sense God compassionates our afflictions, wherefore He is
said to be merciful.
On the contrary, Whoever pities another shares somewhat in his
unhappiness. But the blessed cannot share in any unhappiness. Therefore
they do not pity the afflictions of the damned.
I answer that, Mercy or compassion may be in a person in two ways: first
by way of passion, secondly by way of choice. In the blessed there will
be no passion in the lower powers except as a result of the reason's
choice. Hence compassion or mercy will not be in them, except by the
choice of reason. Now mercy or compassion comes of the reason's choice
when a person wishes another's evil to be dispelled: wherefore in those
things which, in accordance with reason, we do not wish to be dispelled,
we have no such compassion. But so long as sinners are in this world they
are in such a state that without prejudice to the Divine justice they can
be taken away from a state of unhappiness and sin to a state of
happiness. Consequently it is possible to have compassion on them both by
the choice of the will---in which sense God, the angels and the blessed
are said to pity them by desiring their salvation---and by passion, in
which way they are pitied by the good men who are in the state of
wayfarers. But in the future state it will be impossible for them to be
taken away from their unhappiness: and consequently it will not be
possible to pity their sufferings according to right reason. Therefore
the blessed in glory will have no pity on the damned.
Reply to Objection 1: Charity is the principle of pity when it is possible for us
out of charity to wish the cessation of a person's unhappiness. But the
saints cannot desire this for the damned, since it would be contrary to
Divine justice. Consequently the argument does not prove.
Reply to Objection 2: God is said to be merciful, in so far as He succors those
whom it is befitting to be released from their afflictions in accordance
with the order of wisdom and justice: not as though He pitied the damned
except perhaps in punishing them less than they deserve.
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Question: 94 [<< | >>]
Article: 3 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that the blessed do not rejoice in the punishment
of the wicked. For rejoicing in another's evil pertains to hatred. But
there will be no hatred in the blessed. Therefore they will not rejoice
in the unhappiness of the damned.
Objection 2: Further, the blessed in heaven will be in the highest degree
conformed to God. Now God does not rejoice in our afflictions. Therefore
neither will the blessed rejoice in the afflictions of the damned.
Objection 3: Further, that which is blameworthy in a wayfarer has no place
whatever in a comprehensor. Now it is most reprehensible in a wayfarer to
take pleasure in the pains of others, and most praiseworthy to grieve for
them. Therefore the blessed nowise rejoice in the punishment of the
damned.
On the contrary, It is written (@Ps. 57:11): "The just shall rejoice when
he shall see the revenge."
Further, it is written (@Is. 56:24): "They shall satiate [*Douay: 'They
shall be a loathsome sight to all flesh.'] the sight of all flesh." Now
satiety denotes refreshment of the mind. Therefore the blessed will
rejoice in the punishment of the wicked.
I answer that, A thing may be a matter of rejoicing in two ways. First
directly, when one rejoices in a thing as such: and thus the saints will
not rejoice in the punishment of the wicked. Secondly, indirectly, by
reason namely of something annexed to it: and in this way the saints will
rejoice in the punishment of the wicked, by considering therein the order
of Divine justice and their own deliverance, which will fill them with
joy. And thus the Divine justice and their own deliverance will be the
direct cause of the joy of the blessed: while the punishment of the
damned will cause it indirectly.
Reply to Objection 1: To rejoice in another's evil as such belongs to hatred, but
not to rejoice in another's evil by reason of something annexed to it.
Thus a person sometimes rejoices in his own evil as when we rejoice in
our own afflictions, as helping us to merit life: "My brethren, count it
all joy when you shall fall into divers temptations" (@James 1:2).
Reply to Objection 2: Although God rejoices not in punishments as such, He
rejoices in them as being ordered by His justice.
Reply to Objection 3: It is not praiseworthy in a wayfarer to rejoice in
another's afflictions as such: yet it is praiseworthy if he rejoice in
them as having something annexed. However it is not the same with a
wayfarer as with a comprehensor, because in a wayfarer the passions often
forestall the judgment of reason, and yet sometimes such passions are
praiseworthy, as indicating the good disposition of the mind, as in the
case of shame pity and repentance for evil: whereas in a comprehensor
there can be no passion but such as follows the judgment of reason.