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Question: 16 [<< | >>]
We must now consider the consequences of the union; and first as to what
belongs to Christ in Himself; secondly, as to what belongs to Christ in
relation with His Father; thirdly, as to what belongs to Christ in
relation to us.
Concerning the first, there occurs a double consideration. The first is
about such things as belong to Christ in being and becoming; the second
regards such things as belong to Christ by reason of unity.
Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether this is true: "God is man"?
(2) Whether this is true: "Man is God"?
(3) Whether Christ may be called a lordly man?
(4) Whether what belongs to the Son of Man may be predicated of the Son
of God, and conversely?
(5) Whether what belongs to the Son of Man may be predicated of the
Divine Nature, and what belongs to the Son of God of the human nature?
(6) Whether this is true: "The Son of God was made man"?
(7) Whether this is true: "Man became God"?
(8) Whether this is true: "Christ is a creature"?
(9) Whether this is true: "This man," pointing out Christ, "began to
be"? or "always was"?
(10) Whether this is true: "Christ as man is a creature"?
(11) Whether this is true: "Christ as man is God"?
(12) Whether this is true: "Christ as man is a hypostasis or person"?
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Question: 16 [<< | >>]
Article: 1 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that this is false: "God is man." For every
affirmative proposition of remote matter is false. Now this proposition,
"God is man," is on remote matter, since the forms signified by the
subject and predicate are most widely apart. Therefore, since the
aforesaid proposition is affirmative, it would seem to be false.
Objection 2: Further, the three Divine Persons are in greater mutual agreement than the human nature and the Divine. But in the mystery of the Incarnation one Person is not predicated of another; for we do not say that the Father is the Son, or conversely. Therefore it seems that the human nature ought not to be predicated of God by saying that God is man.
Objection 3: Further, Athanasius says (Symb. Fid.) that, "as the soul and the
flesh are one man, so are God and man one Christ." But this is false:
"The soul is the body." Therefore this also is false: "God is man."
Objection 4: Further, it was said in the FP, Question [39], Article [4] that what is
predicated of God not relatively but absolutely, belongs to the whole
Trinity and to each of the Persons. But this word "man" is not relative,
but absolute. Hence, if it is predicated of God, it would follow that the
whole Trinity and each of the Persons is man; and this is clearly false.
On the contrary, It is written (@Phil. 2:6,7): "Who being in the form of
God . . . emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in
the likeness of man, and in habit found as a man"; and thus He Who is in
the form of God is man. Now He Who is in the form of God is God.
Therefore God is man.
I answer that, This proposition "God is man," is admitted by all
Christians, yet not in the same way by all. For some admit the
proposition, but not in the proper acceptation of the terms. Thus the
Manicheans say the Word of God is man, not indeed true, but fictitious
man, inasmuch as they say that the Son of God assumed an imaginary body,
and thus God is called man as a bronze figure is called man if it has the
figure of a man. So, too, those who held that Christ's body and soul were
not united, could not say that God is true man, but that He is
figuratively called man by reason of the parts. Now both these opinions
were disproved above (Question [2], Article [5]; Question [5], Article [1]).
Some, on the contrary, hold the reality on the part of man, but deny the
reality on the part of God. For they say that Christ, Who is God and man,
is God not naturally, but by participation, i.e. by grace; even as all
other holy men are called gods---Christ being more excellently so than
the rest, on account of His more abundant grace. And thus, when it is
said that "God is man," God does not stand for the true and natural God.
And this is the heresy of Photinus, which was disproved above (Question [2], Articles [10],11). But some admit this proposition, together with the reality of
both terms, holding that Christ is true God and true man; yet they do not
preserve the truth of the predication. For they say that man is
predicated of God by reason of a certain conjunction either of dignity,
or of authority, or of affection or indwelling. It was thus that
Nestorius held God to be man---nothing further being meant than that God
is joined to man by such a conjunction that man is dwelt in by God, and
united to Him in affection, and in a share of the Divine authority and
honor. And into the same error fall those who suppose two supposita or
hypostases in Christ, since it is impossible to understand how, of two
things distinct in suppositum or hypostasis, one can be properly
predicated of the other: unless merely by a figurative expression,
inasmuch as they are united in something, as if we were to say that Peter
is John because they are somehow mutually joined together. And these
opinions also were disproved above (Question [2], Articles [3],6).
Hence, supposing the truth of the Catholic belief, that the true Divine
Nature is united with true human nature not only in person, but also in
suppositum or hypostasis; we say that this proposition is true and
proper, "God is man"---not only by the truth of its terms, i.e. because
Christ is true God and true man, but by the truth of the predication. For
a word signifying the common nature in the concrete may stand for all
contained in the common nature, as this word "man" may stand for any
individual man. And thus this word "God," from its very mode of
signification, may stand for the Person of the Son of God, as was said in
the FP, Question [39], Article [4]. Now of every suppositum of any nature we may truly
and properly predicate a word signifying that nature in the concrete, as
"man" may properly and truly be predicated of Socrates and Plato. Hence,
since the Person of the Son of God for Whom this word "God" stands, is a
suppositum of human nature this word man may be truly and properly
predicated of this word "God," as it stands for the Person of the Son of
God.
Reply to Objection 1: When different forms cannot come together in one
suppositum, the proposition is necessarily in remote matter, the subject
signifying one form and the predicate another. But when two forms can
come together in one suppositum, the matter is not remote, but natural or
contingent, as when I say: "Something white is musical." Now the Divine
and human natures, although most widely apart, nevertheless come together
by the mystery of the Incarnation in one suppositum, in which neither
exists accidentally, but [both] essentially. Hence this proposition is
neither in remote nor in contingent, but in natural matter; and man is
not predicated of God accidentally, but essentially, as being predicated
of its hypostasis---not, indeed, by reason of the form signified by this
word "God," but by reason of the suppositum, which is a hypostasis of
human nature.
Reply to Objection 2: The three Divine Persons agree in one Nature, and are
distinguished in suppositum; and hence they are not predicated one of
another. But in the mystery of the Incarnation the natures, being
distinct, are not predicated one of the other, in the abstract. For the
Divine Nature is not the human nature. But because they agree in
suppositum, they are predicated of each other in the concrete.
Reply to Objection 3: "Soul" and "flesh" are taken in the abstract, even as
Godhead and manhood; but in the concrete we say "animate" and "carnal" or
"corporeal," as, on the other hand, "God" and "man." Hence in both cases
the abstract is not predicated of the abstract, but only the concrete of
the concrete.
Reply to Objection 4: This word "man" is predicated of God, because of the union
in person, and this union implies a relation. Hence it does not follow
the rule of those words which are absolutely predicated of God from
eternity.
Index [<< | >>]
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Question: 16 [<< | >>]
Article: 2 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that this is false: "Man is God." For God is an
incommunicable name; hence (Wis. 13:10; 14:21) idolaters are rebuked for
giving the name of God, which is incommunicable, to wood and stones.
Hence with equal reason does it seem unbecoming that this word "God"
should be predicated of man.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is predicated of the predicate may be
predicated of the subject. But this is true: "God is the Father," or "God
is the Trinity." Therefore, if it is true that "Man is God," it seems
that this also is true: "Man is the Father," or "Man is the Trinity." But
these are false. Therefore the first is false.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (@Ps. 80:10): "There shall be no new God in
thee." But man is something new; for Christ was not always man. Therefore
this is false: "Man is God."
On the contrary, It is written (@Rm. 9:5): "Of whom is Christ according
to the flesh, Who is over all things, God blessed for ever." Now Christ,
according to the flesh, is man. Therefore this is true: "Man is God."
I answer that, Granted the reality of both natures, i.e. Divine and
human, and of the union in person and hypostasis, this is true and
proper: "Man is God," even as this: "God is man." For this word "man" may
stand for any hypostasis of human nature; and thus it may stand for the
Person of the Son of God, Whom we say is a hypostasis of human nature.
Now it is manifest that the word "God" is truly and properly predicated
of the Person of the Son of God, as was said in the FP, Question [39], Article [4].
Hence it remains that this is true and proper: "Man is God."
Reply to Objection 1: Idolaters attributed the name of the Deity to stones and
wood, considered in their own nature, because they thought there was
something divine in them. But we do not attribute the name of the Deity
to the man in His human nature, but in the eternal suppositum, which by
union is a suppositum of human nature, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: This word "Father" is predicated of this word "God,"
inasmuch as this word "God" stands for the Person of the Father. And in
this way it is not predicated of the Person of the Son, because the
Person of the Son is not the Person of the Father. And, consequently, it
is not necessary that this word "Father" be predicated of this word
"Man," of which the Word "God" is predicated, inasmuch as "Man" stands
for the Person of the Son.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the human nature in Christ is something new, yet
the suppositum of the human nature is not new, but eternal. And because
this word "God" is predicated of man not on account of the human nature,
but by reason of the suppositum, it does not follow that we assert a new
God. But this would follow, if we held that "Man" stands for a created
suppositum: even as must be said by those who assert that there are two
supposita in Christ [*Cf. Question [2], Articles [3],6].
Index [<< | >>]
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Question: 16 [<< | >>]
Article: 3 [<< | >>]
[*The question is hardly apposite in English. St. Thomas explains why we
can say in Latin, e.g. 'oratio dominica' (the Lord's Prayer) or 'passio
dominica' (Our Lord's Passion), but not speak of our Lord as 'homo
dominicus' (a lordly man)].
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ can be called a lordly man. For
Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36) that "we are to be counseled to hope
for the goods that were in the Lordly Man"; and he is speaking of Christ.
Therefore it seems that Christ was a lordly man.
Objection 2: Further, as lordship belongs to Christ by reason of His Divine
Nature, so does manhood belong to the human nature. Now God is said to be
"humanized," as is plain from Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 11), where he
says that "being humanized manifests the conjunction with man." Hence
with like reason may it be said denominatively that this man is lordly.
Objection 3: Further, as "lordly" is derived from "lord," so is Divine derived
from "Deus" [God]. But Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iv) calls Christ the "most
Divine Jesus." Therefore with like reason may Christ be called a lordly
man.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 19): "I do not see that we
may rightly call Jesus Christ a lordly man, since He is the Lord Himself."
I answer that, As was said above (Article [2], ad 3), when we say "the Man
Christ Jesus," we signify the eternal suppositum, which is the Person of
the Son of God, because there is only one suppositum of both natures. Now
"God" and "Lord" are predicated essentially of the Son of God; and hence
they ought not to be predicated denominatively, since this is derogatory
to the truth of the union. Hence, since we say "lordly" denominatively
from lord, it cannot truly and properly be said that this Man is lordly,
but rather that He is Lord. But if, when we say "the Man Christ Jesus,"
we mean a created suppositum, as those who assert two supposita in
Christ, this man might be called lordly, inasmuch as he is assumed to a
participation of Divine honor, as the Nestorians said. And, even in this
way, the human nature is not called "divine" by essence, but
"deified"---not, indeed, by its being converted into the Divine Nature,
but by its conjunction with the Divine Nature in one hypostasis, as is
plain from Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 11,17).
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine retracts these and the like words (Retract. i,
19); hence, after the foregoing words (Retract. i, 19), he adds:
"Wherever I have said this," viz. that Christ Jesus is a lordly man, "I
wish it unsaid, having afterwards seen that it ought not to be said
although it may be defended with some reason," i.e. because one might say
that He was called a lordly man by reason of the human nature, which this
word "man" signifies, and not by reason of the suppositum.
Reply to Objection 2: This one suppositum, which is of the human and Divine
natures, was first of the Divine Nature, i.e. from eternity. Afterwards
in time it was made a suppositum of human nature by the Incarnation. And
for this reason it is said to be "humanized"---not that it assumed a man,
but that it assumed human nature. But the converse of this is not true,
viz. that a suppositum of human nature assumed the Divine Nature; hence
we may not say a "deified" or "lordly" man.
Reply to Objection 3: This word Divine is wont to be predicated even of things of
which the word God is predicated essentially; thus we say that "the
Divine Essence is God," by reason of identity; and that "the Essence
belongs to God," or is "Divine," on account of the different way of
signifying; and we speak of the "Divine Word," though the Word is God.
So, too, we say "a Divine Person," just as we say "the person of Plato,"
on account of its different mode of signification. But "lordly" is not
predicated of those of which "lord" is predicated; for we are not wont to
call a man who is a lord, lordly; but whatsoever belongs to a lord is
called lordly, as the "lordly will," or the "lordly hand," or the "lordly
possession." And hence the man Christ, Who is our Lord, cannot be called
lordly; yet His flesh can be called "lordly flesh" and His passion the
"lordly passion."
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Question: 16 [<< | >>]
Article: 4 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that what belongs to the human nature cannot be
said of God. For contrary things cannot be said of the same. Now, what
belongs to human nature is contrary to what is proper to God, since God
is uncreated, immutable, and eternal, and it belongs to the human nature
to be created temporal and mutable. Therefore what belongs to the human
nature cannot be said of God.
Objection 2: Further, to attribute to God what is defective seems to be
derogatory to the Divine honor, and to be a blasphemy. Now what pertains
to the human nature contains a kind of defect, as to suffer, to die, and
the like. Hence it seems that what pertains to the human nature can
nowise be said of God.
Objection 3: Further, to be assumed pertains to the human nature; yet it does
not pertain to God. Therefore what belongs to the human nature cannot be
said of God.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4) that "God assumed
the idioms," i.e. the properties, "of flesh, since God is said to be
passible, and the God of glory was crucified."
I answer that, On this question there was a difference of opinion
between Nestorians and Catholics. The Nestorians wished to divide words
predicated of Christ, in this way, viz. that such as pertained to human
nature should not be predicated of God, and that such as pertained to the
Divine Nature should not be predicated of the Man. Hence Nestorius said:
"If anyone attempt to attribute sufferings to the Word, let him be
anathema" [*Council of Ephesus, Part I, ch. 29]. But if there are any
words applicable to both natures, of them they predicated what pertained
to both natures, as "Christ" or "Lord." Hence they granted that Christ
was born of a Virgin, and that He was from eternity; but they did not say
that God was born of a virgin, or that the Man was from eternity.
Catholics on the other hand maintained that words which are said of
Christ either in His Divine or in His human nature may be said either of
God or of man. Hence Cyril says [*Council of Ephesus, Part I, ch. 26]:
"If anyone ascribes to two persons or substances," i.e. hypostases, "such
words as are in the evangelical and apostolic Scriptures, or have been
said of Christ by the Saints, or by Himself of Himself, and believes that
some are to be applied to the Man, and apportions some to the Word
alone---let him be anathema." And the reason of this is that, since there
is one hypostasis of both natures, the same hypostasis is signified by
the name of either nature. Thus whether we say "man" or "God," the
hypostasis of Divine and human nature is signified. And hence, of the Man
may be said what belongs to the Divine Nature, as of a hypostasis of the
Divine Nature; and of God may be said what belongs to the human nature,
as of a hypostasis of human nature.
Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that in a proposition in which
something is predicated of another, we must not merely consider what the
predicate is predicated of, but also the reason of its being predicated.
Thus, although we do not distinguish things predicated of Christ, yet we
distinguish that by reason of which they are predicated, since those
things that belong to the Divine Nature are predicated of Christ in His
Divine Nature, and those that belong to the human nature are predicated
of Christ in His human nature. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. i, 11): "We
must distinguish what is said by Scripture in reference to the form of
God, wherein He is equal to the Father, and what in reference to the form
of a servant, wherein He is less than the Father": and further on he says
(De Trin. i, 13): "The prudent, careful, and devout reader will discern
the reason and point of view of what is said."
Reply to Objection 1: It is impossible for contraries to be predicated of the
same in the same respects, but nothing prevents their being predicated of
the same in different aspects. And thus contraries are predicated of
Christ, not in the same, but in different natures.
Reply to Objection 2: If the things pertaining to defect were attributed to God
in His Divine Nature, it would be a blasphemy, since it would be
derogatory to His honor. But there is no kind of wrong done to God if
they are attributed to Him in His assumed nature. Hence in a discourse of
the Council of Ephesus [*Part III, ch. 10] it is said: "God accounts
nothing a wrong which is the occasion of man's salvation. For no
lowliness that He assumed for us injures that Nature which can be subject
to no injury, yet makes lower things Its own, to save our nature.
Therefore, since these lowly and worthless things do no harm to the
Divine Nature, but bring about our salvation, how dost thou maintain that
what was the cause of our salvation was the occasion of harm to God?"
Reply to Objection 3: To be assumed pertains to human nature, not in its
suppositum, but in itself; and thus it does not belong to God.
Index [<< | >>]
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Question: 16 [<< | >>]
Article: 5 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that what belongs to the human nature can be said
of the Divine Nature. For what belongs to the human nature is predicated
of the Son of God, and of God. But God is His own Nature. Therefore, what
belongs to the human nature may be predicated of the Divine Nature.
Objection 2: Further, the flesh pertains to human nature. But as Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6), "we say, after the blessed Athanasius and
Cyril, that the Nature of the Word was incarnate." Therefore it would
seem with equal reason that what belongs to the human nature may be said
of the Divine Nature.
Objection 3: Further, what belongs to the Divine Nature belongs to Christ's
human nature; such as to know future things and to possess saving power.
Therefore it would seem with equal reason that what belongs to the human
may be said of the Divine Nature.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4): "When we mention
the Godhead we do not predicate of it the idioms," i.e. the properties,
"of the humanity; for we do not say that the Godhead is passible or
creatable." Now the Godhead is the Divine Nature. Therefore what is
proper to the human nature cannot be said of the Divine Nature.
I answer that, What belongs to one cannot be said of another, unless
they are both the same; thus "risible" can be predicated only of man. Now
in the mystery of the Incarnation the Divine and human natures are not
the same; but the hypostasis of the two natures is the same. And hence
what belongs to one nature cannot be predicated of the other if they are
taken in the abstract. Now concrete words stand for the hypostasis of the
nature; and hence of concrete words we may predicate indifferently what
belongs to either nature---whether the word of which they are predicated
refers to one nature, as the word "Christ," by which is signified "both
the Godhead anointing and the manhood anointed"; or to the Divine Nature
alone, as this word "God" or "the Son of God"; or to the manhood alone,
as this word "Man" or "Jesus." Hence Pope Leo says (Ep. ad Palaest.
cxxiv): "It is of no consequence from what substance we name Christ;
because since the unity of person remains inseparably, one and the same
is altogether Son of Man by His flesh, and altogether Son of God by the
Godhead which He has with the Father."
Reply to Objection 1: In God, Person and Nature are really the same; and by
reason of this identity the Divine Nature is predicated of the Son of
God. Nevertheless, its mode of predication is different; and hence
certain things are said of the Son of God which are not said of the
Divine Nature; thus we say that the Son of God is born, yet we do not say
that the Divine Nature is born; as was said in the FP, Question [39], Article [5]. So,
too, in the mystery of the Incarnation we say that the Son of God
suffered, yet we do not say that the Divine Nature suffered.
Reply to Objection 2: Incarnation implies union with flesh, rather than any property of flesh. Now in Christ each nature is united to the other in person; and by reason of this union the Divine Nature is said to be incarnate and the human nature deified, as stated above (Question [2], Article [1], ad 3).
Reply to Objection 3: What belongs to the Divine Nature is predicated of the
human nature---not, indeed, as it belongs essentially to the Divine
Nature, but as it is participated by the human nature. Hence, whatever
cannot be participated by the human nature (as to be uncreated and
omnipotent), is nowise predicated of the human nature. But the Divine
Nature received nothing by participation from the human nature; and hence
what belongs to the human nature can nowise be predicated of the Divine
Nature.
Index [<< | >>]
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Question: 16 [<< | >>]
Article: 6 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that this is false: "God was made man." For since
man signifies a substance, to be made man is to be made simply. But this
is false: "God was made simply." Therefore this is false: "God was made
man."
Objection 2: Further, to be made man is to be changed. But God cannot be the
subject of change, according to Malachi 3:6: "I am the Lord, and I change
not." Hence this is false: "God was made man."
Objection 3: Further, man as predicated of Christ stands for the Person of the
Son of God. But this is false: "God was made the Person of the Son of
God." Therefore this is false: "God was made man."
On the contrary, It is written (@Jn. 1:14): "The Word was made flesh":
and as Athanasius says (Ep. ad Epictetum), "when he said, 'The Word was
made flesh,' it is as if it were said that God was made man."
I answer that, A thing is said to be made that which begins to be
predicated of it for the first time. Now to be man is truly predicated
of God, as stated above (Article [1]), yet in such sort that it pertains to God
to be man, not from eternity, but from the time of His assuming human
nature. Hence, this is true, "God was made man"; though it is understood
differently by some: even as this, "God is man," as we said above (Article [1]).
Reply to Objection 1: To be made man is to be made simply, in all those in whom
human nature begins to be in a newly created suppositum. But God is said
to have been made man, inasmuch as the human nature began to be in an
eternally pre-existing suppositum of the Divine Nature. And hence for God
to be made man does not mean that God was made simply.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above, to be made implies that something. is
newly predicated of another. Hence, whenever anything is predicated of
another, and there is a change in that of which it is predicated, then to
be made is to be changed; and this takes place in whatever is predicated
absolutely, for whiteness or greatness cannot newly affect anything,
unless it be newly changed to whiteness or greatness. But whatever is
predicated relatively can be newly predicated of anything without its
change, as a man may be made to be on the right side without being
changed and merely by the change of him on whose left side he was. Hence
in such cases, not all that is said to be made is changed, since it may
happen by the change of something else. And it is thus we say of God:
"Lord, Thou art made [Douay: 'hast been'] our refuge" (@Ps. 89:1). Now to
be man belongs to God by reason of the union, which is a relation. And
hence to be man is newly predicated of God without any change in Him, by
a change in the human nature, which is assumed to a Divine Person. And
hence, when it is said, "God was made man," we understand no change on
the part of God, but only on the part of the human nature.
Reply to Objection 3: Man stands not for the bare Person of the Son of God, but
inasmuch as it subsists in human nature. Hence, although this is false,
"God was made the Person of the Son of God," yet this is true: "God was
made man" by being united to human nature.
Index [<< | >>]
Third Part [<< | >>]
Question: 16 [<< | >>]
Article: 7 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that this is true: "Man was made God." For it is
written (@Rm. 1:2,3): "Which He had promised before by His prophets in the
holy Scriptures, concerning His Son Who was made to Him of the seed of
David according to the flesh." Now Christ, as man, is of the seed of
David according to the flesh. Therefore man was made the Son of God.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 13) that "such was this
assumption, which made God man, and man God." But by reason of this
assumption this is true: "God was made man." Therefore, in like manner,
this is true: "Man was made God."
Objection 3: Further, Gregory Nazianzen says (Ep. ad Chelid. ci): "God was
humanized and man was deified, or whatever else one may like to call it."
Now God is said to be humanized by being made man. Therefore with equal
reason man is said to be deified by being made God; and thus it is true
that "Man was made God."
Objection 4: Further, when it is said that "God was made man," the subject of
the making or uniting is not God, but human nature, which the word "man"
signifies. Now that seems to be the subject of the making, to which the
making is attributed. Hence "Man was made God" is truer than "God was
made man."
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 2): "We do not say
that man was deified, but that God was humanized." Now to be made God is
the same as to be deified. Hence this is false: "Man was made God."
I answer that, This proposition, Man was made God, may be understood in
three ways. First, so that the participle "made" absolutely determines
either the subject or the predicate; and in this sense it is false, since
neither the Man of Whom it is predicated was made, nor is God made, as
will be said (Articles [8],9). And in the same sense this is false: "God was
made man." But it is not of this sense that we are now speaking.
Secondly, it may be so understood that the word "made" determines the
composition, with this meaning: "Man was made God, i.e. it was brought
about that Man is God." And in this sense both are true, viz. that "Man
was made God" and that "God was made Man." But this is not the proper
sense of these phrases; unless, indeed, we are to understand that "man"
has not a personal but a simple supposition. For although "this man" was
not made God, because this suppositum, viz. the Person of the Son of God,
was eternally God, yet man, speaking commonly, was not always God.
Thirdly, properly understood, this participle "made" attaches making to
man with relation to God, as the term of the making. And in this sense,
granted that the Person or hypostasis in Christ are the same as the
suppositum of God and Man, as was shown (Question [2], Articles [2],3), this proposition
is false, because, when it is said, "Man was made God," "man" has a
personal suppositum: because, to be God is not verified of the Man in His
human nature, but in His suppositum. Now the suppositum of human nature,
of Whom "to be God" is verified, is the same as the hypostasis or Person
of the Son of God, Who was always God. Hence it cannot be said that this
Man began to be God, or is made God, or that He was made God.
But if there were a different hypostasis of God and man, so that "to be
God" was predicated of the man, and, conversely, by reason of a certain
conjunction of supposita, or of personal dignity, or of affection or
indwelling, as the Nestorians said, then with equal reason might it be
said that Man was made God, i.e. joined to God, and that God was made
Man, i.e. joined to man.
Reply to Objection 1: In these words of the Apostle the relative "Who" which
refers to the Person of the Son of God ought not to be considered as
affecting the predicate, as if someone already existing of the "seed of
David according to the flesh" was made the Son of God---and it is in
this sense that the objection takes it. But it ought to be taken as
affecting the subject, with this meaning---that the "Son of God was made
to Him ('namely to the honor of the Father,' as a gloss expounds it),
being of the seed of David according to the flesh," as if to say "the Son
of God having flesh of the seed of David to the honor of God."
Reply to Objection 2: This saying of Augustine is to be taken in the sense that
by the assumption that took place in the Incarnation it was brought about
that Man is God and God is Man; and in this sense both sayings are true
as stated above.
The same is to be said in reply to the third, since to be deified is the
same as to be made God.
Reply to Objection 4: A term placed in the subject is taken materially, i.e. for
the suppositum; placed in the predicate it is taken formally, i.e. for
the nature signified. Hence when it is said that "Man was made God," the
being made is not attributed to the human nature but to the suppositum of
the human nature, Which is God from eternity, and hence it does not befit
Him to be made God. But when it is said that "God was made Man," the
making is taken to be terminated in the human nature. Hence, properly
speaking, this is true: "God was made Man," and this is false: "Man was
made God"; even as if Socrates, who was already a man, were made white,
and were pointed out, this would be true: "This man was made white
today," and this would be false; "This white thing was made man today."
Nevertheless, if on the part of the subject there is added some word
signifying human nature in the abstract, it might be taken in this way
for the subject of the making, e.g. if it were said that "human nature
was made the Son of God's."
Index [<< | >>]
Third Part [<< | >>]
Question: 16 [<< | >>]
Article: 8 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that this is true: "Christ is a creature." For Pope
Leo says [*Cf. Append. Opp. August., Serm. xii de Nativ.]: "A new and
unheard of covenant: God Who is and was, is made a creature." Now we may
predicate of Christ whatever the Son of God became by the Incarnation.
Therefore this is true; Christ is a creature.
Objection 2: Further, the properties of both natures may be predicated of the
common hypostasis of both natures, no matter by what word they are
signified, as stated above (Article [5]). But it is the property of human nature
to be created, as it is the property of the Divine Nature to be Creator.
Hence both may be said of Christ, viz. that He is a creature and that he
is uncreated and Creator.
Objection 3: Further, the principal part of a man is the soul rather than the body. But Christ, by reason of the body which He took from the Virgin, is said simply to be born of the Virgin. Therefore by reason of the soul which is created by God, it ought simply to be said that He is a creature.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Trin. i): "Was Christ made by a word?
Was Christ created by a command?" as if to say: "No!" Hence he adds: "How
can there be a creature in God? For God has a simple not a composite
Nature." Therefore it must not be granted that "Christ is a creature."
I answer that, As Jerome [*Gloss, Ord. in Osee 2:16] says, "words spoken
amiss lead to heresy"; hence with us and heretics the very words ought
not to be in common, lest we seem to countenance their error. Now the
Arian heretics said that Christ was a creature and less than the Father,
not only in His human nature, but even in His Divine Person. And hence we
must not say absolutely that Christ is a "creature" or "less than the
Father"; but with a qualification, viz. "in His human nature." But such
things as could not be considered to belong to the Divine Person in
Itself may be predicated simply of Christ by reason of His human nature;
thus we say simply that Christ suffered, died and was buried: even as in
corporeal and human beings, things of which we may doubt whether they
belong to the whole or the part, if they are observed to exist in a part,
are not predicated of the whole simply, i.e. without qualification, for
we do not say that the Ethiopian is white but that he is white as regards
his teeth; but we say without qualification that he is curly, since this
can only belong to him as regards his hair.
Reply to Objection 1: Sometimes, for the sake of brevity, the holy doctors use
the word "creature" of Christ, without any qualifying term; we should
however take as understood the qualification, "as man."
Reply to Objection 2: All the properties of the human, just as of the Divine
Nature, may be predicated equally of Christ. Hence Damascene says (De
Fide Orth. iii, 4) that "Christ Who God and Man, is called created and
uncreated, passible and impassible." Nevertheless things of which we may
doubt to what nature they belong, are not to be predicated without a
qualification. Hence he afterwards adds (De Fide Orth. iv, 5) that "the
one hypostasis," i.e. of Christ, "is uncreated in its Godhead and created
in its manhood": even so conversely, we may not say without
qualification, "Christ is incorporeal" or "impassible"; in order to avoid
the error of Manes, who held that Christ had not a true body, nor truly
suffered, but we must say, with a qualification, that Christ was
incorporeal and impassible "in His Godhead."
Reply to Objection 3: There can be no doubt how the birth from the Virgin applies
to the Person of the Son of God, as there can be in the case of creation;
and hence there is no parity.
Index [<< | >>]
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Question: 16 [<< | >>]
Article: 9 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that this Man, i.e. Christ, began to be. For
Augustine says (Tract. cv in Joan.) that "before the world was, neither
were we, nor the Mediator of God and men---the Man Jesus Christ." But
what was not always, has begun to be. Therefore this Man, i.e. Christ,
began to be.
Objection 2: Further, Christ began to be Man. But to be man is to be simply.
Therefore this man began to be, simply.
Objection 3: Further, "man" implies a suppositum of human nature. But Christ
was not always a suppositum of human nature. Therefore this Man began to
be.
On the contrary, It is written (@Heb. 13:8): "Jesus Christ yesterday and
today: and the same for ever."
I answer that, We must not say that "this Man"---pointing to
Christ---"began to be," unless we add something. And this for a twofold
reason. First, for this proposition is simply false, in the judgment of
the Catholic Faith, which affirms that in Christ there is one suppositum
and one hypostasis, as also one Person. For according to this, when we
say "this Man," pointing to Christ, the eternal suppositum is necessarily
meant, with Whose eternity a beginning in time is incompatible. Hence
this is false: "This Man began to be." Nor does it matter that to begin
to be refers to the human nature, which is signified by this word "man";
because the term placed in the subject is not taken formally so as to
signify the nature, but is taken materially so as to signify the
suppositum, as was said (Article [1], ad 4). Secondly, because even if this
proposition were true, it ought not to be made use of without
qualification; in order to avoid the heresy of Arius, who, since he
pretended that the Person of the Son of God is a creature, and less than
the Father, so he maintained that He began to be, saying "there was a
time when He was not."
Reply to Objection 1: The words quoted must be qualified, i.e. we must say that
the Man Jesus Christ was not, before the world was, "in His humanity."
Reply to Objection 2: With this word "begin" we cannot argue from the lower
species to the higher. For it does not follow if "this began to be
white," that therefore "it began to be colored." And this because "to
begin" implies being now and not heretofore: for it does not follow if
"this was not white hitherto" that "therefore it was not colored
hitherto." Now, to be simply is higher than to be man. Hence this does
not follow: "Christ began to be Man---therefore He began to be."
Reply to Objection 3: This word "Man," as it is taken for Christ, although it
signifies the human nature, which began to be, nevertheless signifies the
eternal suppositum which did not begin to be. Hence, since it signifies
the suppositum when placed in the subject, and refers to the nature when
placed in the predicate, therefore this is false: "The Man Christ began
to be": but this is true: "Christ began to be Man."
Index [<< | >>]
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Question: 16 [<< | >>]
Article: 10 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that this is false: "Christ as Man is a creature,"
or "began to be." For nothing in Christ is created except the human
nature. But this is false: "Christ as Man is the human nature." Therefore
this is also false; Christ as Man is a creature.
Objection 2: Further, the predicate is predicated of the term placed in
reduplication, rather than of the subject of the proposition; as when I
say: "A body as colored is visible," it follows that the colored is
visible. But as stated (Articles [8],9) we must not absolutely grant that "the
Man Christ is a creature"; nor consequently that "Christ as Man is a
creature."
Objection 3: Further, whatever is predicated of a man as man is predicated of
him "per se" and simply, for "per se" is the same as "inasmuch as
itself," as is said Metaph. v, text. 23. But this is false: "Christ as
Man is per se and simply a creature." Hence this, too, is false; "Christ
as Man is a creature."
On the contrary, Whatever is, is either Creator or creature. But this is
false: "Christ as Man is Creator." Therefore this is true: "Christ as Man
is a creature."
I answer that, When we say "Christ as Man" this word "man" may be added
in the reduplication, either by reason of the suppositum or by reason of
the nature. If it be added by reason of the suppositum, since the
suppositum of the human nature in Christ is eternal and uncreated, this
will be false: "Christ as Man is a creature." But if it be added by
reason of the human nature, it is true, since by reason of the human
nature or in the human nature, it belongs to Him to be a creature, as was
said (Article [8]).
It must however be borne in mind that the term covered by the
reduplication signifies the nature rather than the suppositum, since it
is added as a predicate, which is taken formally, for it is the same to
say "Christ as Man" and to say "Christ as He is a Man." Hence this is to
be granted rather than denied: "Christ as Man is a creature." But if
something further be added whereby [the term covered by the
reduplication] is attracted to the suppositum, this proposition is to be
denied rather than granted, for instance were one to say: "Christ as
'this' Man is a creature."
Reply to Objection 1: Although Christ is not the human nature, He has human
nature. Now the word "creature" is naturally predicated not only of
abstract, but also of concrete things; since we say that "manhood is a
creature" and that "man is a creature."
Reply to Objection 2: Man as placed in the subject refers to the suppositum---and
as placed in the reduplication refers to the nature, as was stated above.
And because the nature is created and the suppositum uncreated,
therefore, although it is not granted that "this man is a creature," yet
it is granted that "Christ as Man is a creature."
Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to every man who is a suppositum of human nature
alone to have his being only in human nature. Hence of every such
suppositum it follows that if it is a creature as man, it is a creature
simply. But Christ is a suppositum not merely of human nature, but also
of the Divine Nature, in which He has an uncreated being. Hence it does
not follow that, if He is a creature as Man, He is a creature simply.
Index [<< | >>]
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Question: 16 [<< | >>]
Article: 11 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ, as Man, is God. For Christ is God by
the grace of union. But Christ, as Man, has the grace of union. Therefore
Christ as Man is God.
Objection 2: Further, to forgive sins is proper to God, according to Is.
43:25: "I am He that blot out thy iniquities for My own sake." But Christ
as Man forgives sin, according to Mt. 9:6: "But that you may know that
the Son of Man hath power on earth to forgive sins," etc. Therefore
Christ as Man is God.
Objection 3: Further, Christ is not Man in common, but is this particular Man.
Now Christ, as this Man, is God, since by "this Man" we signify the
eternal suppositum which is God naturally. Therefore Christ as Man is God.
On the contrary, Whatever belongs to Christ as Man belongs to every man.
Now, if Christ as Man is God, it follows that every man is God---which is
clearly false.
I answer that, This term "man" when placed in the reduplication may be
taken in two ways. First as referring to the nature; and in this way it
is not true that Christ as Man is God, because the human nature is
distinct from the Divine by a difference of nature. Secondly it may be
taken as referring to the suppositum; and in this way, since the
suppositum of the human nature in Christ is the Person of the Son of God,
to Whom it essentially belongs to be God, it is true that Christ, as Man,
is God. Nevertheless because the term placed in the reduplication
signifies the nature rather than the suppositum, as stated above (Article [10]),
hence this is to be denied rather than granted: "Christ as Man is God."
Reply to Objection 1: It is not with regard to the same, that a thing moves
towards, and that it is, something; for to move belongs to a thing
because of its matter or subject---and to be in act belongs to it because
of its form. So too it is not with regard to the same, that it belongs to
Christ to be ordained to be God by the grace of union, and to be God. For
the first belongs to Him in His human nature, and the second, in His
Divine Nature. Hence this is true: "Christ as Man has the grace of
union"; yet not this: "Christ as Man is God."
Reply to Objection 2: The Son of Man has on earth the power of forgiving sins,
not by virtue of the human nature, but by virtue of the Divine Nature, in
which Divine Nature resides the power of forgiving sins authoritatively;
whereas in the human nature it resides instrumentally and ministerially.
Hence Chrysostom expounding this passage says [*Implicitly. Hom. xxx in
Matth; cf. St. Thomas, Catena Aurea on Mk. 2:10]: "He said pointedly 'on
earth to forgive sins,' in order to show that by an indivisible union He
united human nature to the power of the Godhead, since although He was
made Man, yet He remained the Word of God."
Reply to Objection 3: When we say "this man," the demonstrative pronoun "this"
attracts "man" to the suppositum; and hence "Christ as this Man, is God,
is a truer proposition than Christ as Man is God."
Index [<< | >>]
Third Part [<< | >>]
Question: 16 [<< | >>]
Article: 12 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ as Man is a hypostasis or person. For
what belongs to every man belongs to Christ as Man, since He is like
other men according to Phil. 2:7: "Being made in the likeness of men."
But every man is a person. Therefore Christ as Man is a person.
Objection 2: Further, Christ as Man is a substance of rational nature. But He
is not a universal substance: therefore He is an individual substance.
Now a person is nothing else than an individual substance of rational
nature; as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.). Therefore Christ as Man is a
person.
Objection 3: Further, Christ as Man is a being of human nature, and a
suppositum and a hypostasis of the same nature. But every hypostasis and
suppositum and being of human nature is a person. Therefore Christ as Man
is a person.
On the contrary, Christ as Man is not an eternal person. Therefore if
Christ as Man is a person it would follow that in Christ there are two
persons---one temporal and the other eternal, which is erroneous, as was
said above (Question [2], Article [6]; Question [4], Article [2]).
I answer that, As was said (Articles [10],11), the term "Man" placed in the
reduplication may refer either to the suppositum or to the nature. Hence
when it is said: "Christ as Man is a person," if it is taken as referring
to the suppositum, it is clear that Christ as Man is a person, since the
suppositum of human nature is nothing else than the Person of the Son of
God. But if it be taken as referring to the nature, it may be understood
in two ways. First, we may so understand it as if it belonged to human
nature to be in a person, and in this way it is true, for whatever
subsists in human nature is a person. Secondly it may be taken that in
Christ a proper personality, caused by the principles of the human
nature, is due to the human nature; and in this way Christ as Man is not
a person, since the human nature does not exist of itself apart from the
Divine Nature, and yet the notion of person requires this.
Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to every man to be a person, inasmuch as
everything subsisting in human nature is a person. Now this is proper to
the Man Christ that the Person subsisting in His human nature is not
caused by the principles of the human nature, but is eternal. Hence in
one way He is a person, as Man; and in another way He is not, as stated
above.
Reply to Objection 2: The "individual substance," which is included in the
definition of a person, implies a complete substance subsisting of itself
and separate from all else; otherwise, a man's hand might be called a
person, since it is an individual substance; nevertheless, because it is
an individual substance existing in something else, it cannot be called a
person; nor, for the same reason, can the human nature in Christ,
although it may be called something individual and singular.
Reply to Objection 3: As a person signifies something complete and
self-subsisting in rational nature, so a hypostasis, suppositum, and
being of nature in the genus of substance, signify something that
subsists of itself. Hence, as human nature is not of itself a person
apart from the Person of the Son of God, so likewise it is not of itself
a hypostasis or suppositum or a being of nature. Hence in the sense in
which we deny that "Christ as Man is a person" we must deny all the other
propositions.