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First Part of the Second Part [<< | >>]
Question: 46 [<< | >>]
We must now consider anger: and (1) anger in itself; (2) the cause of
anger and its remedy; (3) the effect of anger.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether anger is a special passion?
(2) Whether the object of anger is good or evil?
(3) Whether anger is in the concupiscible faculty?
(4) Whether anger is accompanied by an act of reason?
(5) Whether anger is more natural than desire?
(6) Whether anger is more grievous than hatred?
(7) Whether anger is only towards those with whom we have a relation of
justice?
(8) Of the species of anger.
Index [<< | >>]
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Question: 46 [<< | >>]
Article: 1 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not a special passion. For the
irascible power takes its name from anger [ira]. But there are several
passions in this power, not only one. Therefore anger is not one special
passion.
Objection 2: Further, to every special passion there is a contrary passion; as
is evident by going through them one by one. But no passion is contrary
to anger, as stated above (Question [23], Article [3]). Therefore anger is not a special
passion.
Objection 3: Further, one special passion does not include another. But anger
includes several passions: since it accompanies sorrow, pleasure, and
hope, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2). Therefore anger is not a
special passion.
On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) calls anger a special
passion: and so does Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 7).
I answer that, A thing is said to be general in two ways. First, by
predication; thus "animal" is general in respect of all animals.
Secondly, by causality; thus the sun is the general cause of all things
generated here below, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Because just
as a genus contains potentially many differences, according to a likeness
of matter; so an efficient cause contains many effects according to its
active power. Now it happens that an effect is produced by the
concurrence of various causes; and since every cause remains somewhat in
its effect, we may say that, in yet a third way, an effect which is due
to the concurrence of several causes, has a certain generality, inasmuch
as several causes are, in a fashion, actually existing therein.
Accordingly in the first way, anger is not a general passion but is
condivided with the other passions, as stated above (Question [23], Article [4]). In
like manner, neither is it in the second way: since it is not a cause of
the other passions. But in this way, love may be called a general
passion, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), because love is
the primary root of all the other passions, as stated above (Question [27], Article [4]). But, in a third way, anger may be called a general passion, inasmuch
as it is caused by a concurrence of several passions. Because the
movement of anger does not arise save on account of some pain inflicted,
and unless there be desire and hope of revenge: for, as the Philosopher
says (Rhet. ii, 2), "the angry man hopes to punish; since he craves for
revenge as being possible." Consequently if the person, who inflicted the
injury, excel very much, anger does not ensue, but only sorrow, as
Avicenna states (De Anima iv, 6).
Reply to Objection 1: The irascible power takes its name from "ira" [anger], not
because every movement of that power is one of anger; but because all its
movements terminate in anger; and because, of all these movements, anger
is the most patent.
Reply to Objection 2: From the very fact that anger is caused by contrary
passions, i.e. by hope, which is of good, and by sorrow, which is of
evil, it includes in itself contrariety: and consequently it has no
contrary outside itself. Thus also in mixed colors there is no
contrariety, except that of the simple colors from which they are made.
Reply to Objection 3: Anger includes several passions, not indeed as a genus
includes several species; but rather according to the inclusion of cause
and effect.
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Question: 46 [<< | >>]
Article: 2 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that the object of anger is evil. For Gregory of
Nyssa says [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.] that anger is "the sword-bearer
of desire," inasmuch, to wit, as it assails whatever obstacle stands in
the way of desire. But an obstacle has the character of evil. Therefore
anger regards evil as its object.
Objection 2: Further, anger and hatred agree in their effect, since each
seeks to inflict harm on another. But hatred regards evil as its object,
as stated above (Question [29], Article [1]). Therefore anger does also.
Objection 3: Further, anger arises from sorrow; wherefore the Philosopher says
(Ethic. viii, 6) that "anger acts with sorrow." But evil is the object of
sorrow. Therefore it is also the object of anger.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that "anger craves for
revenge." But the desire for revenge is a desire for something good:
since revenge belongs to justice. Therefore the object of anger is good.
Moreover, anger is always accompanied by hope, wherefore it causes
pleasure, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2). But the object of hope
and of pleasure is good. Therefore good is also the object of anger.
I answer that, The movement of the appetitive power follows an act of
the apprehensive power. Now the apprehensive power apprehends a thing in
two ways. First, by way of an incomplex object, as when we understand
what a man is; secondly, by way of a complex object, as when we
understand that whiteness is in a man. Consequently in each of these ways
the appetitive power can tend to both good and evil: by way of a simple
and incomplex object, when the appetite simply follows and adheres to
good, or recoils from evil: and such movements are desire, hope,
pleasure, sorrow, and so forth: by way of a complex object, as when the
appetite is concerned with some good or evil being in, or being done to,
another, either seeking this or recoiling from it. This is evident in the
case of love and hatred: for we love someone, in so far as we wish some
good to be in him; and we hate someone, in so far as we wish some evil to
be in him. It is the same with anger; for when a man is angry, he wishes
to be avenged on someone. Hence the movement of anger has a twofold
tendency: viz. to vengeance itself, which it desires and hopes for as
being a good, wherefore it takes pleasure in it; and to the person on
whom it seeks vengeance, as to something contrary and hurtful, which
bears the character of evil.
We must, however, observe a twofold difference in this respect, between
anger on the one side, and hatred and love on the other. The first
difference is that anger always regards two objects: whereas love and
hatred sometimes regard but one object, as when a man is said to love
wine or something of the kind, or to hate it. The second difference is,
that both the objects of love are good: since the lover wishes good to
someone, as to something agreeable to himself: while both the objects of
hatred bear the character of evil: for the man who hates, wishes evil to
someone, as to something disagreeable to him. Whereas anger regards one
object under the aspect of evil, viz. the noxious person, on whom it
seeks to be avenged. Consequently it is a passion somewhat made up of
contrary passions.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Question: 46 [<< | >>]
Article: 3 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that anger is in the concupiscible faculty. For
Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that anger is a kind of "desire."
But desire is in the concupiscible faculty. Therefore anger is too.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says in his Rule, that "anger grows into
hatred": and Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that "hatred is
inveterate anger." But hatred, like love, is a concupiscible passion.
Therefore anger is in the concupiscible faculty.
Objection 3: Further, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) and Gregory of Nyssa
[*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.] say that "anger is made up of sorrow and
desire." Both of these are in the concupiscible faculty. Therefore anger
is a concupiscible passion.
On the contrary, The concupiscible is distinct from the irascible
faculty. If, therefore, anger were in the concupiscible power, the
irascible would not take its name from it.
I answer that, As stated above (Question [23], Article [1]), the passions of the
irascible part differ from the passions of the concupiscible faculty, in
that the objects of the concupiscible passions are good and evil
absolutely considered, whereas the objects of the irascible passions are
good and evil in a certain elevation or arduousness. Now it has been
stated (Article [2]) that anger regards two objects: viz. the vengeance that it
seeks; and the person on whom it seeks vengeance; and in respect of both,
anger requires a certain arduousness: for the movement of anger does not
arise, unless there be some magnitude about both these objects; since "we
make no ado about things that are naught or very minute," as the
Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 2). It is therefore evident that anger is
not in the concupiscible, but in the irascible faculty.
Reply to Objection 1: Cicero gives the name of desire to any kind of craving for
a future good, without discriminating between that which is arduous and
that which is not. Accordingly he reckons anger as a kind of desire,
inasmuch as it is a desire of vengeance. In this sense, however, desire
is common to the irascible and concupiscible faculties.
Reply to Objection 2: Anger is said to grow into hatred, not as though the same
passion which at first was anger, afterwards becomes hatred by becoming
inveterate; but by a process of causality. For anger when it lasts a long
time engenders hatred.
Reply to Objection 3: Anger is said to be composed of sorrow and desire, not as
though they were its parts, but because they are its causes: and it has
been said above (Question [25], Article [2]) that the concupiscible passions are the
causes of the irascible passions.
Index [<< | >>]
First Part of the Second Part [<< | >>]
Question: 46 [<< | >>]
Article: 4 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that anger does not require an act of reason. For,
since anger is a passion, it is in the sensitive appetite. But the
sensitive appetite follows an apprehension, not of reason, but of the
sensitive faculty. Therefore anger does not require an act of reason.
Objection 2: Further, dumb animals are devoid of reason: and yet they are seen
to be angry. Therefore anger does not require an act of reason.
Objection 3: Further, drunkenness fetters the reason; whereas it is conducive
to anger. Therefore anger does not require an act of reason.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger
listens to reason somewhat."
I answer that, As stated above (Article [2]), anger is a desire for vengeance.
Now vengeance implies a comparison between the punishment to be inflicted
and the hurt done; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that
"anger, as if it had drawn the inference that it ought to quarrel with
such a person, is therefore immediately exasperated." Now to compare and
to draw an inference is an act of reason. Therefore anger, in a fashion,
requires an act of reason.
Reply to Objection 1: The movement of the appetitive power may follow an act of
reason in two ways. In the first way, it follows the reason in so far as
the reason commands: and thus the will follows reason, wherefore it is
called the rational appetite. In another way, it follows reason in so far
as the reason denounces, and thus anger follows reason. For the
Philosopher says (De Problem. xxviii, 3) that "anger follows reason, not
in obedience to reason's command, but as a result of reason's denouncing
the injury." Because the sensitive appetite is subject to the reason, not
immediately but through the will.
Reply to Objection 2: Dumb animals have a natural instinct imparted to them by
the Divine Reason, in virtue of which they are gifted with movements,
both internal and external, like unto rational movements, as stated above
(Question [40], Article [3]).
Reply to Objection 3: As stated in Ethic. vii, 6, "anger listens somewhat to reason" in so far as reason denounces the injury inflicted, "but listens not perfectly," because it does not observe the rule of reason as to the measure of vengeance. Anger, therefore, requires an act of reason; and yet proves a hindrance to reason. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Problem. iii, 2,27) that whose who are very drunk, so as to be incapable of the use of reason, do not get angry: but those who are slightly drunk, do get angry, through being still able, though hampered, to form a judgment of reason.
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Question: 46 [<< | >>]
Article: 5 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not more natural than desire. Because
it is proper to man to be by nature a gentle animal. But "gentleness is
contrary to anger," as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 3). Therefore
anger is no more natural than desire, in fact it seems to be altogether
unnatural to man.
Objection 2: Further, reason is contrasted with nature: since those things
that act according to reason, are not said to act according to nature.
Now "anger requires an act of reason, but desire does not," as stated in
Ethic. vii, 6. Therefore desire is more natural than anger.
Objection 3: Further, anger is a craving for vengeance: while desire is a
craving for those things especially which are pleasant to the touch, viz.
for pleasures of the table and for sexual pleasures. But these things are
more natural to man than vengeance. Therefore desire is more natural than
anger.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger is
more natural than desire."
I answer that, By "natural" we mean that which is caused by nature, as
stated in Phys. ii, 1. Consequently the question as to whether a
particular passion is more or less natural cannot be decided without
reference to the cause of that passion. Now the cause of a passion, as
stated above (Question [36], Article [2]), may be considered in two ways: first, on the
part of the object; secondly, on the part of the subject. If then we
consider the cause of anger and of desire, on the part of the object,
thus desire, especially of pleasures of the table, and of sexual
pleasures, is more natural than anger; in so far as these pleasures are
more natural to man than vengeance.
If, however, we consider the cause of anger on the part of the subject,
thus anger, in a manner, is more natural; and, in a manner, desire is
more natural. Because the nature of an individual man may be considered
either as to the generic, or as to the specific nature, or again as to
the particular temperament of the individual. If then we consider the
generic nature, i.e. the nature of this man considered as an animal; thus
desire is more natural than anger; because it is from this very generic
nature that man is inclined to desire those things which tend to preserve
in him the life both of the species and of the individual. If, however,
we consider the specific nature, i.e. the nature of this man as a
rational being; then anger is more natural to man than desire, in so far
as anger follows reason more than desire does. Wherefore the Philosopher
says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "revenge" which pertains to anger "is more
natural to man than meekness": for it is natural to everything to rise up
against things contrary and hurtful. And if we consider the nature of the
individual, in respect of his particular temperament, thus anger is more
natural than desire; for the reason that anger is prone to ensue from
the natural tendency to anger, more than desire, or any other passion, is
to ensue from a natural tendency to desire, which tendencies result from
a man's individual temperament. Because disposition to anger is due to a
bilious temperament; and of all the humors, the bile moves quickest; for
it is like fire. Consequently he that is temperamentally disposed to
anger is sooner incensed with anger, than he that is temperamentally
disposed to desire, is inflamed with desire: and for this reason the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that a disposition to anger is more
liable to be transmitted from parent to child, than a disposition to
desire.
Reply to Objection 1: We may consider in man both the natural temperament on the
part of the body, and the reason. On the part of the bodily temperament,
a man, considered specifically, does not naturally excel others either in
anger or in any other passion, on account of the moderation of his
temperament. But other animals, for as much as their temperament recedes
from this moderation and approaches to an extreme disposition, are
naturally disposed to some excess of passion, such as the lion in daring,
the hound in anger, the hare in fear, and so forth. On the part of
reason, however, it is natural to man, both to be angry and to be gentle:
in so far as reason somewhat causes anger, by denouncing the injury which
causes anger; and somewhat appeases anger, in so far as the angry man
"does not listen perfectly to the command of reason," as stated above
(Article [4], ad 3).
Reply to Objection 2: Reason itself belongs to the nature of man: wherefore from
the very fact that anger requires an act of reason, it follows that it
is, in a manner, natural to man.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument regards anger and desire on the part of the
object.
Index [<< | >>]
First Part of the Second Part [<< | >>]
Question: 46 [<< | >>]
Article: 6 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that anger is more grievous than hatred. For it is
written (@Prov. 27:4) that "anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh
forth." But hatred sometimes has mercy. Therefore anger is more grievous
than hatred.
Objection 2: Further, it is worse to suffer evil and to grieve for it, than
merely to suffer it. But when a man hates, he is contented if the object
of his hatred suffer evil: whereas the angry man is not satisfied unless
the object of his anger know it and be aggrieved thereby, as the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4). Therefore, anger is more grievous than
hatred.
Objection 3: Further, a thing seems to be so much the more firm according as
more things concur to set it up: thus a habit is all the more settled
through being caused by several acts. But anger is caused by the
concurrence of several passions, as stated above (Article [1]): whereas hatred
is not. Therefore anger is more settled and more grievous than hatred.
On the contrary, Augustine, in his Rule, compares hatred to "a beam,"
but anger to "a mote."
I answer that, The species and nature of a passion are taken from its
object. Now the object of anger is the same in substance as the object of
hatred; since, just as the hater wishes evil to him whom he hates, so
does the angry man wish evil to him with whom he is angry. But there is a
difference of aspect: for the hater wishes evil to his enemy, as evil,
whereas the angry man wishes evil to him with whom he is angry, not as
evil but in so far as it has an aspect of good, that is, in so far as he
reckons it as just, since it is a means of vengeance. Wherefore also it
has been said above (Article [2]) that hatred implies application of evil to
evil, whereas anger denotes application of good to evil. Now it is
evident that to seek evil under the aspect of justice, is a lesser evil,
than simply to seek evil to someone. Because to wish evil to someone
under the aspect of justice, may be according to the virtue of justice,
if it be in conformity with the order of reason; and anger fails only in
this, that it does not obey the precept of reason in taking vengeance.
Consequently it is evident that hatred is far worse and graver than anger.
Reply to Objection 1: In anger and hatred two points may be considered: namely,
the thing desired, and the intensity of the desire. As to the thing
desired, anger has more mercy than hatred has. For since hatred desires
another's evil for evil's sake, it is satisfied with no particular
measure of evil: because those things that are desired for their own
sake, are desired without measure, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i,
3), instancing a miser with regard to riches. Hence it is written
(Ecclus. 12:16): "An enemy . . . if he find an opportunity, will not be
satisfied with blood." Anger, on the other hand, seeks evil only under
the aspect of a just means of vengeance. Consequently when the evil
inflicted goes beyond the measure of justice according to the estimate of
the angry man, then he has mercy. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet.
ii, 4) that "the angry man is appeased if many evils befall, whereas the
hater is never appeased."
As to the intensity of the desire, anger excludes mercy more than hatred
does; because the movement of anger is more impetuous, through the
heating of the bile. Hence the passage quoted continues: "Who can bear
the violence of one provoked?"
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above, an angry man wishes evil to someone, in so
far as this evil is a means of just vengeance. Now vengeance is wrought
by the infliction of a punishment: and the nature of punishment consists
in being contrary to the will, painful, and inflicted for some fault.
Consequently an angry man desires this, that the person whom he is
hurting, may feel it and be in pain, and know that this has befallen him
on account of the harm he has done the other. The hater, on the other
hand, cares not for all this, since he desires another's evil as such. It
is not true, however, that an evil is worse through giving pain: because
"injustice and imprudence, although evil," yet, being voluntary, "do not
grieve those in whom they are," as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 4).
Reply to Objection 3: That which proceeds from several causes, is more settled
when these causes are of one kind: but it may be that one cause prevails
over many others. Now hatred ensues from a more lasting cause than anger
does. Because anger arises from an emotion of the soul due to the wrong
inflicted; whereas hatred ensues from a disposition in a man, by reason
of which he considers that which he hates to be contrary and hurtful to
him. Consequently, as passion is more transitory than disposition or
habit, so anger is less lasting than hatred; although hatred itself is a
passion ensuing from this disposition. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet.
ii, 4) that "hatred is more incurable than anger."
Index [<< | >>]
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Question: 46 [<< | >>]
Article: 7 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not only towards those to whom one
has an obligation of justice. For there is no justice between man and
irrational beings. And yet sometimes one is angry with irrational beings;
thus, out of anger, a writer throws away his pen, or a rider strikes his
horse. Therefore anger is not only towards those to whom one has an
obligation of justice.
Objection 2: Further, "there is no justice towards oneself . . . nor is there
justice towards one's own" (Ethic. v, 6). But sometimes a man is angry
with himself; for instance, a penitent, on account of his sin; hence it
is written (@Ps. 4:5): "Be ye angry and sin not." Therefore anger is not
only towards those with whom one has a relation of justice.
Objection 3: Further, justice and injustice can be of one man towards an
entire class, or a whole community: for instance, when the state injures
an individual. But anger is not towards a class but only towards an
individual, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 4). Therefore properly
speaking, anger is not towards those with whom one is in relation of
justice or injustice.
The contrary, however, may be gathered from the Philosopher (Rhet. ii,
2,3).
I answer that, As stated above (Article [6]), anger desires evil as being a
means of just vengeance. Consequently, anger is towards those to whom we
are just or unjust: since vengeance is an act of justice, and wrong-doing
is an act of injustice. Therefore both on the part of the cause, viz. the
harm done by another, and on the part of the vengeance sought by the
angry man, it is evident that anger concerns those to whom one is just or
unjust.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (Article [4], ad 2), anger, though it follows an
act of reason, can nevertheless be in dumb animals that are devoid of
reason, in so far as through their natural instinct they are moved by
their imagination to something like rational action. Since then in man
there is both reason and imagination, the movement of anger can be
aroused in man in two ways. First, when only his imagination denounces
the injury: and, in this way, man is aroused to a movement of anger even
against irrational and inanimate beings, which movement is like that
which occurs in animals against anything that injures them. Secondly, by
the reason denouncing the injury: and thus, according to the Philosopher
(Rhet. ii, 3), "it is impossible to be angry with insensible things, or
with the dead": both because they feel no pain, which is, above all, what
the angry man seeks in those with whom he is angry: and because there is
no question of vengeance on them, since they can do us no harm.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 11), "metaphorically
speaking there is a certain justice and injustice between a man and
himself," in so far as the reason rules the irascible and concupiscible
parts of the soul. And in this sense a man is said to be avenged on
himself, and consequently, to be angry with himself. But properly, and in
accordance with the nature of things, a man is never angry with himself.
Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 4) assigns as one difference
between hatred and anger, that "hatred may be felt towards a class, as we
hate the entire class of thieves; whereas anger is directed only towards
an individual." The reason is that hatred arises from our considering a
quality as disagreeing with our disposition; and this may refer to a
thing in general or in particular. Anger, on the other hand, ensues from
someone having injured us by his action. Now all actions are the deeds of
individuals: and consequently anger is always pointed at an individual.
When the whole state hurts us, the whole state is reckoned as one
individual [*Cf. Question [29], Article [6]].
Index [<< | >>]
First Part of the Second Part [<< | >>]
Question: 46 [<< | >>]
Article: 8 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) unsuitably
assigns three species of anger---"wrath," "ill-will" and "rancor." For no
genus derives its specific differences from accidents. But these three
are diversified in respect of an accident: because "the beginning of the
movement of anger is called wrath {cholos}, if anger continue it is
called ill-will {menis}; while rancor {kotos} is anger waiting for an
opportunity of vengeance." Therefore these are not different species of
anger.
Objection 2: Further, Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that "excandescentia [irascibility] is what the Greeks call {thymosis}, and is a kind of anger that arises and subsides intermittently"; while according to Damascene {thymosis}, is the same as the Greek {kotos} [rancor]. Therefore {kotos} does not bide its time for taking vengeance, but in course of time spends itself.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory (Moral. xxi, 4) gives three degrees of anger,
namely, "anger without utterance, anger with utterance, and anger with
perfection of speech," corresponding to the three degrees mentioned by
Our Lord (@Mt. 5:22): "Whosoever is angry with his brother" [thus implying
"anger without utterance"], and then, "whosoever shall say to his
brother, 'Raca'" [implying "anger with utterance yet without full
expression"], and lastly, "whosoever shall say 'Thou fool'" [where we
have "perfection of speech"]. Therefore Damascene's division is
imperfect, since it takes no account of utterance.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii,
16) and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.].
I answer that, The species of anger given by Damascene and Gregory of
Nyssa are taken from those things which give increase to anger. This
happens in three ways. First from facility of the movement itself, and he
calls this kind of anger {cholos} [bile] because it quickly aroused.
Secondly, on the part of the grief that causes anger, and which dwells
some time in the memory; this belongs to {menis} [ill-will] which is
derived from {menein} [to dwell]. Thirdly, on the part of that which the
angry man seeks, viz. vengeance; and this pertains to {kotos} [rancor]
which never rests until it is avenged [*Eph. 4:31: "Let all bitterness
and anger and indignation . . . be put away from you."]. Hence the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) calls some angry persons {akrocholoi}
[choleric], because they are easily angered; some he calls {pikroi}
[bitter], because they retain their anger for a long time; and some he
calls {chalepoi} [ill-tempered], because they never rest until they have
retaliated [*Cf. SS, Question [158], Article [5]].
Reply to Objection 1: All those things which give anger some kind of perfection
are not altogether accidental to anger; and consequently nothing prevents
them from causing a certain specific difference thereof.
Reply to Objection 2: Irascibility, which Cicero mentions, seems to pertain to
the first species of anger, which consists in a certain quickness of
temper, rather than to rancor [furor]. And there is no reason why the
Greek {thymosis}, which is denoted by the Latin "furor," should not
signify both quickness to anger, and firmness of purpose in being avenged.
Reply to Objection 3: These degrees are distinguished according to various
effects of anger; and not according to degrees of perfection in the very
movement of anger.